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Introduction
My semester spent studying history and archaeology in Athens, Greece in the
spring of 2015 was the first time that I, a Classical Studies and Government double major
focusing largely on Roman politics, had been brought into sustained contact with the
institutions, ideology, and political topography of Athenian democracy. Athens
immediately struck me, as it has many others, as politically exceptional in contrast to much
of the ancient and modern world. While far from the only democracy in the competitive
world of Greek city-states, or poleis, during the fifth and fourth centuries B.C.,1 Athens is
notable in comparison to its contemporaries for the breadth of its franchise, strength of
popular ideology and participatory political institutions that encouraged direct mass
participation by a diverse citizenry.2
The Athenian democracy is traditionally described as having been founded in
508/507 B.C. in part due to the reforms of the politician Cleisthenes, who instituted a series
of complex institutional reforms that ended civil conflict created in the wake of the
overthrow of aristocratic Peisistratid tyrants.3 While politics at the start of the fifth century
was still dominated by aristocratic families ruling through claims of wealth, birth ties, and
social status,4 having divided the Athenians into 139 demes, or townships, Cleisthenes
expanded the power of the masses by making citizenship for every individual dependent
on the vote of one’s fellow demesmen. In this way, he made the basic grant of political

Robinson (2011): 248 offers a list of other poleis in Classical Greece and Ionia that were
democratic during the classical period, from the early fifth to late fourth century B.C.
1

Ober (2008): 75.
Ober (1989): 74; Ath. Pol. 22.
4
Ober (1989): 70.
2
3

1

rights dependent on community vote of elite and non-elite neighbors rather than
aristocratic privilege, and based on political equality and consensus rather than deference.5
The creation of a Council of 500 that had representation from every deme—initially elected,
and later chosen by lot—was a crucial institution that eventually allowed non-elite
Athenians to participate in the yearlong part-time process of managing some of the most
important affairs of the state. The creation of ostracism—the ability for the whole populace
to exile a figure deemed dangerous to the state—and the participation of the lower classes
on juries heightened the power of non-elites and the citizen body as a whole vis-à-vis the
governing elite.6
Over time, the institutions of political consensus put in place by Cleisthenes
developed into full-fledged popular government. Property requirements were lowered and
yearlong term limits were introduced for magistracies. Eventually magistrates were
selected by lot rather than election, in order to ensure that power was not monopolized
and the experience of administration was distributed amongst the citizen body.7 The
popular assembly—open to all citizens—became the primary body where political decisions
were made, and the prominence of the navy, Athens’ development of overseas empire, and
development as a commercial center contributed to the political self-awareness and
growing strength of the landless class of thetes, who worked as sailors on Athenian
triremes, as well as lived and worked as banausic wage laborers, artisans, and craftspeople

Ober (1989): 71.
Hansen (1999): 35.
7
Hansen (1999): 52.
5
6
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in the urban city center.8 By the end of the fifth century, following Athens’ defeat in the
Peloponnesian War, civil strife, and the experience of two unsuccessful oligarchic coups,
the democracy stabilized until conquered by the Macedonians in the 320s B.C. In the fourth
century, the poorest Athenian citizens were subsidized for lost wages for attendance on the
assembly and juries. 9 Most property requirements for magistracies were non-existent or
ignored, functionally allowing Athenians of all classes to be eligible for the lottery-chosen
administrative collegial boards and magistracies.10 The failed oligarchies notwithstanding,
mass participation by non-elites was widespread and embedded in Athens’ political culture
in the fourth century B.C.11
For modern scholars, the Athenian experience raises important questions about
representation (or the lack thereof), political expertise, and civic culture, which can inform
debate and scholarship surrounding the modern phenomenon of representative liberal
democracy. Modern American democratic academics treat the question of voter turnout
and citizen participation in civic institutions as a problem to be solved.12 In the early
twenty-first century, scholars have sounded increasingly dire notes about the state of civic
participation in politics, with some noting steep declines over the last forty years not only
in voting rates—the easiest and most common act of political participation—but also
declines in interest in public affairs, current events, attendance at local government

Burke (2005): 8.
For institution of assembly pay, see Ath. Pol. 41.3 ; for jury pay in the fourth century, see Ath.
Pol. 62.2; for pay as allowing the poor to participate in public service see Markle (1985): 271.
8
9

Hansen (1999): 227.
Harris (2014): 4.
12
Saunders (2012): 306.
10
11
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meetings, and participation in political campaigns.13 Due to popular and controversial
works like Robert Putnam’s Bowling Alone, the topic of political action, individual
engagement, and civic participation has focused on the role, connections, and activity of
the individual citizen. The trope of the active citizen—someone involved in many political
and civic associations at a higher level than the norm—has become a common one in social
science and the rhetoric of contemporary political discourse.
For that reason, coming across the terms πολυπράγμων and ἀπράγμων in Athenian
literature of the democratic period can be surprising. In contrast to the modern concern of
citizens not doing enough, the πολυπράγμων could be described as the citizen who does
too much, deriving from the words πολύ (many) and πράγματα (things, deeds, affairs, or
business). On the other hand, the ἀπράγμων is the opposite—they could broadly be
described as someone who refrains from being involved in πράγματα. These terms were
actively employed in literature and political rhetoric during the fifth and fourth century in
Athens to describe certain attitudes towards citizenship just as terms such as active,
involved, apathetic, and disengaged are used in the modern day. My interest in making the
characteristics of being a πολυπράγμων, known as πολυπραγμοσύνη, the focus of this
project comes from my initial confusion as to how the figure of the overactive citizen was
treated in contemporary Athenian discourse. Whereas our modern political context seems
to popularly extol the virtues of the citizen who is politically and socially active above and

Putnam (2000): 46 offers broad (and negative) overview of declines in all these trends. See
Skocpol and Fiorina (1999): 2-20 for an overview of similar trends and a broader perspective of
scholarship in the field.
13
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beyond their peers, in literature discussing and produced by the city of Athens—a vibrant
participatory democracy—the view is decidedly mixed.
In Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War, the politician Pericles, in his famous
praise of Athenian democracy, claims that in Athens:
“ἔνι τε τοῖς αὐτοῖς οἰκείων ἅμα καὶ πολιτικῶν ἐπιμέλεια, καὶ ἑτέροις πρὸς ἔργα
τετραμμένοις τὰ πολιτικὰ μὴ ἐνδεῶς γνῶναι: μόνοι γὰρ τόν τε μηδὲν τῶνδε
μετέχοντα οὐκ ἀπράγμονα, ἀλλ᾽ ἀχρεῖον νομίζομεν…”
“You will find united in the same persons an interest at once in private and in
public affairs, and in others of us who give attention chiefly to business, you will
find no lack of insight into political matters. For we alone regard the man who takes
no part in public affairs not as one who minds his own business, but as good for
nothing”14
(Thuc. 2.40, trans. Smith)
Upon first glance, one might expect such language to be abundant in the literature and
rhetoric of a participatory political culture. However, in reviewing this quotation, the
classicist A.W. Gomme claimed that in fact, Pericles’ criticism of the ἀπράγμων was unique
amongst Athenian political rhetoric, and that “it is to be remembered that ἀπράγμων is a
complimentary term, in Athens as in elsewhere.”15 Across the board, in elite-penned texts
as well as rhetoric composed for mass audiences, the πολυπράγμων receives a negative
portrayal as a meddler, a busybody, and officious individual. On the other hand,
πολυπραγμοσύνη is also depicted as being a particularly Athenian characteristic, associated
particularly with its democratic constitution. It is a fascinating discrepancy.
Scholars of Classical Athens have investigated Athenian πολυπραγμοσύνη in some
detail, mostly from the standpoint of understanding political rhetoric and discourse.
14
15

Translations of Greek throughout this work, unless otherwise cited, are my own.
Gomme (1956): 121.

5

Ehrenberg’s oft-cited 1947 study “Polypragmosyne: A Study in Greek Politics” presented
πολυπραγμοσύνη (and its opposite, ἀπραγμοσύνη) primarily as terms used in the
contemporary debate surrounding Athens’ aggressive foreign policy stances in the fifth
and fourth centuries B.C. Largely neglecting domestic politics and social life, Ehrenberg
saw πολυπραγμοσύνη as “a people’s daring and restless optimism,” which magnified the
rapacity of Athens’ foreign policy goals during the Peloponnesian War.16 Ehrenberg treats
these characteristics as exogenous, and is less interested in probing as to how and why
such a “restless vitality” and “optimism” of Athens might have actually existed, and rather
focuses more on its expression through international politics.
On the other hand, Adkins, writing several decades later, sought to discuss “the
reasons for being said to be a busybody.”17 By approaching the subject firmly on the level of
discourse, he saw πολυπραγμοσύνη as related to the concept of “minding one’s own
business” (τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν) as a term of moral and political constraint, developing out
of older, traditional language used by aristocratic classes to keep non-elites out of the
sphere of politics and political action. Adkins’ work has informed this study by
demonstrating that the term πολυπραγμοσύνη does not appear ex nihilo from the fifth
century political ferment, but draws on far older societal conceptions of acceptable moral
and personal behavior and terms of restraint which eventually become politicized.
Finally, the most recent study on πολυπραγμοσύνη, Leigh’s From Polypragmon to
Curiosυs: Ancient Concepts of Curious and Meddlesome Behavior, provides a useful overview of
many of the term’s uses in fifth and fourth-century literary sources. Leigh’s concern
16
17

Ehrenberg (1947): 51.
Adkins (1976): 301
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(especially in his later chapters) is primarily how πολυπραγμοσύνη developed into a term
of philosophic discourse both in later Latin and Greek literature, yet his early overview
provides insight for the subject not covered by either Adkins or Ehrenberg. He notes that
terms like πολυπραγμοσύνη were “profoundly subjective terms: nobody ever saw a
polypragmon or a periergos on the streets of Athens, only someone he or others held to be as
such.”18
What began as a study of the rhetoric surrounding citizenship, personal behavior,
and conversations about meddlesomeness and “minding one’s own business” in Athens
eventually opened up larger questions into an exploration of how Athenian political
citizenship and social life came together on the street level, and the daily experience of
social interactions in Athens. I will argue in this paper that the real and non-rhetorical
behaviors of both doing many things (being an overinvolved, committed, or active citizen)
and knowing many things (being a social busybody) which inspire the negative stereotype
of the πολυπράγμων were actually important and useful behaviors to be manifested by
citizens in a democratic regime like classical Athens, where information was decentralized
and political authority was non-hierarchical.
In my first chapter, I explore the historical antecedents of the πολυπράγμων and
ἀπράγμων in Homeric and Archaic Greek literature before the birth of the Athenian
democracy in order to demonstrate that both terms arise from elite conceptions about
what is and what is not acceptable political behavior for non-elites. Such texts present
political action by non-elites as socially disruptive behavior dangerous to the aristocratic
status quo, and instead attempt to promote values of restfulness and quietude represented
18

Leigh (2013): 16.

7

by ἀπραγμοσύνη. Establishing a connection between such older phrases of social restraint
such as “minding one’s own business” (τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν) and πολυπραγμοσύνη is
important for underscoring the inherently political nature of calling someone a
πολυπράγμων in classical Athens.
In my second chapter, I explore how such elite language of social restraint and
“minding one’s own business” finds expression in the democratic literature and political
context of fifth-century Athens, as well as at the same time defining the primary
characteristics of the stereotypical πολυπράγμων. The composite πολυπράγμων appears as
an overextended democrat, restless and perpetually active, frequently participating in—
and taking advantage of—political institutions such as the law courts and the assembly,
while simultaneously investigating the details of the personal lives of their fellow citizens
in an onerous fashion. In the fifth-century sources, critiques of πολυπραγμοσύνη are tied to
critiques of the development of the Athenian democratic regime.
My third chapter first seeks to use fourth-century legal rhetoric to resolve the
contradiction between the presentation of πολυπραγμοσύνη as a particularly democratic
characteristic, and the fact that it is a negative term in popular rhetoric that appealed to
mass citizen audiences. I highlight the subjectivity of adversarial legal orations to
demonstrate that the polypragmatic behaviors of inquisitiveness and meddlesome
intrusion that litigants attempt to tar their legal opponents with are praised in other
contexts by the political orators as defining positive Athenian attributes of intelligence,
action, and patriotic duty.
I then turn to the works of Plato, who ties πολυπραγμοσύνη to his strongest
critiques of the Athenian capacity for good government. In arguing as a basic principle that

8

an individual can only do one thing well, Plato attacks not only the figure of the
πολυπράγμων but also the basic ideological principles of Athenian democracy, which
institutionally and ideologically encouraged part-time governance by individuals who were
not professionals, but instead laborers, farmers, and tradesmen. Plato’s dialogues raise
powerful questions about how individuals and political regimes gather, define, and employ
politically useful expertise and knowledge, a subject intimately connected to the inquisitive
and curious side of the πολυπράγμων. The idealized cities presented in his Republic and
Laws seek to limit and regulate the ways in which residents of all classes, citizen status, and
occupational position interacted and generated common knowledge through social ties.
Plato’s doubts about the political utility of knowledge embedded in social interactions—the
kind of knowledge that specifically animates the πολυπράγμων—leads him to therefore
limit the social conditions that allow for Athenian polypragmatic behavior.
My final chapter seeks to employ modern theories of epistemic democracy,
associational theory, and studies of the information-spreading potential of social networks
and weak ties, to push back against Plato’s claims about social knowledge’s lack of utility
for good governance and danger of πολυπραγμοσύνη to the polis. It seeks to argue that in
an environment like classical Athens, where information, expertise, and knowledge were
decentralized, dispersed and often only accessible through social relations, the individual
who acted as did a πολυπράγμων was actually at a distinct advantage vis-à-vis his fellow
citizens. Those individuals with more connections, broader associational involvement, and
who spent more time present in the common spaces of the city of Athens were more likely
to be nexuses of socially valuable information. Thus, the πολυπράγμων can be considered
as an informal mechanism—along with the institutional mechanisms of participatory

9

politics—that helps explain the ways in which Athens was able to generate and marshal
information and individual expertise effectively for use by the citizen body as a whole.
Finally, I hope to have proven that the behaviors behind πολυπραγμοσύνη were not limited
to a small group of the Athenian population but instead, were common attributes of
Athenian social life and political behavior in general.

10

Chapter One
“M inding One’s Own Business” in Hom eric and Archaic Greek Literature
The first extant occurrence of the word πολυπραγμοσύνη or its derivatives appears
in a text dating from the last quarter of the fifth century B.C. as the verb μὴ
πολυπρηγμονέειν (Hdt. 3.15.2).19 However, the scope of one’s search is widely extended if
one considers the synonyms (or antonyms) of πολυπραγμοσύνη in the dragnet.20 Scholars
have taken various formulations of πολλὰ πράσσειν to mean synonyms for meddling and
plotting21 and on the other hand, the formulation τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν is used as the
opposite of πολυπραγμονεῖν (to meddle), and a synonym for the actions of an ἀπράγμων.22
Yet, when one searches as far back as Homer, these words are not always present, and then
the task is to discover—while not projecting a more modern conception of what it means to
be meddlesome back into older texts—behaviors and attitudes that may have informed the
definitions and attitudes of the classical Athenians.
The most pertinent example of meddlesome behavior in both a social and political
sense—involving both questions of political power and class relations—can be found in
Book II of the Iliad, involving the treatment of the dissenter Thersites in front of the
Achaean assembly. At this point in the narrative, Achilles has withdrawn from battle, and
On the dating of Herodotus, see Asheri et al. (2007): 5 “We cannot even establish the year of
his death: we can only fix a terminus ante quem non: 430 B.C.” adding that “Herodotus has no
personal experience of the events of 480/79 B.C.”; Fornara (1981): 149 argues that Herodotus
had knowledge of the Archidamian War, focusing on a reference at Hdt. 9.73.3.
20
Allison (1979): 10 notably differs from other writers who seek to connect the terms in a
“family of concepts” governed by or related to the substantive πολυπραγμοσύνη. However,
19

hers is largely a minority opinion in the scholarship.
21
Ehrenberg (1947): 46.
22
Lateiner (1982): 11.
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Agamemnon, in concert with the other “greathearted leaders” decides to test the troops’
dedication by lying to them. He claims that Zeus has prophesized disaster to him, and thus
recommends that they give up the fight and return home. 23 When the πληθύς (the largely
nameless mass of common soldiers) hears, they immediately begin a stampede towards the
ships. Observing this, Odysseus performs crowd control with Agamemnon’s scepter, the
symbol of royal authority.24 Odysseus’ treatment of the each chieftain (βασιλῆα καὶ ἔξοχον
ἄνδρα, Il. 2.149) is widely different from that of each soldier (δήμου τ' ἄνδρα, Il. 2.188).
While the captains are met only with spoken rebukes, each common soldier, the δήμου
ἀνήρ, is reproved with harsher language and struck with the staff. Each man is called
cowardly and unwarlike (ἀπτόλεμος καὶ ἄναλκις, Il. 2.201-202) and is told at least
individually, that he does not count in the assembly or in war (ἐν πολέμῳ ἐναρίθμιος οὔτ'
ἐνὶ βουλῇ, Il. 2.202-203). For that reason, the correct role of the soldiers in this situation is
to sit still and listen (ἧσο καὶ ἄλλων μῦθον ἄκουε, Il. 2.200) to their superiors —those that
are better than them (φέρτεροί εἰσι, Il. 2.201). Quieted down by both Odysseus’ words and
his force, most return to the assembly and listen in orderly fashion, with the exception of
Thersites, who does the opposite.

The translation of μεγαθύμων ... γερόντων is literally “old men,” but used metaphorically
here, as elsewhere, for the princes or leaders of the Achaeans; Lattimore (2011): 94 translates as
“high-hearted princes.” While most of the time in the Iliad it seems to have the connotation of
old, sometimes when used in the plural, as at 2.204, 4.344 it seems to refer to the leaders of the
Achaeans.
24
Odysseus’s claim at Il. 2.205-6, “εἷς βασιλεύς, ᾧ ἔδωκε Κρόνου πάϊς ἀγκυλομήτεω / σκῆπτρόν
τ' ἠδὲ θέμιστας,” not only appeals to royal and monarchic authority, but also divine sanction
23

for the social-political order. Thomas (1966): 389 notes that kingship in Homer is more complex
than being grounded simply in religion as a basis, but I do argue that it is used in this sequence
and in the subsequent speeches as another way of enforcing the kings’ dominant authority.
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Thersites, who has the most detailed description of any character’s appearance in
the Iliad,25 yet appears nowhere else in the poem, has been understood as either a common
soldier, or a captain of a similar rank (albeit lower) to Odysseus and Agamemnon. Several
late poetic traditions that date to the 2nd Century A.D. or later are known to describe him as
part of the Calydonian royal house.26 Plato’s Socrates, (Pl. Gorg. 525d) however, specifically
presents him as a private man (ἰδιώτης) in contrast to kings and dynasts (βασιλέας γὰρ καὶ
δυνάστας). Plato’s contemporary Xenophon (Mem 1.2.59) argues that ancient writers and
even the accusers of Socrates more broadly believed that the Iliad passages in question
meant that “the poet approved of chastising common and poor folk.”27 In Homer Thersites
is described as a physically un-heroic and atypical figure, characterized at length as the
most ugly man who came beneath Ilion (αἴσχιστος δὲ ἀνὴρ ὑπὸ Ἴλιον ἦλθε, Il. 2.216). Often
in Greek literature, there is an assumed relationship between handsome physical
appearance and one’s social status.28 Thersites has none of the telltale signs of political

Thalmann (1988): 15.
The lost Aithiopis, which dated to the eighth or seventh centuries B.C., describes him as a
relative of Diomedes. Marks (2005): 2 cites the bT scholia to Iliad 2.212, Apollodorus’s Bibliotheke
1.7.7, and Pausanias 2.25.2 as textual evidence for this claim. While Apollodorus is dubiously
dated to the 1st century B.C. or the 2nd A.D., Pausanias wrote in the 2nd century A.D. The dating of
the scholia is difficult to determine.
25
26

In this case, Xenophon offers that comment to say that Socrates did not quote those Homeric
lines to endorse such a policy of chastising the poor, but had he quoted those lines as such, his
accusers might have thought him to hold such a view.
28
Marks (2005): 4 n. 8 states that while there are some important contrary examples, like the
Trojan Herald Dolon, “Positive correlation between physical beauty and social status is of
course the norm.”; at Od. 4.63 Menelaus comments that Telemachus and Peisistratus must be of
political nobility simply on the basis of their appearances, unaware of their parentage; also, at
27

Od. 24.242 Odysseus notes that Laertes’ kingliness is not disguised through his rags; Iros the
beggar in Od.18.2, like Thersites, is distinguished by his ugly, almost comical physical
appearance.
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nobility. He lacks any sort of patronymic,29 has no mention amongst the leaders in the
Catalog of the Ships, and is given little backstory. He is typified by exaggerated physical
appearance and personal characteristics, such as the “shrill cry” (κεκληγὼς) used to
describe his speech. His words are disorderly (ἄκοσμα) and endless (ἀμετροεπὴς).30
From the perspective of the poem’s elites, and the poem’s narrator, Thersites
directly interferes with the process of the reconstituted assembly. Whereas the trend
imposed by Agamemnon and Odysseus had been to return the assembly to orderly silence,
Thersites interrupts it with his loud voice, exaggerated characteristics, and seemingly
endless disorderly energy. He turns his shrill critiques towards Agamemnon, and even if he
is not solidly attributed to the soldiers’ class, he is at least channeling their anger. While
the mass of soldiers feels this anger in their hearts, they are silent. Thersites, however,
actually steps forward from the crowd and articulates the anger of the common soldiers.
He loudly and publicly insults Agamemnon, and exhorts the troops to return home—
recognizing implicitly that while the members of the πληθύς are not individually
comparable to the Homeric heroes as Odysseus remarked above, they are crucial for the
war effort, and have a potent political heft.31

Thalmann (1998): 75 notes that even Eurykleia, the slave of Laertes and Odysseus’ nursemaid
in the Odyssey is given a patronymic and a personal history, whereas Thersites, treated with
contempt, is not.
30
Il. 2.212-215. It is interesting that the depiction of Thersites as a speaker lines up with the
depiction of what Carter (1986): 91 calls a “demagogue” in Euripides Orestes: “he is a man with
an ‘unstoppable mouth’, impudent, persuasive, and bold.” The characterization of Thersites in
29

this passage is not unlike the demagogues that also appear in Aristophanes.
31
Raaflaub and Wallace (2007): 26: “Homer knows and assumes mass fighting by the people and
considers it crucial for the success of battle.”
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Regardless of whether Thersites is a member of the lower class, or simply
elucidating an anger that they feel, most important for this study is the realization that
“the principal objection to Thersites is his rocking of the boat, his constant urge to “quarrel
with the princes” (ἐριζέμεναι βασιλεῦσιν, Il. 2.214).32 Whether it is because of his class—that
he argues against the leaders though being far worse (οὐκ ἂν βασιλῆας ἀνὰ στόμ' ἔχων
ἀγορεύοις, Il. 2.215)—or because he argues for things that are unpleasing to Agamemnon’s
honor (τίμη) and excellence (ἀρετή), Thersites is told that the debate is none of his
business. Given the language used, he is essentially told that he is “out of order” (οὐ κατὰ
κόσμον, Il. 2.214). As Adkins notes, κόσμον is part of a broader set of terms, such as μοῖρα,
one’s fate or lot, which Homeric speakers use to describe what is correct or incorrect based
on one’s station in society.33 Due to his class, his manners, or simply the fact that he is not
Agamemnon, it is not within Thersites’ realm of competence to address the assembly, let
alone advocate for a whole change in the Greek military policy. Thersites stands and
meddles where he ought not.
Rather than a threat, or even a spokesman for the πληθύς, Thersites is presented as
neither. He is instead turned into a scapegoat for the tensions between the assembly
(which might wish to disobey Agamemnon, but does not), and the princes (who might wish

Postlethwaite (1988): 126.
Adkins (1976): 321: “What speech is or is not in accordance with kosmos and moira will be
determined by the agathoi, whose values are accepted by all the characters in the Homeric
poems: speech or behavior which the agathoi regard as being unbeautiful, unpleasing,
32
33

inappropriate will be stigmatized as not in accordance with kosmos; and where such speech
infringes the status of the agathos and slights his arête, its being not in accordance with kosmos
will override the question of its truth.”

15

to further discipline their dissenting troops, but do not).34 Thersites is comically struck by
Odysseus with the staff—the soldiers laugh even though they are grieved at heart (οἳ δὲ καὶ
ἀχνύμενοί περ ἐπ' αὐτῷ, Il. 2.270)—and after being threatened with a public flogging,
rejoins the πληθύς in anonymity. The brave braggart is turned into a frightened, helpless
wreck.35 This scene sets the pattern for later literature, where individuals seen as politically
or socially meddlesome are often treated with shame, and as comic relief.
The political and social context of the situation is important in classifying this as an
example of politically meddlesome behavior—an individual getting involved in something
that they are said to not belong in—rather than simply disobedience. If Thersites was on
the battlefield, disobeying military commands, or an outright traitor, the situation could
not function this way. Yet, the context of this interaction is the assembly. As Raaflaub and
Wallace note, assemblies are a constant feature of Homeric society.36 While the mob is
accorded a function—largely communal approbation or criticism of their leaders’
decisions—it is the basileis who are the ones entitled to regularly speak as individuals at
assemblies, and allowed to propose new courses of action.37 Even though the poem
mentions that Thersites had spoken up before to insult Achilles and Odysseus (Il. 2.216), it is
not clear that this was in the assembly, or whether it was to endorse such a drastic

Thalmann (1988): 17: “It is as a marginal comic figure that Thersites, through his defiance and
the reaction that it provokes, involuntarily performs a healing function for his society.”
35
Il. 2.268-9: ὃ δ' ἄρ' ἕζετο τάρβησέν τε / ἀλγήσας δ' ἀχρεῖον ἰδὼν ἀπομόρξατο δάκρυ, “and he
sat down again, frightened, in pain, and looking helplessly about wiped off the tear-drops”
(trans. Lattimore).
36
Raaflaub and Wallace (2007): 28.
34

Raaflaub and Wallace (2007): 28: “Only the leaders (basileis, sg. basileus) speak. The assembled
men are limited to expressing their opinion collectively by shouting approval or displeasure, or
else by voting with their feet…”
37
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difference in policy from what the basileis desired. Thersites, moreover, was operating in
the very arena in which one might question the king, or propose new plans for the
Achaeans, which makes reading the scene as disobedience less tenable. Even within that
social context, however, Odysseus’ reaction implies that he—Thersites—was not one of the
individuals entitled to do that. 38
The idea of stepping outside of one’s own proper sphere, and subsequent criticism
for it, may be in its most generalized form visible in another brief section of Homer, albeit
perhaps less in a paradigmatic situation. When Aphrodite returns to Olympus after having
been harmed by Diomedes during the fighting at Troy (Il. 5.340-1) she is told that she
should not participate in battle, as that was limited to Ares and Athena. Aphrodite
(although she has just demonstrated that she can participate in battle, Il. 5.314) is to be
limited to “the works of marriage” (Il. 5.430). On first blush, this seem to be more of a
mythological differentiation between the Olympian gods, or even a differentiation of
gender roles between the most feminine of the gods, and the two others dedicated to
different arts. However, the concept of each God doing what is proper to oneself also
accords with the saying that is attributed to Pittacus of Mytilene: “may everyone look after
his own things.”39 Asheri in turn connects these two ideas along with a third, the anecdote

Kalchas must be invited to speak at the assembly by Achilles, rather than speak up himself,
although he knows exactly why Apollo is plaguing the Achaeans (Il. 1.62). On the other hand,
even Achilles is told not to wrangle with Kings (ἐριζέμεναι βασιλῆϊ) during his dispute with
Agamemnon. However, his treatment is entirely different from that of Thersites (Il. 1.277-281),
although his language is largely the same, cf. Postlethwaite (1988): 126-134
38

Leigh (2013): 17; Pl. Prt. 343a identifies him as one of the seven sages of Greece. Asheri et al.
(2007): 82 notes that this quote is from the Palatine Anthology VII 89, and it is admittedly hard
to verify the age of such quotations. However the phrasing of the quote does appear very
39
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about Gyges, Candaules, and Candaules’ wife in the first book of the Histories. While
Herodotus’ Histories themselves are a product of the fifth century, his Gyges claims that
“men long ago invented rules” (πάλαι δὲ τὰ καλὰ ἀνθρώποισι ἐξεύρηται, Hdt. Hist. 1.8.4),
one of them being to “consider one’s own things” (σκοπέειν τινὰ τὰ ἑωυτοῦ, Hdt. Hist.
1.8.4). Gyges’ position is a complicated one because in his situation, he is being asked to
look at another man’s wife naked, and that man is his social superior. There is not only a
boundary of moral propriety, but also a social one—the fact that his own superior is
pressuring him to do it initially makes no difference, on first blush—when quoting the
proverb, Gyges refuses to transgress that line. That he eventually does so, and is caught by
Gyges’ wife, perhaps only underscores the cultural power of such an admonition, even if it
is folkloric. Breaking it invites consequences.40
The earliest extant appearance of a term directly linguistically related to the noun
ἀπραγμοσύνη or πολυπραγμοσύνη occurs in a fragment of Archilochus. A fragment notes
that, “the life of the ἀπράγμων is most suitable for the elderly, especially if they happen to
be simple in their ways, are stupid, or speak nonsense” (βίος δ᾿ ἀπράγμων τοῖς γέρουσι
συμφέρει, τύχοιεν ἁπλοῖ τοῖς τρόποις / ἢ μακκοᾶν μέλλοιεν ἢ ληρεῖν ὅλως, Archil. fr. 330,
Loeb Edition). In this sense ἀπράγμων is a synonym for a retired and reserved life, and
while not functioning exactly as an antonym of πολυπραγμοσύνη implies that for the
elderly there is a proper behavior and attitude towards life, especially public life. The
societal group of old men is praised for being retiring, withdrawn, and idle in public life,
similar to the formulation of the phrase τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν, which does become a synonym for
ἀπραγμοσύνη.
40
Leigh (2013): 17 calls this one of the antecedents of Plato’s description of πολυπραγμοσύνη in
Republic 433a-b.
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much as Thersites should be, and other groups in later literature will be blamed for their
intrusion and participation. Thus, there are those who ought be active, and those who
ought not. Although the political and social context of such a limited fragment is hard to
define, it demonstrates an early proscriptive use of ἀπραγμοσύνη. Neither something to be
blamed or praised outright, quietude is valued for a certain group of people, and
presumably not praised for others.
Another antecedent and related term to ἀπραγμοσύνη identified by both Ehrenberg
and Carter is the term ἡσυχία, which is roughly equivalent to the word quietude,
peacefulness, and tranquility.41 It is used often to denote a peaceful or restful state of mind
of an individual, as in Homer and the Homeric Hymns.42 It is used similarly by Pindar to
refer not only to a state of inner peace and harmonious quiet for the individual, but also for
the state and political community as a whole.43 In Pindar’s work, and in that of other Greek
lyric poets in the seventh and sixth centuries, tranquility of both soul and of the state is to
be desired and is praised.44 For, without it, according to Theognis, cities will be gripped by
“public ills, discord, and inter-communal violence” (Thgn. 1.43-52). In this genre of poetry
ἡσυχία is contrasted with ὕβρις—violence and ambition—and κόρος—surfeit and

Ehrenberg (1947): 46; Carter (1986): 42.
Hymn. Hom. Merc. 356, 438; Hom. Il. 21.598; Hom. Od. 18.22.
43
“Pindar becomes especially eloquent when he sings of hesychia: peace, tranquility, order, and
stability; almost any good which can befall a city may be summed up in it” (Carter (1986): 42).
44
Pindar praises ἡσυχία both as a personified characteristic, as well as an adjective of cities and
individuals: “I praise a man who is most eager / in the raising of horses / who rejoices in being
41
42

hospitable to all guests / and whose thoughts are turned towards city-loving peace” (ἐπεί νιν
αἰνέω μάλα μὲν / τροφαῖς ἑτοῖμον ἵππων, / χαίροντά τε ξενίαις πανδόκοις / καὶ πρὸς ἁσυχίαν
φιλόπολιν καθαρᾷ γνώμᾳ τετραμμένον, Pind. Ol. 4.16).
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superfluity.45 ἡσυχία as a characteristic of a city as a whole is also presented as a
complementary value to εὐνομία, a personified aristocratic “norm of good behavior”
characterized by moderation.46
Pindar’s poetry, which honored victors in the Panhellenic athletic contests, both
celebrates and reflects the values of the aristocratic social structure that provided for both
the funding and training of the athletic victors.47 Much like the Homeric admonition to act
in accordance with one’s lot or station (κατὰ κόσμον), Pindar’s work justifies an existing
aristocratic ruling order and mindset. When he heaps praises on ἡσυχία and advocates for
quiet in the city, it is because the opposite—violence and stasis—threatens that wellmaintained social order of peace and obedience to laws represented by εὐνομία.48 In some
ways, promoting quietude—stillness, quiet and calm in an individual or place—can be seen
as promoting quietism—acceptance of things as they are. Again, in this case, the praise of
quietude does not apply equally to those who live in the city and those who rule it. In
Pindar’s Pythian 4, he praises the youth who has learned both to hate ὕβρις and to not strive
against the nobles (ἔμαθε δ᾿ ὑβρίζοντα μισεῖν ... οὐκ ἐρίζων ἀντία τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, Pind. Pyth.
4.284-285).49 The probable commissioner of this poem, Damophilius, has been exiled from
Cyrene, and in reference to his own situation, Pindar makes the violence of ὕβρις—
previously criticized in the city writ large—explicitly political, as part of a plea to revoke
Carter (1986): 43.
Carter (1986): 43.
47
Burnett (1987): 434; Stoneman (2014): 6.
48
Andrewes (1938): 89: Εὐνομία is “the noun of εὔνομος and εὐνομοῦμαι, meaning discipline and
good order: a condition in which the citizens obey the law, not a condition of the state in which
45
46

the laws are good.”
49
Adkins (1976): 322 sees this as reflecting a general sentiment, and “would serve to convict of
hubris any social inferior who endeavored to assert his rights against an agathos.”
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his exile.50 Damophilius has learned his lesson to not strive against those who are better
than he, in this case, the rulers of Cyrene. However, this type of ἡσυχία is not unqualifiedly
praised, especially for the leaders of the city. Often, they must be active and engaged, not
delaying accomplishments, and prepared to seize the moment when opportunity is given
(οὐδὲ μακύνων τέλος οὐδέν, ὁ γὰρ καιρὸς / πρὸς ἀνθρώπων βραχὺ μέτρον ἔχει, Pind. Ol.
4.285-6). Pindar is praising noble, politically involved, and actively athletic young men, and
his calls for ἡσυχία on behalf of the city are not the same as asking those in power to be
ἀπράγμων.
Pindar, as might be rightly noted, is not an author who writes on particularly
democratic or Athenian themes. Pindar was born around 520 B.C. and resided for much of
his life in Thebes, which remained solidly oligarchic while the Athenians changed their
constitution to a more democratic one in 508/507 B.C.51 Wade-Gery argued that the values
espoused in Pindar’s poems, while aristocratic, were also the values of Greek elites
internationally.52 Aristocratic Athenian families, who belonged in the same social class and
strata as the ruling classes in other Greek poleis even as their own city turned towards
democratic government, also commissioned Pindar’s work.53 Ober argues that such values
were part of a “generalized ‘panhellenic’ aristocratic ideology,” that existed during the
archaic period, coinciding with aristocratic and elite rule in many Greek cities.54 As WadeGery argues, such values could be found amongst aristocratic Athenian families even down

50
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Race (1997): 264.
Hansen and Nielsen (2004): 455.

Wade-Gery (1932): 210.
E.g. Pythian 7, as per Stoneman (2014): 23.
54
Ober (1989): 312.
52
53
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to the eve of the Peloponnesian war, seeing a direct personal tie between Pindar and the
family of Thucydides, son of Melesias, the aristocratic rival of Pericles in Athenian
politics.55
However, even if the values of ἡσυχία and εὐνομία, along with the social class that
supported them, existed at Athens into the democratic period, it should still be noted that
most of the cities Pindar describes as containing the laudatory characteristics of ἡσυχία
and εὐνομία are Dorian cities that are in many ways very different from Athens. Thebes,
Opous, and Corinth, which are praised both for their values of internal peace, unity, and
concord, were all oligarchies at the time, while tyrants governed Aegina and Cyrene.56
Sparta is described by in similar terms by Herodotus (Hist. 1.65) as also experiencing
εὐνομία, for which it became the example par excellence. While there is a limit to how far
Pindar’s values of quietude and a stable and aristocratic social order may be extended to an
Athenian context, nonetheless they cannot be discounted for this study. In fact, the image
of the peaceful, quiet, and well-ordered Dorian polity emerges as a foil and contrast to that
of the Athenians.
Yet, even the political discourse of Archaic Athens parallels some of the values
found in Pindar. Under the period of aristocratic and elite rule before the Peisistratids and
later the establishment of the democracy, the “generalized ‘panhellenic’ aristocratic
ideology” mentioned by Ober found its own expression in the Athenian context. The sixth
century lawgiver of Athens Solon appeals to similar values in a poetic fragment, part of a

Wade-Gery (1932): 210.
Carter (1986): 44, citing evidence for Thebes in Pind. Pae 1.10; Corinth Ol. 13.6; Cyrene Pyth.
5.67; Aegina Isthm. 5.22.
55
56
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larger work justifying and explaining his reorganization of the constitution of Athens in
the 590s. He describes his political and economic reforms and education of the Athenians as
bringing “lawfulness” to the city.57 In the face of violence and turmoil in the city of Athens
between elites and non-elites, Solon’s most famous reforms—specifically his abolition of
enslavement for debt and opening of the highest political offices on the basis of wealth,
rather than solely birth—were in the interest of reducing tensions between elites as well as
between the rulers and the poorer populace.58 By abolishing debt-bondage, as well as offering
the lowest classes minimal rights in the courts and assembly, a firm delineation was made
between slave and citizen, ensuring that the lower classes were more endeared towards the
upper classes. On the other hand, the governing aristocrats, by co-opting those who were
rich but not wellborn into the apparatus of government, allowed the new elite of weath to
partake in ruling rather than side with the lower classes against the existing elite order.59 It
was a policy geared towards εὐνομία and in consonance with the values embodied by ἡσυχία
in the lyric poets, which sought to protect the stability of the aristocratic order by redefining,
or perhaps for the first time actually defining, the rights and privileges of different groups in
Athenian society.
Another fragment of Solon’s sheds more light on the relationship of quiet lawfulness
to the values of κόρος (surfeit) and ὕβρις that Pindar’s lyric work decries:
δῆμος δ᾿ ὧδ᾿ ἂν ἄριστα σὺν ἡγεμόνεσσιν ἕποιτο,
μήτε λίην ἀνεθεὶς μήτε βιαζόμενος·
τίκτει γὰρ κόρος ὕβριν, ὅταν πολὺς ὄλβος ἕπηται
57

Solon fr. 4, ln. 32.

Ober (1989): 63; Ath. Pol. 6.1 for the abolition of debt-bondage, Ath. Pol. 7-8 for the opening of
offices based on criteria of wealth.
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Ober (1989): 62-63.
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ἀνθρώποις ὁπόσοις μὴ νόος ἄρτιος ᾖ.
“And in this way the masses would best follow their leaders,
if they are neither given too much freedom nor subjected to too much
restraint.
For excess breeds insolence, whenever
great prosperity comes to men who are not sound of mind.”
(Solon, fr. 6, trans. Gerber)

Solon’s fragment here is revealing because it includes both the Pindaric and lyric
conception of κόρος and ὕβρις in the context of early Athenian domestic politics. The
δῆμος ought follow their leaders, being less sound or suitable (ἄρτιος) than the elites are.
Desiring for more freedom than one is entitled to, a form of κόρος, makes one more likely
to commit ὕβρις, and led to the violence that Solon’s reforms sought to cure in the first
place.60 Solon himself claimed that he did not give the demos more than they deserved, nor
did he harm them unduly.61 The implication here is that to not follow the leaders of the
people is to lead to the violence and disorder of ὕβρις, which had been opposed to εὐνομία
and ἡσυχία in Pindar’s poetry. Such language firmly reinforces a particular social order—
the leaders are to lead, the rest of the citizens, although more enfranchised than
previously, are to be led. Again, an emergent dynamic is clear. In certain poetry of the
Archaic and early classical period, the concepts of quietude on behalf of a city are also
equated with an understanding and acceptance of elite political authority. In Pindar and
Solon at least ὕβρις, either by other elites or especially by the masses, involves disrupting
that acceptance.
Solon fr. 4, ln. 32-35: εὐνομία “τραχέα λειαίνει, παύει κόρον, ὕβριν ἀμαυροῖ”, “makes the
rough smooth, stops excess, and weakens hubris.”
61
Ath. Pol. 12.1.
60
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In Herodotus one sees a conflation between the negative political and social
implications of terms such as πολυπραγμοσύνη and ὕβρις. Herodotus uses the term
πολυπραγμοσύνη as he describes the revolt of the formerly deposed Egyptian king,
Psammenitus, against the Persian King Cambyses, who had been keeping him at the Persian
court since his deposition. Herodotus writes that due to Persian traditions about reenthroning rulers as client kings, Psammenitus might have retained his position “had he
known not to meddle” (εἰ δὲ καὶ ἠπιστήθη μὴ πολυπρηγμονέειν, Hdt. 3.15.2). In this case
the meaning of πολυπρηγμονέειν is somewhat similar to intriguing, or plotting, and is
depicted negatively. Herodotus is less interested in proscribing a social value than in
analyzing a historical situation—he seems to be employing language rather than using it to
shape it into a form of discourse. He seems to be saying that had Psammenitus been an
ἀπράγων in this situation his position would have been secure. Yet Herodotus also labels a
similar situation, a revolt by the Egyptians under the subsequent king Darius, not as
πολυπραγμοσύνη but as an act of ὕβρις.62 In this way, πολυπραγμοσύνη is also co-opted into
the emergent axis of values both describing and proscribing different types of social
behavior. Additionally, a similar reference in Herodotus involves ἡσυχία. When Herodotus
describes the Spartan desire to go to war with their neighbors, the Arcadians, in an early
Adkins (1976): 323 argues that the use of πολυπραγμοσύνη rather than hubris in the
democratic period reflects a secularization of religious beliefs reflected in language, arguing
that elites begin to use the term πολυπραγμοσύνη because those individuals they wish to
constrain no longer hold the religious beliefs associated with hubris that would render it a
potent word of restraint. My only comment, which might not negate this view but complicate
it, would be the fact that by the fifth and fourth centuries, a law against acts of hubris had been
established and was considered a particularly democratic law. If what Adkins says is correct, it
62

is possible that the language of wanton violence as dangerous to the community had been
appropriated by democratic ideology to refer to the upper classes instead. Cf. Murray (1990):
139.
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part of the Histories, he says that the Spartans “were no longer eager to keep quiet” (οὐκέτι
ἀπέχρα ἡσυχίην ἄγειν, 1.66.1). Such activity on the part of Sparta is later called τῶν
Σπαρτιητέων τὴν πλεονεξίην, with πλεονεξία sharing significance with both ὕβρις and
κόρος.63
In presenting these examples from Homer, the lyric poets, and Herodotus, I have
sought to demonstrate and define a family of linguistic terms that relate to how Greek
elites (largely the readers and writers of texts in the pre-classical period) talked about the
relationship between minding one’s own things, or business, and appropriate social and
political behavior. While the terms ἀπράγμων and πολυπράγμων largely do not appear in
discourse until the fifth century B.C., praises and criticisms of what those ideas represent
are present through other ideas and values. On the one hand the praises of ἡσυχία and
εὐνομία are equated with a tranquil, retired, and politically quietist and orderly populace
in the face of the established ruling classes. On the other hand, disruption of the given
social and political order is presented as violent ὕβρις, exemplified in the abstract by
Solon’s poetry and Pindar’s work but given a full form in Homer’s Thersites sequence. Both
usages attest to existing elite attitudes towards behaviors that later become praised or
blamed as πολυπραγμοσύνη and ἀπραγμοσύνη. Herodotus’s equation of the term to
πολυπρηγμονέειν with committing an act of ὕβρις implies that by the fifth century, one
does not go too far in categorizing such acts of social disruption as related to busybodiness,
or political meddling, in a negative sense. Thus, two emergent axes can be seen:
πολυπραγμοσύνη—πολλὰ πράττειν—ὕβρις and ἀπραγμοσύνη—τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν—ἡσυχία.
Given the relative paucity of our sources in the classical period, these axes of values, and
63

Ehrenberg (1947): 46.
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the broader ideas that they portray, are necessary for understanding the full implications
of naming somebody an ἀπράγμων or πολυπράγμων in democratic Athens.
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Chapter Two
Being a Busybody in Fifth-Century Athens
By the time that the term πολυπράγμων and its derivatives first appear in extant
literature, the world of democratic Athens is far different from that of the Homeric basileus
or the aristocratically ordered cities of the late Archaic period.64 Athenian elites continued
to leverage their family ties, wealth, and status to be the chief policymakers and leaders of
the polis, but they were operating in an increasingly democratic context.65 Reforms, spurred
on both by exogenous events such as the increase of the power of the landless thetes after
the naval victory at Salamis, as well as by competition amongst elites themselves slowly
created a situation in which, by the 430s, major policy decisions were now made by mass
bodies of the citizenry.66
Conversations amongst elites in Athens about types of citizenship, appropriate
political behavior, and the correct deference—or lack thereof—to political leaders were
occurring in a context where non-elites now had the ability to participate in the political
processes of the polis as individuals. Unlike in archaic cities, where the power of the lower
classes could only be expressed through mass action, in democratic Athens, the regular
citizen, whether an urban worker in the city, or a peasant farmer in living in the
countryside of Attica, had certain political rights (and obligations) that enabled him to
participate directly in decision-making processes. Such opportunities included the Council
of 500, which was chosen by lot, and required approximately three-fourths of the council

Asheri et al. (2007): 3.
Ober (1989): 85.
66
Ober (1989): 83-85.
64
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members to be new each year, meaning that a high percentage of the Athenian population
had to serve on the council for the system to work.67 Additionally, under the Athenian
democracy of the fifth and fourth centuries B.C., any citizen, regardless of wealth or social
status, had the right to bring a case to the popular courts to prosecute a wrongdoer on
public charges.68 This was not only considered a crucial right of the democracy, but also
was seen as providing another check on elite citizens by less powerful ones. Importantly, it
was viewed as a particularly democratic right. It was also necessary for the structure of the
polis to function since Athens had no public prosecutor. Law-breakers had to be voluntarily
prosecuted by their fellow citizens.69
Given that the Athenian demos legitimately wielded power that could restrict the
powers of elite citizens, it seems that elite conversations and the promotion of certain
norms of political participation had to be more nuanced. If critiques were to be made
publicly to mass audiences, they often had to be framed as constructive criticisms—not
negating the premises of the democracy—or as promoting a different type of democratic
citizenship altogether.70

67

Hansen (1985): 57. Hansen is primarily concerned with the fourth century, where epigraphic

lists of council-members are more readily available. Hansen argues that that century, the total
population of Attica was around 30,000 people. Therefore the rotation of the council members
and bans on serving more than twice would have meant more than 50% of the population
would have taken part in the council—the agenda-setting body of the democracy—during their
own lifetime. In the fifth century, where the population was larger and our data is scarcer,
presumably that percentage would most likely have been lower, but still significant.
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It is perhaps in such a context that a term like πολυπράγμων comes into use as a
proscriptive term. While its genesis might have been connected to the term ὕβρις, it carries
fewer semi-religious and violent overtones. It is a more moderate word employed to
critique what was rapidly becoming the dominant political ideology.71 Within the
democracy, telling someone to mind their own business, or implying that it is not proper
for them to act in a given political realm, was a way of delineating specific social lines that
ought not be crossed, even when the institutional basis for those lines no longer existed.
I would assert, then, that one may construct a basic set of categories as to how the
terms πολυπράγμων and ἀπράγμων (and the synonymous concepts that they represent)
are used to promote or proscribe certain behavior in fifth-century Athens. The first
category is the criticism of the πολυπράγμων, the second is the praise of the ἀπράγμων,
and the third is the criticism of the ἀπράγμων. The obviously missing final category in this
scheme, the praise of the politically busy and nosy citizen, will be pursued and investigated
further at length in subsequent chapters of this work.
It is true that not all social behavior which was described as meddlesome in
classical Athens in the fifth century sources was necessarily and explicitly political. In
Aristophanes’ Peace, the protagonist Trygaeus drives off a poor soothsayer who attempts to
join his feast uninvited by saying that, “you’re certainly nosy, whoever you are.” (πολλὰ
πράττεις, ὅστις εἶ, Ar. Pax, 1058). Another example relating to both the household and
private relationships is the example of the Chorus of Women of Troezen in Euripides’

Ober (1998): 40 argues that by the late fifth-century, “‘The many’ gained control of the public
language employed in political deliberations, and so the primary context for felicitous speech
performance in Athens was defined by popular, not elite, ideology.”
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Hippolytus, who declare—upon being asked whether they should enter the Queen’s home
and remove her from her suicide noose—“to meddle is not the safe course in life” (τὸ πολλὰ
πράσσειν οὐκ ἐν ἀσφαλεῖ βίου, Eur. Hip. 785). Yet in that case, as in another example in
Aristophanes’ Frogs, meddling is associated with disobeying one’s master.72 The question of
meddling and authority also can be found in Herodotus’s story of Aristagoras and
Megabates.73 A fragment of Pherecrates, writing slightly earlier than Aristophanes, from
440-410 B.C.,74 although delightfully vague on the exact situation, involves a character
telling those who think themselves clever that they shouldn’t act the busybody
(δοκησιδεξίων ... μὴ πολυπραγμόνει, Pherec. fr. 163). Interestingly enough, the adjectives
and synonyms of clever sometimes have negative implications in the context of Athenian
politics, often being associated with rhetoric or unfair linguistic or intellectual cunning.75
This fragment seems to imply a relationship with those intellectual qualities of curiousness
and being a meddler that will become more evident in later Athenian literature.
The association of cleverness with meddling in contrast to simple or
unsophisticated speech continues in a comic fragment from Eupolis, a contemporary of
Aristophanes, which states that a character “is not really a πολυπράγμων, but rather
simple.” (οὐ γὰρ πολυπράγμων ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ἁπλήγιος, Eup. Fr. 238).76 In this case, the

Ar. Ran. 748-9. Ξανθιας: τί δὲ πολλὰ πράττων; / Οἰκέτης: ὡς μὰ Δί᾿ οὐδὲν οἶδ᾿ ἐγώ, “Xanthias:
and what about meddling? / Slave: By Zeus, I don’t know anything else.”
73
Cf. in Hdt. 5.33.1-4, Aristagoras and Megabates argue over who has authority in their given
situation. Aristagoras, claiming that Megabates was sent by the Persian King to obey his orders,
asks him “τί πολλὰ πρήσσεις”; “why do you meddle?”
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Storey (2011): 410.
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In Pl. Ap. 17b Socrates defends himself against charges that he is δεινός, clever or skillful in
speaking, to name one case.
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Storey (2011): 225-26.
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πολυπράγμων is contrasted to the ἁπλήγιος, which also means “clad in a single garment,”
perhaps signifying social status or financial means. It is also a synonym for the
metaphorical ἁπλόος, which can mean simple, plain, or simple minded. That sophistication
and intelligence of a negative quality is associated with the individual πολυπράγμων is a
theme directly mirrored in Aristophanes’ works, which are some of the best fifth-century
examples for criticisms of the πολυπράγμων.
The πολυπράγμων, especially as found in Aristophanes, is a product of the urban
polis—he spends his time close to the agora, the assembly, and the law courts (the central
political centers of urban Athens). In Aristophanes, characters labeled as πολυπράγμων or
exhibiting πολυπραγμοσύνη are most often associated with the stock character of the
sycophant. In Athenian comedy and court oratory, the sycophant was seen as someone
who abused the rights given to citizens under the Athenian legal system, and imposed
onerous litigation on their fellow citizens.77 If πολυπράγμων can be considered a mildly
negative term, being labeled a sycophant in discourse was entirely negative.78 In Athenian
literature abuse of the right to prosecute includes the motivation of making money off of
lawsuits, either through outright extortion (for real charges)79 or through bringing false
charges.80 The sycophant is in particular a product of the city because he (in many
depictions) attempts to live off of the earnings of his extortions and his lawsuits,81

Harvey (1990): 103.
Harvey (1990): 108-109 has a quite impressive listing of many of the negative terms to
describe the sycophant and the locations that they appear in Greek literature.
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Harvey (1990): 110.
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Harvey (1990): 112.
Osborne (1990): 86. “…It seems to have become standard to allege sycophancy in any case
where a poor man was involved as plaintiff.”
80
81

32

something only possible if one’s residence is near the agora and the courts. In
Aristophanes’ Acharnians, when the protagonist Dikaeopolis sets up his own reformed agora
in the countryside, he specifically bans sycophants from its premises.82 The sycophant in
Aristophanes is important as a critique of πολυπραγμοσύνη because it is most often an
example of a contested discourse about civic duty and participation.
In Aristophanes, while most of the sycophants (all of whom are introduced as
sycophants, thus leaving the audience little room for doubt) are given short shrift and
either thrashed or comically run off stage, they do however offer a vision of their role as
democratic citizens in which being πολυπράγμων is a positive characteristic.83 In
Aristophanes, the sycophantic characters make the claim that being meddlesome is
actually part and parcel of being a good citizen. The sycophant in Aristophanes’ Wealth
(facing off against the “just man” Dikaos) says that he is in fact a “useful and good citizen,
as well as a patriotic one.”84 The fact that the sycophant claims he is χρηστός was most
notably used for comic effect, as χρηστός was a term most often applied by the aristocratic
Athenian elite to themselves.85 Later, as the sycophant is being thrashed off stage, he is
called the opposite of χρηστός, “a vile champion” (πονηρόν γ᾿ ἆρα προστάτην). πονηρός was
a term often used in opposition to χρηστός, and was often applied to political leaders in the
Ar. Ach. 725-727.
Adkins (1976): 309: “This is of course, character assassination rather than portrayal, as befits a
comedy. To introduce anyone as ‘sycophant’ already prejudges the question of the
respectability of his activities…”
84
Ar. Plut. 901-902.
85
Ober (1989): 251: “The Athenian aristocrat was differentiated from, and might be perceived to
be better than, the non-aristocrat because he was thought to have inherited from his ancestors
82
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certain desirable traits—especially the trait of being noble and good (agathos) and physically
beautiful (kalos)—and because he acted differently from other men.” Ober notes that chrestoi is
one of the many words used to describe this group.
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late fifth century like Hyperbolus (by their elite rivals), who might have in reality been
wealthy, but also lacked elite attributes, and were comically presented by critics as base,
poor, and slavish. Their political style is particularly seen as serving as unelected speakers,
allotted councilmembers, and volunteer prosecutors.86 Therefore, a connection is not only
made with a class distinction, but a type of politics that was very different from the elite
modes of gaining political power.
Crucial to the conception of this sycophant’s political role is being a busybody. The
rest of the sequence is worth quoting:
ΔΙ: πῶς οὖν διέζης ἢ πόθεν μηδὲν ποιῶν;
ΣΥ: τῶν τῆς πόλεώς εἰμ᾿ ἐπιμελητὴς πραγμάτων καὶ τῶν ἰδίων πάντων.
ΔΙ: σύ; τί μαθών;
ΣΥ: βούλομαι.
ΔΙ: πῶς οὖν ἂν εἴης χρηστός, ὦ τοιχωρύχε, εἴ σοι προσῆκον μηδὲν εἶτ᾿ ἀπεχθάνει;
ΣΥ: οὐ γὰρ προσήκει τὴν ἐμαυτοῦ μοι πόλιν
εὐεργετεῖν, ὦ κέπφε, καθ᾿ ὅσον ἂν σθένω;
ΔΙ: εὐεργετεῖν οὖν ἐστι τὸ πολυπραγμονεῖν;
ΣΥ: τὸ μὲν οὖν βοηθεῖν τοῖς νόμοις τοῖς κειμένοις
καὶ μὴ ᾿πιτρέπειν ἐάν τις ἐξαμαρτάνῃ.
ΔΙ: οὔκουν δικαστὰς ἐξεπίτηδες ἡ πόλις ἄρχειν καθίστησιν;
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ΣΥ: κατηγορεῖ δὲ τίς;
ΔΙ: ὁ βουλόμενος.
ΣΥ: οὔκουν ἐκεῖνός εἰμ᾿ ἐγώ; ὥστ᾿ εἰς ἔμ᾿ ἥκει τῆς πόλεως τὰ πράγματα.
ΔΙ: νὴ Δία, πονηρόν γ᾿ ἆρα προστάτην ἔχει.
ἐκεῖνο δ᾿ οὐ βούλοι᾿ ἄν, ἡσυχίαν ἔχων ζῆν ἀργός;
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ΣΥ: ἀλλὰ προβατίου βίον λέγεις,
εἰ μὴ φανεῖται διατριβή τις τῷ βίῳ.
(Ar. Plut. 906-925)
Rosenbloom (2004): 61. “Leaders marked poneros perform speaking roles that require
knowledge of political and legal procedure, but they lack traditional elite attributes; they serve
86

as un-elected rhetores and allotted bouleutai. They intensify political competition by
representing the demos when they prosecute graphai and charges arising from euthynai, styling
themselves ‘friends of the people’ (φιλόδημοι) and defenders of democracy.”

34

The sycophant notes that his employment (referencing the monetary motivation
behind sycophancy) is to be the “manager of all private and public affairs” (907), and when
asked as to how he has that right, he claims, “βούλομαι” (909), referencing, of course, the
nomenclature for the right to bring cases to juries, as well as for initiating other citizen
action, that of “ho boulomenos.” He calls his actions of bringing cases to uphold the established
laws (βοηθεῖν τοῖς νόμοις τοῖς κειμένοις) to be a benefaction to the city (εὐεργετεῖν).
Interesting enough, the sycophant’s enemy, the “just man,” does not argue with the
sycophant’s legal right to engage in political action as a boulomenos (919) in theory.87 He
instead decries the nature in which it is done, calling such actions as “πολυπραγμονεῖν”
(913), or “to meddle.” The sycophant is told by Dikaos that the matters of the city “τῶν τῆς
πόλεώς” and private life “τῶν ἰδίων πάντων” are not his business or concern “εἴ σοι
προσῆκον μηδὲν” (910), meaning they are not fitting for him to do, because of his vile
character, rather than being specifically illegal. In fact, he is well within his citizen rights.88
The conversation goes on to use more language that fits on the πολυπράγμων-ἀπράγμων
axis. When Dikaos asks, why can’t you keep quiet and live an idle life (ἡσυχίαν ἔχων ζῆν
ἀργός)—here again ἡσυχία is opposed to activity, in this case explicitly political—he responds
that such a life would be living like a sheep (προβατίου βίον, 921-922). Before being
humiliated and pushed off stage, the sycophant makes one more claim that appears
preposterous in this context, but it also gives a sense of why the πολυπράγμων might justify
Sommerstein (2001): 194 notes that “the Informer is allowed to present an argument which
has considerable prima facie plausibility and which his antagonists do not refute but merely
87

ignore, as if instinct rather than reason assured them it must be wrong.”
88
Sommerstein (2001): 194: “It was a completely sound argument (since no one envisaged the
alternative of creating a state prosecution service).”
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bringing his cases forward, saying that the god Wealth is “guilty of attempting to subvert
the democracy, acting on his own authority” (945).
The πολυπράγμων presented as justifying his meddling actions by appealing to
patriotism and duty is featured elsewhere in Aristophanes. In the Acharnians, a sycophant
has somehow arrived at Dikaeopolis’ newly instituted agora, and attempts to denounce as
contraband a Megaran and his goods. Dikaeopolis drives him out, but not before the
sycophant cries, “may I not denounce our enemies?” (οὐ γὰρ φανῶ τοὺς πολεμίους; Ar. Ach.
827). The sycophant makes a patriotic appeal, but Dikaeopolis dismisses him, saying that he
will bear the consequences of such meddling rather than the Megaran (πολυπραγμοσύνη
νῦν ἐς κεφαλὴν τράποιτ᾽ ἐμοί, Ar. Ach. 836). Leigh sums up the situation insightfully when
stating, “the active citizen constantly runs the risk of being dismissed not as a patriot but
as a busybody.”89
Such a perception seems equally present in the Old Oligarch’s mention of
πολυπραγμοσύνη in politics. This anonymous elite writer who authored a pamphlet,
possibly between the 430s and 410s, deeply critical of Athenian democracy, complains that
it is always the wealthy and well born (πλούσιος ἢ γενναῖος) that are demonized in
comedy.90 He argues that rarely are “the poor or members of the masses” (τῶν πενήτων καὶ
τῶν δημοτικῶν) comedized91 except for when they have been “meddling in others’ affairs,
or trying to rise above their position,” so people feel no problem with them being abused by

Leigh (2013): 24.
Osborne (2004): 9.
91
Adkins (1976): 307 uses this as a translation of κωμῳδέω, satirize, or make fun of someone.
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the poets (μὴ διὰ πολυπραγμοσύνην καὶ διὰ τὸ ζητεῖν πλέον τι ἔχειν τοῦ δήμου).92 The Old
Oligarch seems to assume that the leaders of the demos satirized in comedy try to seek to
have more than the demos (ζητεῖν πλέον τι ἔχειν).93 Such language implies that there is a
specific sphere that both the demos and the men who get above it should be participating in.
In the Old Oligarch’s telling, to emerge from that mass by exercising certain citizen rights,
even if one claims to be arguing for the good of that larger body, is to expose oneself to
claims that one is being meddlesome, or even worse, trying to infringe on the populace of
mass citizens that they claim to speak to.
The situation that the Old Oligarch sets up seems to be directly related to, and
possibly even to explain the dynamics of the Thersites sequence that appeared in Homer.
Aristophanes’ plays, like the Homeric text, both vilify the meddling character, the disruptive
influence and individual who steps out of the anonymous mass, but also still allow his voice
to be heard. Thalmann sees the Iliad and Odyssey as ideological tools of an aristocratic elite,
composed during the development of the polis, and serving to legitimize their hold on power
(having replaced the basileis, yet still dominating the lower classes) by presenting an idealized
vision of the heroic hierarchy.94 These poems did so, however, even while being performed to

Ps.-Xen. Ath.Pol. 2.18.
Adkins (1976): 310: “Dicaeus and Aristophanes, and the Old Oligarch, contrive to give the
impression that such polupragmones and “sycophants” were drawn exclusively from the poorer
citizens of Athens, and that other members of the demos disapproved so much of their activities
that they would have tolerated their being “comedized” by the comic poets.”
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Thalmann (1998): 275; Powell (2007): 59 says “Most scholars now agree that Homer’s world,
while embodying artifacts from earlier times, from the Bronze Age and the Iron Age, is mostly
the world of his own day, the early Archaic Period of the eight century B.C.”
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audiences that were socioeconomically and ideologically diverse. 95 Perhaps there were those
who might sympathize with the claims Thersites makes, were he not presented as such a
vilified character. In fact, by giving Thersites his chance to speak while making him as
comedically grotesque to the audience as possible, Thersites is distanced from the soldiers on
whose behalf he is arguing. The theatre audience in Athens was similarly socioeconomically
diverse, and although mass theater is a democratic institution, plays were also produced by
and written by elite writers.96 Therefore, the same ideological contestation might be at play.97
Much like Thersites is “comedized,” and the class critic of the Homeric power structure is
made into a comic scapegoat, and his criticisms negated by being distanced from the body
that he claims to represent, so is the figure of the πολυπράγμων and sycophant in
Aristophanic comedy. Presenting those who exercise certain democratic rights and claim
to be working in the interests of the democracy as both separate from and even
detrimental to the rest of the democratic community is a form of scapegoating in its own
way. Matthew Christ argues that in Aristophanes’ sequences, the “process of intrusion and
expulsion diminishes the status of the sycophant as outsider that must be shunned.”98 By

Thalmann (1988): 27-28: “early Greek epic was publicly performed and thus occupied a
central position in its society”; Scodel (2009): 176 agrees, saying “The evidence tells strongly
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against such a restriction of the audience, although the presence of bards at elite feasts
certainly implies that some people had more opportunity than others to enjoy epic
performances.”
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Roselli (2011): 9.
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Ober (1989): 152 argues that Athenian theater reflected ideological contestation in other
respects, saying, “Athenian theatrical performance was closely bound up in the attempt to
resolve the contradictory social values of intense competition and political unity.”
Christ (1998): 53. Christ also argues on 48, “Sycophancy constituted a negative social category,
founded upon the notion that the Athenian society consisted of insiders and outsiders and that
it was critical for Athenians to distinguish sharply between these.”
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associating the actions of a meddler or a sycophant as being like those of an outsider, in a
way, elites are able to distance what is a democratic institutional function of society that is
particularly dangerous to them—the man who dares to stand up and speak truth to power—
and discourage it by presenting it as being harmful to the democratic community as a
whole.99
Another way such language dissuading political meddlesomeness functions is to
praise the individual who is ἀπράγμων, or ἥσυχος, or minds their own things, τὰ ἑαυτοῦ
πραττείν. There are crucial passages in Euripides, Thucydides, and again Aristophanes
that—in contrast to the (largely satirized) claims of the πολυπράγμονες—present
ἀπραγμοσύνη instead as the political value that is to be promoted and esteemed amongst
the citizenry. In particular, praise of the peasant farmer as the ideal type of democratic
citizen mirrors the attitude towards urban politics and regular political participation which
accords with the critiques of the πολυπράγμων lain out above.100
Thucydides states that at the start of the Peloponnesian War, the majority of the
citizens in Athens and Attica were still living in the countryside, and were forced to enter
the walls of the city when the Peloponnesians invaded Attica.101 The majority of these
would have been autorgoi, a term meaning “those who work their own land.”102 These

Osborne (1990): 94-95 argues that despite the rhetoric that surrounded the sycophant, the
volunteer prosecutor who acted in a vexatious way was crucial for the functioning of the
democracy. I am not yet engaging that claim here, but I will seek to do so later on in this work.
100
A second theme, which I will not touch on here, but return to when discussing
πολυπραγμοσύνη in Plato’s writing, is the development of the figure of the contemplative or
philosophic ἀπράγμων, and the critiques and praises of their behavior in Plato, Euripides, and
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the court orators.
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Thuc. 2.16.1.
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autorgoi would have had little leisure and little capital, and therefore, little time or
economic incentive to come into the city regularly.103 These autorgoi were often presented,
in idealized and dramatic form, in the theatrical plays of Athens’ festivals. Aristophanes’
pro-peace plays featured protagonists that are (or were originally) rural residents, and
mostly autorgoi.104 Many of them, as has been mentioned above, are the enemies of the
sycophants and meddlers when in the city, or when such urban characters intrude into the
countryside. In Aristophanes’ Peace, Tyrgaeus announces himself as a rural demesman, a
vinedresser, and neither a sycophant nor a lover of (urban) affairs (ἐραστὴς πραγμάτων, Ar.
Pax 190). In the Knights, the Sausage-Seller identifies the greatest desires of the character
Demos to be to return to his lands in the country, to enjoy his country ways (Ar. Eq. 805).
The country is associated with quietude and peace, while the city life is associated with the
law courts, with business, and with politics. It is for that reason that two autorgoi
protagonists of the Birds leave Athens; they declare themselves to be looking for “a quiet
and peaceful place” (τόπον ἀπράγμονα, Ar. Av. 44).
In terms of thinking proscriptively about political values, the rural protagonists of
Aristophanes make for an important contrast to the urban sycophants, πολυπράγμονες,
who also have the associations of poverty, and low-class status, at least in comparison to
the χρηστοί who served as political leaders. The fact that these individuals are largely
unable to participate regularly in politics is actually praised by writers like Euripides, who
praises both the character and the retiring nature of the autorgoi. Like Aristophanes, his
103
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been a day’s walk.
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Dikaeopolis in Acharnians, Strepsiades in Clouds, Peisthetairos and Euelpides in Birds are
autorgoi, to name a few.
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depictions are idealized and are probably not meant to be explicitly political, yet they still
offer a different sense of proscriptive values of political behavior.105 Euripides introduces
the eponymously named Autourgos as a character in the Electra, where he is introduced as
the husband of Electra, who has been forced to marry a peasant farmer by her mother and
mother’s lover, Aegisthus. However, this farmer has respected his wife and preserved her
virginity, ashamed to violate her (ὑβρίζειν) since he is “not worthy of the daughter of a
wealthy man” (οὐ κατάξιος γεγώς ὀλβίων ἀνδρῶν τέκνα, Eur. El. 45). Carter argues that the
figure of the autorgos in the Electra displays a “sturdy independence, yet knows his place; he
is in a word, respectable, and it is this which endears him to the oligarchic and fourthcentury theorists.”106 Carter also notes that the terms of nobility and restraint used to
describe the peasant farmer, such as gennaios, aristos, eugenes, smack of the self-praises of
the aristocracy. 107
In the Suppliant Women, Euripides’ Athenian king Theseus specifically singles out the
class in between the poor and the rich as being the “class which saves the city by
protecting the order that the city ordains” (μέσῳ σῴζει πόλεις κόσμον φυλάσσουσ᾽ ὅντιν᾽
ἂν τάξῃ πόλιs, Eur. Supp. 245-6). When a hostile Theban herald enters the city, he
denigrates the Athenian regime for being one in which the demos rules, and identifies that
demos which Theseus talks about as the body of poor farmers, saying that they are
incapable of participating in politics, because they don’t have the time to turn from their
Dover (1974): 17 argues that despite the fact that tragedy contains “fictitious people in
fictitious situations,” one should still consider that “the moral sentiments which they utter
deserve to be taken seriously as the sentiments which some Athenians could accept in some
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106
Carter (1986): 91.
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On this see also Rosenbloom (2004): 56.
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work to deal with common things, the politics of the city (Eur. Supp. 421-22). Yet, in the end
it is this very quality that Euripides seems to praise about the politics of the autorgoi. In the
Orestes, Euripides praises the farmer who speaks up in the assembly. This farmer is “not
often seen in the marketplace and in the town,” but he is, much like in the Suppliants, the
savior of the city, an individual who is beyond reproach (Eur. Or. 929-933). In other
fragments, such as the ἄγων λόγος in Euripides’ Antiope, this concept is echoed yet again,
where the quiet man is praised as both safest and best citizen for the city (ἥσυχος φίλοισί τ᾿
ἀσφαλὴς φίλος πόλει τ᾿ ἄριστος, Eur. Fr. 194). Carter’s summation of Euripides’ idealized
peasant citizen—poor, living far from the city, rarely at the town and at the assembly,
contrasted with the demagogue, and praised in similar terms to the χρηστοί—leads to an
interesting result: “It would seem that Euripides’ hero is a good citizen not because he is
always busy and zealous in his city’s affairs” (much as I would suggest, the πολυπράγμων is)
but for the opposite reason, “because he is in fact unable to come to the assembly very
often.”108 In this case, the ideal citizen is one who does not exercise his democratic rights,
or only does so in a very limited and moderate way.109 In this way, the praise of the
ἀπράγμων peasant in this context encourages political deference and a limited engagement
with civic institutions of the city.
The closest that we come to seeing a depiction of outright praise of a
“polypragmatic” type of democratic citizenship in the literature of the fifth century is
Thucydides’ Pericles’ strong critique of the ἀπράγμων in the Funeral Oration in Book II,
108

Carter (1986): 92.

Euripides perhaps gives an inclination of what negative political participation is in Fragment
200, from the Antiope, when Antiphon praises the wisdom of one wise counsel over the crassness
of the mob (σὺν ὄχλῳ δ᾿ ἀμαθία πλεῖστον κακόν, Eur. Frg. 200).
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which rounds out the third category of my typology. In the speech (as any of the speeches,
which, as one should remember, are not necessarily historical documents, but what
Thucydides felt what ought be demanded in a given situation),110 the man he saw as the
democratic leader par excellence both honors the war dead as well as praises the democratic
constitution.111 One might read the speech, therefore, not necessarily as praising what
Thucydides saw as praiseworthy, but what a democrat speaking to democrats might wish to
praise. Midway through the speech Pericles states his goal to highlight the unique nature of
the Athenian constitution in comparison to its neighbors (Thuc. 2.37.1). He touches on
participation in politics, arguing that in Athens individuals are not barred from the ability
to gain honors because they belong to a given class, and poverty is not to prevent someone
from public service if they wish to do the state a service (ἔχων δέ τι ἀγαθὸν δρᾶσαι τὴν
πόλιν, ἀξιώματος ἀφανείᾳ κεκώλυται, Thuc. 2.37.1). Participation and contribution, in the
words of a paradigmatic democrat, are open to all. Pericles goes farther when he claims
that in Athens, in comparison to other poleis, Athens regards those who not are taking part
in (μετέχοντα) the affairs of the city or public duties (τὰ πολιτικά) are not only considered

Thuc. 1.22, “Therefore the speeches are given in the language in which, as it seemed to me,
the several speakers would express, on the subjects under consideration, the sentiments most
110

befitting the occasion, though at the same time I have adhered as closely as possible to the
general sense of what was actually said” (trans Smith); Hornblower (1991): 60 sees Thucydides’
claim to have written what was objectively appropriate (in his own mind) for the situation to be
inconsistent with his subsequent claim to “οὐδ’ ὡς ἐμοὶ ἐδόκει”, “reconstruct events according
to ideas of my own.” Thuc. 2.65 “In short, what was nominally a democracy became in his hands
government by the first citizen”, “ἐγίγνετό τε λόγῳ μὲν δημοκρατία, ἔργῳ δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ πρώτου
ἀνδρὸς ἀρχή.”
On Pericles’ stated praise of Athens’ democratic constitution see Thuc. 2.36: “But what was
the road by which we reached our position, by what was the road under which our greatness
grew?”
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“ἀπράγμονα” but also useless (ἀχρεῖον, Thuc. 2.40.1). Thucydides’ Pericles, having not only
cast a broad net for whom can be useful to the state—anyone respective of class or wealth—
then proceeds to argue that it is indeed their role to be un-ἀπράγμων. πολυπραγμοσύνη is
not mentioned, but it is clear that Pericles is not equating these political roles with
intervention in others’ personal lives in that negative sense. He had earlier claimed that
Athenians do not exercise a “jealous surveillance over each other” in their personal lives
(Thuc. 2.37.2).
It would seem that the characteristics that Pericles praises about Athens are
somewhat akin—if not presented as such a negative light—to the characteristics of the
πολυπράγμων. Regular political participation and engagement is praised, as also is the
spectacle of “daring and deliberation,” as well as a willingness to brave toils (τῶν
κινδύνων) on behalf of their country (Thuc. 2.40.3). The speech of the Corinthians (Thuc.
1.70) contextualizes these same characteristics in a more critical light, one that sounds
suspiciously like πολυπραγμοσύνη. The Corinthians detail the national character of Athens
to the Spartans. The Athenians are innovative and revolutionary (νεωτεροποιός) and are
quick to plan and act on such plans (1.70.2). They are bold and adventurous, and run risks
and dangers optimistically (κινδυνευταὶ καὶ ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς εὐέλπιδες, Thuc. 1.70.3). The
Athenians are constantly active, toiling, and troubling, both in their domestic lives and
their foreign policy, for themselves and for their country, and for them, having no leisure
(ἀσχολίαν) is less of a misfortune than the peace of a quiet life (ἡσυχίαν ἀπράγμονα). Such
a characterization of the domestic character of the Athenians is not limited to mouths of
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the hostile critics of Athens in Thucydides.112 This characterization of the Athenian polis on
the whole as being busy, optimistic, and active finds common currency in popular
discourse as well. Similar language is found again in Aristophanes, this time in Birds.113
This play opens with the two main characters leaving Athens in order to find a
peaceful place (τόπον ἀπράγμονα, Ar. Av. 45), something therefore that Athens is not. The
business that they seek to leave is similar to Aristophanes’ previous depictions of
πολυπραγμοσύνη with much blame going on the law courts; they are a pair of anti-jurors,
coming from a land that has few juro-phobes (105-110).114 Later on, when describing the
city in the clouds founded by the birds at the instigation of Peisetairos, one of the
protagonists, one of the things the city is specifically cited for is embodying is “gentle
peace” (ἀγανόφρονος Ἡσυχίας). Dunbar’s commentary on this passage specifically
highlights the Pindaric tinge of such a passage, noting that here, as in Pindar, the concept
of Athens as a busy, unquiet, rambunctious polis is used in Aristophanes and Thucydides to
contrast with the “ideals of Dorian cities.”115 While the protagonists at the start seem to be
seeking an idealized type of city such as the Dorian type, other characteristics emerge in

Hornblower (1991): 114 argues that the Corinthian speech, compared to many of the
speeches, may actually represent what Thucydides believed was the main difference between
112

the Athenian and Spartan characters—ambitious versus cautious—as it essentially expands
upon the statements that he makes at 8.96 in his own voice blaming Spartan cautiousness for
their inability to end the war after attacking Euboea during the oligarchy of the Four-Hundred.
113
Hornblower (1991): 115 mentions that Birds was first produced in 414, midway through the
war. It might be hard to draw a line of direct influence between Aristophanes’ work and
Thucydides’ History, but such a correlation does provide evidence of an existing contemporary
discourse around depictions of the character of Athens and the Athenians as a whole.
Dunbar (1995): 169: ἀπηλιαστής: One who is ἀπ-Ἡλιαία, or one who keeps away from the
main law-court of Athens.
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Dunbar (1995): 649.
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their characters that are more reminiscent of the democratic polis that they are leaving
behind.
The two heroes are named Peisetairos and Eulepides, names that are both words for
“comrade-persuader” (πείθω-ἑταῖρος) and “hopeful or optimistic” (literally, good hope, εὖἐλπίς). Euelpides puts in mind the optimism ascribed to the Athenians by the Corinthians
(Thuc. 1.70.3) while on the other hand, Peisetairos’s ability to be a comrade-persuader, as
Leigh puts it, is better suited to the active citizen in the courtroom or the assembly than to
the ἀπράγμων.116 Finally, upon meeting the chorus of birds, Peisetairos tells them that they
are unlearned (ἀμαθής) and un-curious (κοὐ πολυπράγμων, Ar. Or. 469), at least compared
to their Athenian guests, who subsequently persuade the birds into engaging in the utopian
mission of building a city in the clouds. Used positively here on Peisetairos’ behalf, the
concept of the πολυπράγμων as intelligent does have further implications for democratic
citizenship—in modern democracies, being informed is oft described as crucial to
participation. In the ancient discourse, Aristophanes’ heroes had bashed the well-informed
πολυπράγμονες as being informers.117 One of the characteristics hinted at here is of the
πολυπράγμων as an individual interested in gathering and using information. Despite
attempting to leave the polypragmatic city of Athens, the protagonists still demonstrate
attitudes towards πολυπραγμοσύνη that are particularly Athenian. Harding puts it well in
claiming that Peisetairos and Euelpides will never find their τόπον ἀπράγμονα, “for no
Leigh (2013): 46.
The fragments of Pherecrates (193 Loeb) and Eupolis (238 Loeb) had both also connected
being a πολυπράγμων to intelligence and cleverness; Dunbar (1995): 325 notes that “the term is
116
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now being used in a clearly favorable sense, appropriate to Peis., who is now actively
interfering in the life of the birds. A restless, interfering man would be likely to keep himself
well informed on everything including Aesop’s stories.”
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sooner will they find it than their true nature will assert itself and they will take over the
universe.”118 Leigh too sees the Birds as essentially being “a play about polypragmosyne and
the Athenian spirit,” and it is well worth noting that the depictions of the Athenians in
Thucydides, as individuals and as a polis as a whole, draw on larger (and dubiously negative)
conceptions of πολυπραγμοσύνη.
While Thucydides’ Pericles is outwardly praising of this kind of national character—
something Aristophanes’ plays and Pericles’ rhetoric seem to attach specifically to Athens’
democratic institutions—it is not clear that Thucydides the writer saw those characteristics
as positive. In fact, as Ehrenberg states in his study of the term πολυπραγμοσύνη as it
becomes applied to Athenian foreign policy (and as was noted by the Corinthians), in
Thucydides, “πολυπραγμοσύνη was the psychological basis for Athenian imperialism.”119
The Athenian speakers in Sicily proudly describe their policy to the Camarinaeans, whom
they are trying to win over to their side, as “our interfering character” (πολυπραγμοσύνης,
Thuc. 6.87.3). Alcibiades, in pressing for the Sicilian Expedition, denounces Nicias’s
opposition as ἀπραγμοσύνη, and argues that a city not inactive by nature (πόλιν μὴ
ἀπράγμονα) could ruin itself by adopting a policy of ἀπραγμοσύνη (Thuc. 6.18.6). Diodotus,
arguing against Cleon for punishing the Mytilenean revolt, argues that hope (ἐλπὶς) along
with desire (ἔρως) is what does damage (βλάπτουσι) to ventures or plans. Such a
description of Athenian foreign policy puts in mind the name of Aristophanes’
polypragmatic protagonist, Euelpides. Ehrenberg notes that one of the characteristics
leading Athens into the Sicilian Expedition, one of Athens’ greatest disasters, was
118
119

Harding (1981): 41.
Ehrenberg (1947): 47.
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unreasonable optimism.120 Subsequent scholarship has largely made the connection of
Thucydides’ depiction of the domestic democratic πολυπραγμοσύνη as leading to an
interventionist, meddling, and imperialist foreign policy.121
Therefore, the question to be asked is, in comparison to the speech he puts in
Pericles’ mouth, does Thucydides approve of πολυπραγμοσύνη, at home or abroad? His
portrayal of the Athenians as being overambitious and optimistic in their views of the
Sicilian Expedition seems to indicate that he believes such national characteristics
permitted to their extreme to have led to disaster. Politically, the Old Oligarch described
the abuse of the allies by the Athenian democracy as a result of the democratic rabble
(δημοτικοῖς) having sway in politics (Ps.-Xen. Ath. Pol. 1.15). Thucydides, less blunt than the
Old Oligarch, seems to view Athenian imperialism as stemming more from a democratically
related πολυπραγμοσύνη rather than simply bold money-grubbing against the allies.
However, he offers his own political preferences when he praises the moderate Oligarchy
of 5,000 that followed more severe one that orchestrated the coup of 411. Thucydides notes
that such a time was when the Athenians seemed to be best administering the state (εὖ
πολιτεύσαντες, Thuc. 8.97.2). It then could be argued that the glowing praise that
Thucydides puts into Pericles’ mouth about the character of a democratic city, and
especially its attitude towards action, business, optimism, and mass political participation
Ehrenberg (1947): 51, cf. Thucydides 6.24, who describes the “ἐπιθυμία,” desire of the
majority, and the lack of doubt in the success of the expedition.
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Ehrenberg (1947): 53: “The ἀπράγμων is anti-democratic, the πολυπράγμων is a democrat.
This division can be traced behind Thucydides’ application of the terms to foreign policy;”
Harding (1981): 44 is perhaps the outlier in that he equates πολυπραγμοσύνη with all types of
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Athenian imperial policies, and moderately argues that support for such a policy was broad and
widespread, not restricted to a radical democratic faction or opposed by a radical oligarchic
one.
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must be read through the perspective of a writer that seems at other times to be very wary
of those characteristics. Thus, what appears to be an example of democratic language
extolling a polypragmatic democracy becomes far more suspect given the rest of
Thucydides’ narrative.
In much of the literature of the fifth century in Athens, the terms πολυπράγμων
and ἀπράγμων were part of a contested discourse about political engagement, citizenship
duties, and even foreign policy and the character of a city. Previously, I had laid out four
categories of use for these terms and the family of synonyms and antonyms that go with
them, and examined some of the paradigmatic ways that these terms are treated in
surviving literature. In the first category—that of criticism of the πολυπράγμων—business,
nosiness, and bad character are used to tar those who are exercising certain democratic
rights, especially those of ho boulomenos. However, what critics can decry as meddling, a
positive user of such terms can claim that they are acting in the interest of the city, and
name a necessity (the lack of a state prosecutor) and a patriotic compulsion. On the other
hand, the praise of the idealized rural, rustic, and retired ἀπράγμων who appears in the
plays of Euripides and Aristophanes as the ideal democratic citizen has an irony to it. The
individual who is praised as being best for the state is the one who is least likely to
participate often in its formal political institutions. Implicit criticism is found again in
these sources of those who actively seek to spend their time engaging in civic business—
they are equated to demagogues or busybodies, and are detrimental for the state.
On the one hand, Thucydides’ Pericles, in his castigation of the ἀπράγμων, might
appear in his Funeral Oration to give the most coherent explanation of democratic rights
and democratic participation, and their relation to the busy, active, and optimistic
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democratic character. Yet, much of Thucydides’ narrative becomes a strong criticism of
such πολυπραγμοσύνη as manifested in Athens’ relationship with other nations in the field
of foreign affairs. It is the goal of this study in subsequent chapters to investigate this
missing part of the quartet—the praise of the πολυπράγμων. I will seek to use the fourth
century sources—which provide us a good deal more information about the ways that a
regular Athenian interacted with his fellow citizens and political institutions on a day-today basis—to tease out a conception of the busy, active, democratic citizen during what was
a largely stable and well-documented time for democratic institutions.
Unlike much of the literature of the fifth and fourth century, which is largely
written for elite/elite audiences, such as the Old Oligarch, Thucydides, and the philosophic
writers like Plato, the speeches of the Athenian orators before the popular assemblies and
before the courts plausibly offer a view into how the Athenian demos, and not just elite
commentators, considered itself and its democracy.122 I therefore will seek to use popular
oratory to engage with broadly held and popular views of πολυπραγμοσύνη. After doing
this, I will consider πολυπραγμοσύνη as it is presented in Plato. As one of the most
sophisticated critics of Athenian democracy, Plato makes πολυπραγμοσύνη central to his
conception of justice and the political critiques offered in the Republic. Writers like Plato,
Aristophanes, the Old Oligarch, and others saw πολυπραγμοσύνη and meddlesome or
bothersome ways of exercising democratic citizenship as being present enough in their
own contemporary context to make it the point of sustained criticisms, many of which
122

Ober (1989): 43. “It would be reductionist to suppose that every comment in an oration

derives immediately from popular ideology, but we may suppose that skilled and experienced
speakers would avoid making comments that they thought were likely to contradict deeply
held popular convictions.”
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have been treated in this second chapter. This implies, then, that democratic citizenship
was something that, at least by the late fifth century, did legitimately encourage a sense of
activity and involvement (or over-involvement) for regular, non-elite citizens. The voices
of the critics that we have access to—elite writers—mostly seem to characterize such
behavior as meddlesome, analogous to pre-existing examples of social disruption and
admonitions to “stay in one’s place.” However, it is largely the voices and experiences of
such citizens that we lack in the historical record of the fifth century in classical Athens in
which I am interested. While Aristophanes lays the dikasts of Athens out for brutal satire in
his plays, the archaeological record on the other hand provides evidence that many
Athenians took their jury-allotment tokens with them to their graves.123 It is the views and
impact of the role of such citizens that I will continue exploring in subsequent chapters of
this project.
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51

Chapter Three
From Rhetoric to the Republic: Polypragm osune in the Orators and Plato
In the previous chapters I sought to demonstrate that in much of Athenian
literature of the fifth century B.C., the use of the term πολυπραγμοσύνη to describe and
criticize the busy, active, prying, optimistic, and meddlesome Athenian citizens as
individuals and a polis as a whole more often than not came laden with socio-political
baggage. In the works of elite writers, criticism of πολυπραγμοσύνη and praise of
ἀπραγμοσύνη involve criticism of their current democratic status quo, and (with praises of
ἀπραγμοσύνη in particular) point Athens towards a more measured and less directly
participatory gradient of democracy, particularly in regards to the legal system and the
assembly.
I had also set out a schematic for considering uses of πολυπραγμοσύνη and related
terms in fifth-century literature: (1) criticism of πολυπραγμοσύνη or the πολυπράγμων, (2)
praise of ἀπραγμοσύνη or the ἀπράγμων, (3) criticism of the ἀπράγμων, and (4) praise of
the πολυπράγμων. I found the criticism of the first two categories coming from mixed
sources such as the playwrights (reformist criticism internal to the democracy in the form
of “warnings and admonitions,” also called “immanent critics,” by Ober)124, and rejectionist
critics, such as the Old Oligarch, whose disapproval of Athens’ πολυπραγμοσύνη-laden
character are indications of broader dissatisfaction with the political regime as a whole. In
the fifth century, Thucydides’ work provides evidence of the third category, praising
characteristics that are in other negatively associated with πολυπραγμοσύνη, and offering
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For admonitory critics, see Ober (1998): 126. For immanent critics see Ober (1998): 48.
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on the ἀπράγμων through the mouth of his paradigmatic democrat, Pericles, associating
these characteristics and a defense of them, with the democratic conditions of the late fifth
century. However, Thucydides’ own narrative seems to make it clear that Pericles’ praise is
not his own. Much of his narrative plays out Athens’ πολυπραγμοσύνη as leading to
disastrous consequences in political and military leadership—Thucydides himself endorses
a more limited form of government near the end of his work, the Five Thousand, based on
restricted wealth qualifications (Thuc. 8.98).
One might be tempted to see an explicit political axis relating to these two terms
emerging. Praise of the πολυπράγμων might be said to come from more democratic
sources, and criticism of the ἀπράγμων comes from the more aristocratic examples of the
fifth-century writers. Also, as the words of Thucydides’ Pericles might lead one to believe,
it is to democratic discourse that one must turn if they are to complete the fourth category,
and find praise of the πολυπράγμων and his behaviors in a democratic context. While some
of Athens’ citizens may have been functionally literate,125 it would be hard to look to
written literature for an unequivocal democratic response to such elite penned criticism—
the writing of literature and the collection of books was largely an upper-class activity,
with minor middle-class participation.126 Ober suggests that much of Athenian popular
ideology was formulated by public speech acts in fora such as the Assembly and the
lawcourts. In his view, the “general understanding held by the citizenry regarding the
nature of society was the same understanding employed by all decision-making bodies in
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formulating government policy for deployment in the real world.”127 Therefore, it is to the
literature with mass audiences, such as symbouletic and dicanic speeches, that the scholar
of popular ideology should turn. Canevaro too notes that in Athens, “popular culture seems
to live rather inside the formal institutions of the state, fostered and validated by them.”128
While the speakers of public addresses in the assembly, courts, or council that we
find extant were frequently members of the wealthy elite (although not always, as Lysias’s
On the Pension suggests), the majority of those sitting on the assembly, courts, and council
were not of elite status.129 Ober suggests therefore that this dynamic produces a complex
relationship in reading the values of elites and masses into court oratory. In his view, it is
important to see rhetorical appeals in assembly, council, and court speeches as calculated
to appeal to the opinions, norms, beliefs, and prejudices of their audiences.130 He therefore
sees court oratory in particular as a key way that the real and obvious inequalities of
wealth and status between Athenian elites and the majority of the population were
mediated in light of a prevalent egalitarian ideology and popular control of decision-

127
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Canevaro (2016), forthcoming.
On the notion that logography services were not common for non-wealthy elite see Canevaro
(2016). Contrast Ober (1989): 118: “Given that being a politician in fourth-century Athens was a
full-time affair, being a member of the leisure class was virtually a prerequisite.” On overall
demographics see Hansen (1999): 127 “There is, therefore, no good ground to postulate any
marked difference between the Assembly and the courts in this regard; indeed the crush to
secure the daily payment indicates that the poorer group of citizens were the majority in both
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Ober (1989): 43: “As Aristotle clearly recognized, an orator who wishes to persuade a mass
audience must accommodate himself to the ethos—the ideology—of his audience.”
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making political bodies.131 Yet, aside from the obvious doubts about questions of fact, court
documents cannot simply be used as an easy mirror of reality, particularly for popular
sentiments. Mass audiences and elite litigants may have differing expectations and
standards for respective elite and non-elite behavior. Elite values and standards of behavior
may not be able to contradict popular ideology, but they can significantly differ from the
standards espoused by and for non-elite Athenians.132
I spend time on this qualification because the context in which a speaker decries
the πολυπραγμοσύνη of their accuser or accusers in general and promotes their own
ἀπραγμοσύνη needs to be considered in order to determine whether such criticism or
praise refers to ordinary citizen behavior, or sets differing standards to which elites are
held to rather than their non-elite judges in the courts. Part of what I am seeking to
understand is whether the behaviors (both positively and negatively associated with
πολυπραγμοσύνη and its certain brand of civic behavior) were considered by the common
Athenian at the time to be, first, associated with a democratic form of government, and
second, played an important role (positive or negative) to the democracy’s functioning.133

Ober (1989): 45: “Public rhetoric not only helps us to define Athenian public ideology, it was
instrumental in the regulation of mass-elite relations for the Athenians themselves.
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Ober (1989): 44: “...[W]e may suppose that skilled and experienced speakers would avoid
making comments that they thought were likely to contradict deeply held popular
convictions.” Ober (1989): 335: “The orator had to be simultaneously of the elite and of the
mass, and he was expected to prove his membership in both on a regular basis.”
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Even if they were not considered by an Athenian at the time to be important to democracy’s
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Yet, elite citizens and non-elites often drove forward different parts of Athens’ democratic
machinery, and while an elite litigant may promote their dedication to actively staying out
of politics and being above the fray of, say, the boule, or assembly, as does the speaker in
Lysias’s On the Property of Aristophanes (Lys. 19.55), this may reflect attitudes that he is
expected to hew to as a member of a wealthy family. On the other hand, the regular
assembly- or council-goer might not be proud to abnegate something they consider to be a
right, duty, or simply a common behavior as a citizen of the polis.
Given the previous association of πολυπραγμοσύνη with democracy, one might
assume that discussions of πολυπραγμοσύνη would, in contrast to elite/elite literature,
entail the positive identification of certain behaviors and characteristics embodied by the
πολυπράγμων, such as vigorous information gathering and inquisitiveness (Ar. Or. 469),
enthusiastic activity and action in domestic and foreign affairs (Thuc. 6.18.6-7), and
innovation and adventurousness (Thuc. 1.70.2). One might expect to find in such discourse
the language of vigorous participation in citizen obligations, such as the lawcourts and the
assembly, as might befit a type of citizen that is expected to be busy, active in many things,
and spending time around the city’s political institutions and the marketplace (Ar. Plut 907909). If elite critics attempt to draw lines (as represented by the formulation of (τὰ ἑαυτοῦ
πράττειν) proscribing an active inquisitiveness into private and public lives, or limit
spheres of political behavior considered to be particularly democratic, one might expect to
find a defense of such behavior in popular rhetoric. Yet, what one discovers at first blush is
that like in elite-penned literature, it appears that it is decidedly a negative thing to call
someone a πολυπράγμων. Yet, numerous references to the term and its synonyms and
antonyms betray one of the weaknesses of court oratory for historical factuality—but still
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make it useful for this study. As Leigh notes, πολυπραγμοσύνη (and court rhetoric in
general) is construed subjectively—while a defendant in court can tar their political
adversary with negatively tinged characteristics such as being a πολυπράγμων, an accuser
in court can equally claim to be a good citizen carrying out their duties, or an engaged
community member seeking information and political discussion in the open spaces of the
city.134
In the court orations, calling someone a πολυπράγμων or other synonyms like a
φιλοπράγμων (a lover of πράγματα) or a περίεργος (meddler, with an emphasis on
officiousness) is lumped in with other popular insults designed to present their adversary
as being a danger and outsider to the community in their personal and civic behavior, such
as sycophancy and quarrelsomeness. Thus Aeschines calls his political nemesis
Demosthenes both a “meddler and a sycophant” (περίεργος καὶ συκοφάντης, Aeschin. In
Ctes. 172-173) in the same breath in which he implies that Demosthenes’ mother was a
foreigner (and therefore of suspect citizenship), and that he had squandered his own
inheritance. On the other hand, Demosthenes, at the same trial, justifying his own career as
a public speaker, obviously puts it in a different light, saying that his skills in speaking have
always been brought forward for “the common good” (τοῖς κοινοῖς, Dem. De cor. 277). That
is, he works for the public’s concerns and the public’s interest, rather than the public’s loss,
and his own interest. What Demosthenes can tout as a career of honorable prosecutions in
the public’s interest, Aeschines can call meddlesome self-aggrandizement.

Leigh (2013): 16: “These are always profoundly subjective terms: nobody ever saw a
polypragmon or periergos on the streets of Athens, only someone he or others held to be such.”
134
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Other court speakers take pains to defend themselves from claims of
πολυπραγμοσύνη. The defendant in Lysias’ On the Pension argues that he has never been
politically active before—he has to contend with the claim that he is “a busybody or quarrel
seeker” (ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι πολυπράγμων εἰμὶ καὶ θρασὺς καὶ φιλαπεχθήμων; Lys. 24.24). Lycurgus
claims that it is unfair that those who bring cases to court or speak in the assembly can be
considered “not as patriotic but as meddlesome” (οὐ φιλόπολιν ἀλλὰ φιλοπράγμονα δοκεῖν
εἶναι, Lycurg. Leoc. 3). Isocrates’ Antidosis states, perhaps metaphorically, that the
“πολυπράγμονας” are one and the same with the “wrongdoers and sycophants” that the
city punishes (ἀδικοῦντας καὶ τοὺς συκοφαντοῦντας, Isoc. 15.237).135 In another speech of
Lysias, an old woman is reluctant to tell the defendant about a case of adultery that is being
committed in his own house for fear of being named as a meddler (πολυπραγμοσύνῃ
προσεληλυθέναι με νόμιζε πρὸς σέ, Lys. 1.15-16). The litigant in Lysias’s On the Property of
Aristophanes praises his father for having naturally minded his own business, while in
contrast critiques his deceased and destitute creditor Aristophanes for bankrupting himself
by focusing on both public and private activities (Lys. 19.18).
As these examples show, calling someone a πολυπράγμων is not simply part of elite
discourse. In legal discourse the term was indeed used along with other terms of social
disapproval, often as a modifier to a worse term, the sycophant, designed to present
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for the use of popular rhetoric earlier. As Leigh (2013): 27 notes, it is a speech composed for a
fictional trial, which however still retains characteristics of the typical courtroom exercise
speech, down to the “sundry references to the dripping of a non-existent water clock.”
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adversaries as dangerous social outsiders.136 In that way, the use of it might assume that
certain values associated with the πολυπράγμων, such as inquisitiveness, busyness,
activity, and action are not ones that are viewed as positive amongst the Athenian
populace as a whole. Adkins, believing that in the late fifth-century Athens was “still to a
surprising extent in sentiment and values a collection of virtually autonomous households”
sees such uses of language as revealing a “general pre-existing dislike of ‘meddling’ that
rendered polupragmosune so useful a word of abuse in Athenian politics.”137 As Millett notes,
archaeologically and textually, there does seem to be strong attitudes towards a division
between private life and public life: “private space is oikos space,” as opposed to “polis
space.” Textual references to doorkeepers, locked homes, and a reluctance to step over the
threshold of another without invitation138 reflect preoccupations with personal privacy not
surprising to us in the modern age.139 Christ, approaching the topic of popular values from
a different angle, argues that “helping behavior” between Athenian citizens (particularly in
disputes involving strangers and bystanders) who were neither friends nor family was in
fact minimized by the fear of being considered “intrusive and meddlesome.”140 However, I
argue that this is not simply a cultural onus against prying or busy behavior—it is also an
outgrowth of the democratic nature of Athens’ society. Athens was a polis where every

Christ (1998): 51: “The sycophant bustles about (perieimi) the city in pursuit of victims and
never desists from his sycophantic activity; he is a meddlesome troublemaker (polupragmōn)
and busybody (periergos); he disturbs (tarattō), confuses (kukaō) and shakes down (seiō)—that is,
blackmails—his victims…”
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citizen had the right—and was essentially individually deputized, in contrast to a modern
governmental prosecutorial arm—to carry out the law (as well as seek a lawsuit against any
other Athenian, regardless of social status and class) as ὁ βουλόμενος.141 Moreover,
intervening in other individuals’ legal troubles might not only be seen as a negative thing,
but potentially dangerous for the intervening party, who might run the risk of
exacerbating or being included in an ongoing conflict.142 While Theophrastus’s Characters is
certainly not a piece of popular rhetoric, it does corroborate the claim in speeches that the
περίεργος is someone who will attempt to separate combatants in a fight even if he does
not know them.143
One side of the πολυπράγμων that appears to come in for criticism in both
elite/elite and elite/non-elite discourse is the inability to distinguish what one’s own
things, τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν are. The type of πολυπραγμοσύνη described in the courtroom
reflects a fear that might have had legitimate purchase in Athens—the positive side of
embracing one’s citizen duties as a prosecutor can also mean investigation, intervention,
and judgment on the private lives of other individuals. Regardless of whether this aspect of
Athenian democracy was beneficial to the flourishing of the state or adherence to the laws,
a defendant in court would naturally feel (and seek to present such activity) as socially and
Hansen (1999): 72: “‘He of the Athenians who wishes from amongst those who may,’
frequently mentioned as the originator of laws, decrees, and public prosecutions, was arguably
the real protagonist of the Athenian democracy.”
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Christ (2010): 274: “Bystanders in Athens, moreover, typically did not know the context of
violence involving strangers, including whether the participants had a history of violent
relations of which this was just one more episode.”
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The genre and purpose of the Characters is an open question. Theophrastus was a pupil of
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Aristotle, but rather than any work of moral philosophy like his teacher’s Ethics it should be
according to Ussher (1993): 23 taken instead as a literary hand-book, a guide to comic
characterization.
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morally onerous. Indeed, as Thucydides’ Pericles had noted in the Funeral Oration, one of
the outstanding Athenian characteristics is that they are not suspicious of each other in
their private lives (Thuc. 2.37). This is a πολυπραγμοσύνη that lacks the kind of anti-urban
(as the city center is associated with the agora, courts, and assembly) sentiment and
questioning of broader democratic values that could be found in some of the fifth-century
literature, and is more concerned with how certain Athenians gather information about
and interact with each other on a daily basis. In the court orations, πολυπραγμονεῖν is
representative of a subset of individual citizens. Meddlesomeness and busyness are not
characteristics that are to be critiqued about the entire democratic polis or Athens’
constitution as a whole as is presented by Thucydides’ Corinthian speech (Thuc. 1.70).
The intellectual trend I had advanced in the first chapter was that of the
πολυπράγμων as a kind of overextended democrat—one who infringes on the political
space traditionally considered the domain of the political elite and celebrates what
Thucydides’ Pericles would call “the freedom that Athenians maintain in their
government” (ἐλευθέρως δὲ τά τε πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν πολιτεύομεν, Thuc. 2.37). Such a trend
can still be seen in these orations, but in an inverted way. Whereas in the fifth century,
aristocratic and oligarchic writers were praising the ἀπραγμοσύνη of the rural peasant with
little time for politics, in the fourth-century orations, it becomes a common topos in oratory
for a wealthy defendant to highlight their own ἀπραγμοσύνη, their own withdrawal from
politics.
Lateiner highlights this trend well in his analysis of Lysias’s speeches, both those
written by the metic logographer for mostly wealthy clients (between 402-380), as well as
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those delivered on his own behalf.144 He argues that even when dominant in the fifth
century, “the ordinarily political class, the self-styled khrēstoi (the kaloi k' agathoi to which
Pericles belonged),” felt a “posture of distaste” towards the institutions of democratic
politics.145 Lateiner shares a view with other scholars that the nature of political leadership
shifted in the late-fifth century away from being dominated by an established elite of
wealth and birth, largely through family ties, largesse, and military success, keeping an
aloof or a measured distance from the democratic organs of the city, such as attacks in the
courts and in the assembly.146 Lateiner notes that Lysias describes his own family as living
in Athens in a “democratic fashion” (ᾠκοῦμεν δημοκρατούμενοι, Lys. 12.4). What this is
revealed to mean, however, is an abstention from lawsuits and wrongdoing against other
citizens (Lys. 12.5) as well as paying for liturgies, funding festivals, and living in an orderly
and moderate fashion (κοσμίους δ’ ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς παρέχοντας, Lys 12.20).147 However, Lysias
is a metic, a resident foreigner, and while obliged to fund civic life in the city and able to

Carter (1986): 106-107 presents Lysias’s clients as wealthy. Certainly, those who claim to have
funded choregia and trierarchies were undoubtedly wealthy, as well as those who paid for
speechwriting services. Ober (1989): 113 argues that in private oratory, speakers were most
likely part of a wealthy elite, if not an educated elite. On 221-222 he remarks that many
speakers who claim to not be of such social status may be employing a dramatic fiction, one
fully understood by their audiences. Lateiner (1982): 4-5 adds, “While quick to mention their
144

fulfillment of civic obligations and duties, the logographer’s wealthy clients claim to have
avoided, to the best of their ability, the law courts, the assembly, and the council house: that is,
Athenian politics tout court.”
145
Lateiner (1982): 4. Pericles himself is perhaps is the outlier in this regard. Ober (1989): 88
presents his unique success vis-à-vis his contemporaries due to his embrace of democratic
rhetoric and institutions.
146
Connor (1971): 9-11 on family ties, 19-22 on politics of largesse. Ober (1989): 86: “The
Athenian politician of the earlier fifth century appealed to the demos, but he did through the
symbols of wealth and birthright that would have been familiar to his sixth-century ancestors.”
147
Lateiner (1982): 6.
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appear in court, he and his family lack any of the directly participatory political rights of
Athenian citizens.148 In Lysias’s case, living in a “democratic fashion” has nothing to do
with exercising political rights of decision-making.
This is an important passage to highlight, because many of Lysias’s other clients,
who are, in contrast, wealthy and also fully enfranchised citizens “dissociate themselves as
clearly as the metic from the lawcourts and from the administration of the state.”149 In
Lateiner’s reading, the speaker of On the Property of Aristophanes claims that he had never
been seen in the council and courts (Lys. 19.55) because it was sensible for members of the
upper classes following the two oligarchic revolutions to “plead a lack of appearances in
the political arena.”150 Lysias’s clients appear to make themselves indifferent to either
democracy or oligarchy, stressing that they are politically active under neither, but live in
an orderly (κόσμιος) and modest (σώφρων) manner.151 As I mentioned above, it is difficult
to attempt to extract values wholesale from such court documents, be they popular or elite
ones. However, one does see that during the early fourth century, a time when the
democracy has been restored, and popular control of the assembly, courts, and council reestablished,152 it is an acceptable strategy for wealthy defendants disavow any type of
πολυπραγμοσύνη, and any type of political activity altogether. Regardless of whether such
Hansen (1999): 97.
Lateiner (1982): 7.
150
Lateiner (1982): 7.
151
Lys. 7.41: “κόσμιον δ᾽ ἐμαυτὸν καὶ ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ καὶ ἐν ὀλιγαρχίᾳ παρασχών”; Lys. 21.19:
“διὰ τέλους τὸν πάντα χρόνον κόσμιον εἶναι καὶ σώφρονα”; Lateiner (1982): 8.
152
Ath. Pol. 42.2: “They have made themselves supreme in all fields; they make run everything
by the decrees of the assembly and by decisions of the courts in which the people are supreme.”
148
149

Democracy restored and reaffirmed, Harris (2014): 3-4; Ober (1989): 98 claims “The description
of the democracy of the fourth century as most fully developed, most extreme, even most
“radical” makes a good deal of sense from the point of view of political sociology.”
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a strategy was viewed favorably or unfavorably by the non-elite jurors and audience, the
fact that the defendants—in what is, admittedly, an incredibly slim representation of
surviving court literature153—so consistently sought to contrast their behavior with their
πολυπράγμων accusers and highlight their distance from Athens’ democratic institutions
offers a negative critical inference for the existence of such behavior as particularly
democratic—spurred on by the popular institutions—and prevalent in Athens.
The “retreat by the socially and economically advantaged class from the world of
politics and political maneuvering in the courts”154 that Lateiner notes, and the aristocratic
ethic that emerges from it—wealthy litigants claim to be “κόσμιος” and “σώφρων,” in
opposition to civic-minded and active—are particularly important in relation to the works
of one of the most famous and lasting critics of Athenian democracy, Plato. As a writer,
Plato is in dialogue with and actively critiquing his contemporary political culture in
Athens, and it is no surprise that he treats the subject of πολυπραγμοσύνη in a central place
in his most famous work, the Republic.
Compared to other writers like Herodotus, Thucydides, and even Aristophanes, the
scholarly tradition preserves a good amount of biographical detail about Plato, whose
writing overlaps with that of Lysias. Plato was born into an aristocratic family around
424/3 B.C., and died in the 340’s. He was the nephew of two politically active aristocrats,
Critias and Charmides, who were notorious in later literature, such as Xenophon’s Hellenica,
for overthrowing the democracy in 404/403 B.C., and putting to death enemies of the new
153

Ober (1989): 44 remarks on the paucity of written texts by ordinary Athenians for mass

audiences, and argues further that the speeches we have surviving represent about ten percent
of the speeches actually delivered.
154
Lateiner (1982): 11.
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regime.155 He founded a school of philosophy at the Academy gymnasium in Athens, and for
a time travelled to Sicily to educate two tyrants of Syracuse. Most famously, he wrote
largely in the dialogue form, and was an admirer and, during his early life, direct student of
Socrates.156 Rare bits of biographical detail supplied by the author himself emerge in the
dialogues. The Apology (34a) places Plato at Socrates’ trial in 399 B.C., although he was not
present for Socrates’ death as depicted in the Phaedo (59b). Aside from later sources like
Aristotle and Diogenes Laertius, much of the contemporaneous biographical information
we have about Plato comes from the so-called Letters, and in particular, the Seventh Letter.
While the letter is of contested attribution, it is crucial to the arguments of certain modern
writers on the purposes and intentions of Plato when writing the dialogues.157 The Letter
states that Plato was deterred from embarking on a career in politics twice. First he became
disaffected with hardline oligarchy after seeing the abuses of his great-uncle Critias and
uncle Charmides as part of the Thirty’s regime (Pl. L. 7.325a). However, following that he
became disaffected even with Athenian democratic politics following the eminently unjust
and unholy (ἀνοσιωτάτην) conviction and execution of Socrates (Pl. L. 7.325b).
Addressing the question of why and to whom Plato was writing with his dialogues is
an important question of this section, because, in the Republic, Laws, and other dialogues
Plato makes strong normative claims about the ideal ordering of society which are

See Xen. Hell. 2.3.32-56 for Critias’ debate with Theramenes, a more moderate oligarch.
Biographical details for Plato, Allen (2010): 11 and Ober (1998): 156.
156
Diogenes Laertius 3; Ober (1998): 156.
157
Ober (1998): 162 n. 16 reads the letter as if it were written by Plato or a member of the early
155

Academy; Allen (2010): 12-13 doubts that it was written by Plato, yet still believes it to be a
trustworthy source of information about his beliefs. It is a thoroughly contested subject, but I
tend to agree with those who argue for attribution.
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particularly related to Athenian πολυπραγμοσύνη. Political theorists like Strauss and
Bloom see in Plato a heavy focus on irony in his own writing and beliefs (rather than just in
the words of his version of Socrates), and a rejection of utopian ideals and an ability to
directly influence political ends openly through writing.158 Therefore, they see the goal of
Plato and the Republic in particular as seeking to cultivate a love of philosophy in rulers, as
a method of indirect leadership.159 On the other hand, scholars like Ober and Euben take
Plato as genuinely intending political action and effect with his writings, although to
different degrees of criticism, while refraining from the more extreme view offered by
Popper, who saw Plato as wholeheartedly endorsing antidemocratic tyranny.160 Ober
classes Plato as largely a “rejectionist critic” of democracy who seeks not to reform the
current society, but challenge and overthrow its dominant values.161 Allen, in seeking to
interact with this question, argues for a kind of middle ground, saying that Plato’s political
plan in the Republic is to “refashion Athenian political language” and cultural values. In her
mind, “the utopian plan” of the dialogue that has caused such controversy “is a tool used”
for that purpose.162
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Allen (2006): 127; Bloom (1991): 410: “The Republic serves to moderate the extreme passion

for political justice by showing the limits of what can be demanded and expected of the city;
and at the same time it shows the direction in which the immoderate desires can be
meaningfully channeled.”
159
Allen (2006): 128; Bloom (1991): 425 “The choice between the philosophic and tyrannic lives
explains the plot of the Republic. Socrates takes a young man tempted by the tyrannic life and
attempts to give him at least that modicum of awareness of philosophy that will cure him of the
lust for tyranny.”
Stances of Ober, Allen, and Popper summarized by Allen (2006): 129.
Ober (1998): 49.
162
Allen (2010): 19.
160
161
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Allen therefore sees a broader political role for the philosopher and elite writers in
public life than the previous writers mentioned. In her view Plato did seek the wholesale
transformation of Athenian life towards the ideals of Republic, but sought to do such
through education.163 However, in this reading, Plato’s education was not only that of elites,
like in Strauss’s and Bloom’s view, but also education of a wider audience, through the use
of the rhetorically constructed images such as the noble lie, the γενναῖον ψεῦδος (Pl. Resp.
414b-c). Such rhetorical images, while not being the truth prized by the philosopher, have a
similar moral and actionable effect as truth on the broader populace.164 Her thesis is
supported by analyses of the speeches of the court orators, particularly Aeschines,
Demosthenes, and Lycurgus, in which she identifies Platonic language and topoi in the
debates about how best to respond to the foreign policy threat of Macedon as well as the
domestic political conflicts between Aeschines and Demosthenes.165 However, as Allen
herself notes, such cross-references do not necessarily mean that the philosophers were
influential in politics, but that the orators’ debates were, like the works of the philosophers,
grappling with the same fundamental and practical questions “of what type of city to
build.”166 Regardless of whether Plato or someone in his close circle wrote the Seventh
Letter, the fact that Plato claimed (or was seen to have claimed in his time) that education

Allen (2010): 77.
Allen (2010): 67-68. On pg. 5 of the same work she argues that the low rates of literacy were
not necessarily an impediment to some dissemination of Plato’s ideas solely beyond a literate
and moneyed subsection of society, bringing up the fact that the Academy was not a
hermetically sealed group, but as Kierstead (2013): 214 puts it, “The location and origins of the
philosophical schools fed into their character in the fourth century as open, dynamic
163
164

institutions with permeable boundaries with the rest of the Athenian polis.”
165
Allen (2010): 119-121.
166
Allen (2010): 113.
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in philosophy was necessary for rulers (Pl. L. 7.326b) seems to bear out the idea that Plato
pragmatically sought to reshape the values of his own community, even if it was through
writing and teaching rather than active political engagement.
If one understands Plato as a critic of Athenian democracy as existed in his time,
therefore, the critiques his interlocutors make about Athenian political behaviors and
political culture are necessarily reflective about the political climate in which he is writing.
For the purpose of this project, discerning Plato’s intent, or perhaps whether he had
political orientations that could be actualized is secondary to understanding what his
critiques reflect about democracy in his day. I do not deem it divisive to say that Plato can
be construed as a “critic of popular rule,” questioning the capability of the broader
populace to engage in political decision-making, while raising questions of the necessity of
expertise, and specialized knowledge in politics.167 If Plato’s views can be considered a
reaction against Athenian democracy, the highly structured and regulated cities in speech
that appear in the Republic and the Laws can be seen as being in explicit opposition to and in
criticism of Athenian πολυπραγμοσύνη.
A section in the Charmides initially seems reminiscent of the kind of ἀπραγμοσύνη
that Lyisas’s elite speakers appear to be promoting when they tie their lack of political
activity to both their “κόσμιος” and “σώφρων” characters. Socrates, speaking with
Charmides, Plato’s family member and future oligarchic revolutionary, describes his
interlocutor as both handsome and of good family (Pl. Charm. 154b-d). Socrates inquires as
to what the meaning of temperance (σωφροσύνη) is, and after several failed attempts,
Charmides offers the formulation that it is “τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν,” to mind one’s own
167

Ober (1998): 161.
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business, or to do one’s own things, claiming that he has heard it from another person (Pl.
Chrm. 161b). Socrates, sardonically claiming that Charmides must have heard this from
some other of the wise men (τῶν σοφῶν), rounds on Critias, who he believes to be the
author of this dictum, calling it an enigma or riddle (αἴνιγμα, 161c).
Socrates—taking “minding one’s own things” literally, by understanding τὰ ἑαυτοῦ
to mean an individual’s physical possessions—asks whether a city would be well managed
(εὖ οἰκεῖσθαι) if everyone produced everything they needed for themselves, if “there was a
law commanding each man to weave and wash his own cloak, make his own shoes, and oil
flask and scraper, and perform everything else by this same principle of keeping his hands
off other people’s things and by making and doing his own” (161e-162a). When Charmides
agrees that this hypothetical would not be good governance, Socrates responds that if
being governed temperately is the same as governing well (σωφρόνως γε οἰκοῦσα εὖ ἂν
οἰκοῖτο), a city where everyone minded their own business (being the working temperate)
would not be governed well, and therefore the two things are not the same (162a-b).
Following this, Critias is incensed, and is depicted as having an emotional stake (162d-e) in
this argument.
The situational use of the phrase τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν, along with a praise of
σώφρων behavior might remind the reader of Lysias’s defenses of his wealthy clients. Yet,
on the other hand, the fact that Plato has Critias—who was an actively violent member of
the oligarchic faction—roused to defend such a claim, does not seem unintentional.168
Several of Lysias’s clients use the formulae of being σώφρων and minding their own
business in the same breaths that they deny aiding and abetting the oligarchic revolutions
168

Xen. Hell. 2.3.15 names Critias as specifically ordering the death of democratic sympathizers.
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of the late fifth century.169 Yet, as I hope to have demonstrated in my last chapter, in the
fifth century, such language of encouraging others to mind their own business was often to
circumscribe activity that was deemed unsuitable for them by another person.170 While it
should be remembered that this is a fictional dialogue, constructed perhaps decades after
any hypothetical dramatic date, the fact that a pro-oligarchic aristocrat in mid-fifth
century Athens (before the revolutions) could be plausibly presented as endorsing or
having devised such a formulation fits with the essentially negative aristocratic attitude
towards Athenian democratic political activity and behavior represented by
πολυπραγμοσύνη.171
Critias would not (unlike Lysias’s clients) perhaps deny that he was active in
politics. He might, however, as a member of the χρηστοί, disdain the type of non-elite,
active, and institutionally vigorous political activity represented by πολυπραγμοσύνη and
embrace τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν as a proscriptive doctrine.172 Each one should do what is their
own business, and explicit in the moral claims of the fifth-century χρηστοί (who might also
indeed describe themselves as σώφρων and κόσμιος) is an expectation of a monopoly on
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Lys. 7.41, 20.14; Lateiner (1982): 7-9.

Leigh (2013): 18: “It is the voluntary circumscription of one’s own activities and is the
opposite of unwelcome or uninvited intervention in that which is proper to others. Yet, it also
admits of a more prescriptive application if we do not ourselves decide what is our proper
business but have that decisions made for us.”
171
Nails (2002): 311 puts an estimated dramatic date at 430 B.C., when Critias is in middle age,
and Charmides—whom we can say was at least of a politically active age in 404/403 B.C.—is still
in his youth.
170

Socrates offers a detailed backstory of the honor, fame, and wealth embodied in the
aristocratic lineage of both Critias and Charmides at Pl. Chrm. 157e-158c. Connor (1971): 18-22;
Ober (1989): 85 and 251.
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influencing civic life.173 Meanwhile their opposites, the πονηροί, who seek power through
serving as public speakers, council members, or court litigants, are to be deterred.174 It is
true that in this dialogue, Critias refrains from exploring the political implications of such a
formulation in search of a better definition of σωφροσύνη, yet the fictional Critias exists in
a different political world than his analogues in Lysias’s speeches. Whereas Critias might be
able to wholeheartedly adopt the claim that one should “mind their own business”—given
that part of his culturally entitled business is politics—following the tyrannies, it is not
acceptable for a wealthy litigant in popular rhetoric to embrace participation in politics as
part of their “own business,” or to seek to circumscribe that of others as a matter of due
course. Plato, on the other hand, writing dialogues rather than public speeches, has a
freedom to interact with, and expand—possibly to an unrecognizable extent—the political
notions behind this throwaway phrase of an aristocratic partisan.175
The formulation of τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν appears in the Republic at a crucial point,
and when it does appear, it is directly paired with πολυπραγμοσύνη. While initially

Rosenbloom (2004): 56 n. 3 notes that a host of associated terms with χρηστός are “kalos
k’agathos, gennaios, eugenes, dikaios, sophron, kosimos, metrios, dexios, mousikos, eusebes”.
Rosenbloom (2004): 63: “This ideological positioning legitimates its moral leadership (aretê) and
elicits the consent, honor (timê), and gratitude (charis) of all classes”; Ar. Eq. 1274-75 praises the
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χρηστοί as worthy of being well reckoned, “ὅστις εὖ λογίζεται.”
174
Rosenbloom (2004): 61: “Leaders marked ponêros perform speaking roles that require
knowledge of political and legal procedure, but they lack traditional elite attributes; they serve
as un-elected rhêtores and allotted bouletai.
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Leigh (2013): 19 calls this an “avowedly commonplace” phrase, and Critias’s use of it as
reflective of a more popular usage, while Adkins (1976): 302 sees it as important that the
definition comes from Critias or “another wise man,” meaning that it is not simply a popular
convention. On 325 Adkins argues that in using the phrase τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πραττείν, Charmides and
Critias “evidently wished to confine political activity to their own, very small, group of
aristocratic Athenians.”
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constructing the idealized city in speech, Kallipolis, Socrates has Glaucon and Adeimantus
agree to a principle of division of labor: a person does a better job if they only practice a
single craft, and does the best at the single craft to which they are naturally suited (Pl. Resp.
2.370b-c). He further argues that one person cannot attempt to “dabble in many things”
(ἐπιχειροῖ, πολλῶν ἐφαπτόμενος), because they will not be good at them (Pl. Resp. 3.394e).
Such an agreement may not be objectionable under some branches of modern economic
theory and conceptions of labor specialization.176 But it becomes more controversial and
contradictory to Athens’ popular democratic ideology as the dialogue continues, and the
principle of specialization is extended beyond the economic and into the political and
social fields. Socrates notes that such principles lead to a city where one finds a “cobbler
who is a cobbler, and not also a captain along with his cobbling, and a farmer who is a
farmer and not also a juror along with his farming” (Pl. Resp. 3.397e). Such an argument is
antithetical to the democracy at its core—the very nature of the council, the assembly, and
the juries is predicated on the democratic belief that the wisdom of mass and collective
decision-making was superior, and that all citizens could participate, even if they were a
cobbler or a farmer.177 To push it farther, structurally, Athenian democracy in the fourth

Ober (2008): 94 connects this argument with the modern theory of Taylorist and Fordist
industrial organization, which involves applying expert technical knowledge in the
management echelons to determine best practices and production strategies and imparting it
down to the non-experts at the lower echelons of decision-making.
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Ober (1998): 33. Markle (1985): 275: “The kinds of citizens who predominated in the Athenian
assembly were craftsmen, traders, and farmers, and these persons required some compensation
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for loss of earnings when they took time off from their occupations to attend the assembly.”
Xen. Mem. 3.7.6 has Socrates describe assembly attendants as “fullers, shoemakers, carpenters,
blacksmiths, farmers, merchants, or traders…”
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century required the participation of those workers without leisure.178 These are the same
men who most obviously did not have the time—as the Athenian Stranger mandates for
citizens in Plato’s Laws for largely the same reasons of lack of competence at more than one
profession as in the Republic—to refrain from work and solely cultivate civic virtue.179
Socrates himself notes that this forced separation of citizen duties is something
that could happen solely in Kallipolis. The fact that each person is not two or multiple
I take the council as an example, because the council is often said to have been the least open
to wage laborers given that it met on a daily basis (and members even slept in the Pyrtaneion
during their Prytany), according to Rhodes (1972): 30-31. Therefore it is most often considered
to have been a full-time occupation in the way that Plato’s Socrates discusses here. Hansen
178

(1986): argues that the institutional structure of the boule in Athens meant that it required at
least 19,000 citizens to be of serving age (above 30) in the population in the fourth century,
which would mean that if the citizen population was near 25,000 or even 30,000 as Hansen and
others argue, then anywhere from 63-76 percent of the citizen body had to serve on the boule
for it to function adequately. Hansen (1999): 249 again notes that almost two thirds of citizens
over forty would have served on the council in their lifetime, and the boule itself must have
required a “reasonable” number of thetes, the lowest wealth class of the Athenian citizenry.
Sinclair (1988): 106 argues that in the fifth century there was a restriction on the thetic class
serving in the council, but “it was very likely that by the 320s the question of the census class
was ignored, as it was in respect to the election of archons, and that thetes were members of
the council.” As Markle (1985): 271 argues, the point of instituting assembly, council, and jury
pay was to enable those who work full time to support themselves and their dependents “to
take time off from their occupations to perform public service and attend festivals.” Sinclair
(1988): 108 also argues that the payment to councilors was more regular, and higher (5 obols),
and more frequent (260 days of service) than either assembly or jury pay, and might have been
enough to allow a laborer to participate in most or all of the meetings with good conscience.
179
Pl. Leg. 8.846b-847b (block translations of Platonic dialogues are all from Cooper (1997) unless
otherwise noted) “A citizen’s vocation, which demands a great deal of practice and study, is to
establish and maintain good order in a community, and this is not a job for part-timers.” I
would argue that in contrast, Athenian government in the fourth century could be considered
wholly as a job of part-timers, particularly the assembly, the courts, and to a lesser degree, the
council. Yes, given the regularity of meetings, frequency of court cases, and requirements of
the council, Athenian government may have been a democracy of part-timers, but certainly not
amateurs. Harris (1986): 363 notes that the Assembly met at least four times per prytany, which
means at minimum, forty meetings per year.
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people simultaneously, as Socrates puts it (διπλοῦς ἀνὴρ παρ᾽ ἡμῖν οὐδὲ πολλαπλοῦς, Pl.
Resp. 3.397e), certainly differs from the vision of Thucydides’ Pericles in the Funeral
Oration. He, speaking to a popular audience, praised Athens as one of the sole places in
Greece that produces versatile and dexterous citizens (εὐτραπέλως, Thuc. 2.41) who, as was
mentioned in the previous chapter, are able to attend well to their own private as well as
public affairs (τοῖς αὐτοῖς οἰκείων ἅμα καὶ πολιτικῶν, Thuc. 2.40). Socrates does not at this
point name Athens as the subject of his barbs, but one can easily see what he leaves out.
The multiplicity of roles that any individual can fulfill in Athenian democracy, be it cobbler
and juror, sailor and assemblyman, peasant farmer and councilman, which Pericles praises
as the heart of what a democratic constitution is, are conspicuously absent. In fact, the
tripartite structure of rulers, guardians, and laborers is to be fixed in place by the noble
falsehood (γενναῖον ψεῦδος) and foundational myth of Kallipolis that legitimizes the firm
division of individuals into separate immutable classes (Pl. Resp. 3.414c). Socrates states
that it will be given out that a divine oracle foretells disaster for the city if the classes are
ever to be mixed (Pl. Resp 3.415c). For, given that Socrates had stated (and his interlocutors
agreed) that individuals are suited to only be in one of the three classes in the city by
nature, and that the individuals in each class are only able to do one thing well, it would be
harmful to the proper functioning of the city if citizens were to switch roles (Pl. Resp.
4.434b).
Socrates goes on to offer the formulation that in the proposed city (in speech),
justice is therefore “for each one to do one’s own things and not to meddle” (ὅτι τὸ αὑτοῦ
ἕκαστος εἷς ὢν ἔπραττε καὶ οὐκ ἐπολυπραγμόνει, 4.433d). In the inverse, injustice in the
city therefore is for “there to be exchange between the different classes and meddling in
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the jobs of others” (δοκεῖν ταύτην τὴν τούτων μεταβολὴν καὶ πολυπραγμοσύνην ὄλεθρον
εἶναι τῇ πόλει, 4.434b-c). Πολυπραγμοσύνη, in the words of Socrates, results in the
destruction of the highly ordered and segmented polity of the proposed city (in speech).
This city, which is both self-controlled and moderate (σώφρονα), and ruled by the prudent
minority of best-educated and best-natured individuals (φρονήσεως τῆς ἐν τοῖς ἐλάττοσί τε
καὶ ἐπιεικεστέροις, 4.431d), is also just. The fact that Socrates offers πολυπραγμοσύνη as the
worst injustice in such a city could not have been lost on the contemporary Athenian ear.
Unlike the orators, who used the charge of πολυπραγμοσύνη to rhetorically negate their
individual opponents’ behaviors in the eyes of the jurors, Plato—like Thucydides—offers a
definition of πολυπραγμοσύνη that is leveled at the institutions and character of the
democratic Athenian polis as a whole. By tying injustice to πολυπραγμοσύνη, Socrates’
critique is aimed squarely at Athens, where part-timers and the less formally educated
enjoyed a share in and sometimes dominated politics.180
Socrates further ties such meddling specifically to democratic constitutions, when
he notes that oligarchy (having previously devolved from the best regime to timocracy,
and then to oligarchy) devolves to democracy partly because it allows meddling; under this
constitution, oligarchs—who fear to arm the masses—have to serve as farmers, moneymakers, and soldiers all at the same time (8.551e). The fact that property can be sold in an
oligarchy allows for the creation of a class of those without property, “πένητες”—a word of
contested meaning, ranging from day laborers to indigent poor—that eventually endeavors
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to establish a democracy.181 The democracy is characterized by many of the things that
Socrates praised his Kallipolis for lacking, namely total freedom, freedom of speech, and the
license for each individual to do as they wish (ἐλευθερίας ἡ πόλις μεστὴ καὶ παρρησίας
γίγνεται, καὶ ἐξουσία ἐν αὐτῇ ποιεῖν ὅτι τις βούλεται, 8.557b).182 In the democratic city one
finds people of all variety of types (παντοδαποὶ δὴ ἂν οἶμαι ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ πολιτείᾳ, 8.557c).
Socrates calls democracy an anarchic constitution—literally “ἄν-αρχος,” without rulers—
that provides equality to equals and non-equals alike (ἴσοις τε καὶ ἀνίσοις, 8.558c).
In creating Kallipolis, Socrates identifies (and circumscribes) two interlocking facets
of democratic life—freedom and πολυπραγμοσύνη. The just city is radically different from a
democracy in its relationship to freedom and permissiveness. The social structure is rigid,
and all roles, be they economic or civic, are specialized according to individual natures.
Participation of individuals in the diverse roles of wage-labor, farming, commerce, law
court judging, assembly decision-making, and military service—all roles that an Athenian
citizen might plausibly fulfill over the course of their lifetime, sometimes
simultaneously183—is made possible by the political equality and freedom that democratic
regimes offer. The democratic constitution, in Plato’s telling, does not only permit, but
actively promotes dabbling in many things. However, in the just city, such behavior is

Markle (1985): 268: “Use of the terms πενία and ἀπορία and their related forms by other
ancient writers also indicates that the poor included people who had to work for a living and
lacked leisure. Indeed, the nouns πενία and πένης are derived from the verb πένομαι which
means to ‘labour’.”
182
At Pl. Resp. 4.431b Socrates had noted that “one finds all kinds of diverse desires, pleasures,
and pains, mostly in children, women, household slaves, and in those of the inferior majority
181

called free.” In the city in speech, as was noted above, inferior many are ruled by and restrained
by the prudent few (4.431d).
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Leigh (2013): 20.

76

characterized as πολυπραγμοσύνη, and the height of injustice. In making his broader
arguments about the moral licentiousness (Resp. 8.556-558, Leg. 3.700-701) and political
amateurism of democratic life, Plato places the fact that the Athenians are busy about and
dabble in many things (πολυπραγμονοῦσι) as one of the key facets of such a life.
Socrates’ stated goal in constructing the just city in the Republic is to offer by
analogy the example of the just man (Resp. 4.435b). This text has therefore been read as not
offering practical political suggestions.184 Yet, some of the ideological implications, if not
practical blueprint of the Republic are also expressed in Plato’s Laws. The hypothetical polis
described in the Laws also emphasizes unity and order, while at the same time seeking to
minimize contact between social classes, enforcing specialization, and endorsing
associational rigidity—offering another way to reducing the ability or intention for citizens
to “dabble in many things.” Again, because of Plato’s status as a critic of democracy (and
the fact that his primary speaker in the laws is the “Athenian Stranger”) the innovations
introduced in the Laws are particularly interesting for what they reveal in relationship or
in opposition to Athens.185
In the Republic, the commercial and laboring classes are to have no say in political
leadership, but they are still considered to be part of the state.186 However, in the Laws, the
metics and slaves in the city—who lack political or even long-term residence rights—fill the
Allen (2006): 127-128; Pl. Resp. 9.592b offers the possibility of the existence of the just city as a
blueprint for a real polis as ambiguous: “But perhaps, I [Socrates] said, there is a model of it in
heaven, for anyone who wants to look at it and to make himself its citizen on the strength of
what he sees. It makes no difference whether it is or ever will be somewhere, for he would take
part in the practical affairs of that city and no other.”
184

Ober (1998): 160.
Establishing their status and co-fraternity with the other classes of the state is the point of
the noble lie in Resp. 4.414b.
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same roles that the lowest class of citizens did in the Republic. Metics are allowed to stay in
the city for only twenty years (Pl. Leg. 8.850b-c), while slaves are to be imported from
different countries and speak different languages, and therefore have little cultural or
social connection to the city whatsoever (Leg. 6.777c-d).187 Like the Republic, strict
separation of roles is enforced to a degree: citizens are banned from working as
craftspeople and laborers (Leg. 8.846d), as such roles are only to be filled by metics (Leg.
8.849d). Even within the class of craftspeople and laborers, there is to be no switching of
roles.188 In contrast to contemporary Athens, the laboring class is not only institutionally
excluded from politics, but also spatially separated from each other and the rest of the
citizens through their residency in thirteen separate districts around the city (Leg.
8.848e).189 The only interactions between citizens and the craftsmen metics are to be
through mediated and regulated business in the city’s twelve separate and orderly markets,
overseen by the market-wardens, and then only on specific days of the month (Leg. 8.848e849c). Such activity is a far cry from the agora at Athens, which served as a civic,
commercial, and social space.190 The Athenian agora provided the backdrop for interactions
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Stalley (1983): 106-108.

This is a law to be enforced by the City-Wardens (Leg. 8.847a). In the Republic, Socrates and
Glaucon had agreed that a carpenter attempting “to do the work of a cobbler” would do some
small harm to the city, but far less notable when compared to the harm of a craftsman
attempting enter the ranks of soldiers (Pl. Resp. 4.434b).
189
Sobak (2015): 705 n. 71.
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Wycherly (1956): 3: “If law-courts were embedded in market-districts, political activity too
was not confined to council-house and magistrates’ office but was carried on vigorously in the
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neighboring shops just as in the cafés of modern Athens”; Camp (1992): 122: While many of the
smaller shops were not on the public square known as the agora proper in the fifth century,
there were also large stoai constructed as early as the 420s B.C. (such as “South Stoa I”) where
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between many different social classes and individuals, often to the chagrin of conservative
critics at the time.191 In this way the Athenian interlocutor of the Laws appears acutely
aware of and responsive to Athenian social behaviors that are not what we in the modern
day would call political, but seem to be linked together for ancient thinkers.
The fact that the ideal city of Magnesia in the Laws is characterized not only by
institutional and social rigidity but also geographic and spatial separation highlights one of
the characteristics of πολυπραγμοσύνη that has been teased at by various writers who had
associated it with the urban polis, the agora, and the civic institutions, but not explicitly
drawn the connection. In Plato, the polypragmatic behaviors that characterize democratic
cities are not only institutional; they also refer to types of individual behaviors that expand
purely social interactions and increase contact between the ostensibly separated groups in
the ideal poleis. Whether the intended goal, or part of a broader goal of creating unity in
these ideal cities, it seems that both the Athenian Stranger and Socrates (and other
conservative critics of socializing, politicking, and non-elite interactions in the agora)
attempt to hamper a process of democratic information-gathering and knowledge sharing
that is only made possible in a city where individuals are polypragmatic—where the farmer
and urban laborer (or the silversmiths and the cobblers) work and trade together in the

private individuals were allowed to carry out commerce in the heart of the agora. South Stoa I
itself bordered the Heliaia, the main court of the city.
191
Vlassopoulos (2007): 40; Aristotle Politics 1331b argues that in his ideal city that there should
be different agorai and locations for economic business, for sacred buildings, law courts, and
leisure. He recommends particularly a Thessalian agora, which is called a “ἐλευθέραν,” into
which “no artisan or farmer may intrude unless summoned by the magistrates.”
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agora, attend the assembly together and serve on the council, and perhaps serve in the
military together.192
It is not, however, only the metics and citizens who are separated spatially from
each other in this polis, it is also the citizens who are set spatially apart from each other as
well. In the ideal state of the Laws, all families are to own equally divided lots of agricultural
land (Leg. 5.737d-e), making them in essence, farmers. As was mentioned above, citizens are
to refrain from manufacture and trade but it is not entirely clear whether these citizens
will be working their own land, or slaves will be doing it for them.193 The fact that the
citizens are ordered to concentrate solely on maintaining good order, which requires study
and practice, and is not a part-time job, seems at odds with the Athenian Stranger’s
comments that the lowest two classes of the citizen population need not (and presumably
will not regularly) attend the assembly (6.764a). In the theorized Magnesia the citizens are
to own land, serve in the military, and elect leaders and (to a degree) engage in politics—
something that appears to be breaking the dictum set down in the republic of
specialization. However, Stalley notes that the roles that had previously been kept away
from the guardians and the rulers of Kallipolis by assigning them to the lowest class of
citizens, in this case have been pawned off on the metics and the slaves of the city, who do
not participate in the franchise.194 In the case of the Laws, the citizens are homogenized and

Vlassopoulos (2007): 40; Ar. Nub. 1002-8; Theophrastus’s Characters abound with individuals
who are presented as being particularly onerous, chatty, and gossiping in marketplaces;
Aristophanes’ characters (Ar. Ach. 725) particularly associate the agora with commerce,
πολυπράγμονες, and sycophants; as mentioned in the last chapter, the autourgos in Euripides’
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Orestes 930 is notable and praised for rarely being in the marketplace.
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given roughly the same roles, and much of their association and personal contact is not
separate from, but under the umbrella of the central state. The twelve village centers
established outside of the main city center in Magnesia (known as demes) are “spatially
extended enough not to be natural sites of associational activity.”195 While the citizens are
often brought together to eat in common messes established by the state called syssitia,
(Leg. 1.635e-636a) they are not particularly encouraged to associate formally or informally
outside of the institutions of the central state. Solidarity is so important to Magnesia that
the Athenian Stranger can say that “ἑταιρεία,” companions, clubs, or associations, are one
of the most dangerous things for the state.196
The fact that the Stranger in Plato’s Laws spatially separates and regulates the kind
of behaviors that are allowed to occur in the agorai of Magnesia is perhaps one of the
greatest ways that he differentiates his cities from the contemporary Athenian life. To an
elite critic such as Plato, the agora of Athens might represent the height of
πολυπραγμοσύνη. As noted before, those seeking information, rumors, and gossip all
operate in the marketplace and by the court buildings located therein. However, a huge
variety of interconnected and diverse activities happened on a daily basis in the Athenian
agora. After listing the variety of judicial, economic, conversational, and entertainment
activates that went on in one of Athens’ large stoai197—the architecturally open, covered,

Kierstead (2013): 6.
Kierstead (2013): 7.
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Millett (1998): 215: The Stoa Poikile served as a patriotic art gallery, a military museum, an
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execution chamber, a location for arbitration, a law-court, a strolling place for the stoic
philosophers and fashionable men of letters, as well as a haven of street entertainers and
beggars.
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and multifunctional colonnades that surrounded the city’s squares198—Millet summarizes
them as synecdoche of the activities in Athens’ agora as a whole:
“The mixing of activities and persons within the space of the Stoa Poikile
exemplifies in miniature the blending of formal and informal, public and private
that went on over the whole of the Agora area. In civic terms, the classical Agora
was the setting for administration, publicity, justice, ostracism, imprisonment,
religion, processions, dancing, athletics, and equestrian displays. In addition to
persons passing through, individuals might gather there to get information (official
or otherwise), gather a crowd, gamble, torture a slave, get hired as labourers, bid
for contracts, accost a prostitute, seek asylum, have a haircut, beg for money or
food, fetch water, watch a cock-fight and find out the time. The list is hardly
exhaustive. And going on all around was the business of buying and selling.”199
In contrast, Plato separates the civic and political from the economic, commercial,
and social in the Laws. Assemblies are moved to religious sites (Leg. 5.738d) and magistrates
are to be elected in temples (Leg. 8.848d). As was mentioned above, strict regulations are
imposed on buying and selling, and interactions between citizens, slaves, and metic
craftspeople in the marketplaces are monitored for their conduct; goods are sold for fixed
prices (Leg. 8.849-850a). In contrast, in Millett’s words, the agora of Athens provided a
“neutral stage on which all citizens, however poor, had good reason regularly to appear,
relate to, and (if they wished) compete with each other.”200 The structure of Athens’ own
agora and its relationship to civic spaces also keys into one of Plato’s key arguments against
πολυπραγμοσύνη. The spatial closeness of the workshops and stalls to civic spaces allows
Wycherly (1978): 37 notes the radical openness of the stoai: “essentially it was a long narrow
structure with a solid wall on one long side and an open colonnade on the other” and “was not
attached to any other structure, but rather formed the edge of an open space.”
199
See Millett (1998): 215 cf. n. 25 on 215-216 for what is an incredibly extensive list of literary
198

references in classical Athenian literature to all of the above activities happening in the
Athenian agora.
200
Millett (1998): 220.
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more individuals to participate more easily in the civic activities of the city. The hill of the
Pnyx, which is near the agora, is less than a ten-minute walk away. Xenophon’s “fullers,
shoemakers, smiths, peasants, and merchants” are enabled to dominate the assembly,
partially because the assembly is so close to their place of work.201 It is not hard to imagine
that many of the banausoi of Athens’ marketplace could attend some of the shorter
assembly meetings.202 They could have performed this duty without significant cost to their
earnings in a given day, especially if many of their clients and neighboring vendors were
doing the same.203 For those wishing to attend the courts, the spatial location was even
more congruous—most courts met in the agora. Many private suits were over in two hours,
and while public suits had the potential to last all day, jurors were still compensated.204
The cities of the Republic and the Laws are not structurally or entirely ideologically
consistent with each other, nor do they have to be for the purposes of this study.205 What is
crucial about the two depictions of idealized states in Plato’s works is what they reveal
Millett (1998): 223.
Hansen (1999): 136 notes that it was noteworthy that meetings might go from dawn to dusk.
More often than not, the Athenian assembly meetings (which began in the morning) probably
lasted a few hours and were over by midday. The fact that the council often met for their daily
meeting after assembly meetings demonstrates that meetings could not have regularly been all
day affairs.
203
The fact that the assembly became paid throughout the fourth century certainly would have
201
202

aided this process as well, at a rate that started at 3 obols for an assembly meeting, which grew
to 1 drachma, according to Ath. Pol. 41.3 and Jones (1952): 14. On 23-24 Jones also heartily rejects
the claim that one could make a living drawing pay from serving on the various organs of
government. The yearlong council pay could only be drawn for at most, twice in a lifetime,
while the possibility of being one of the 6000 jurors in a given year was slim and not something
to be counted on. He sums up: “The majority of the citizens were then workers who earned
their own livings and whose political pay served only to compensate them in some measure for
loss of working time.”
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about what Plato, an acute observer and critic of Athenian political life, saw as particularly
noteworthy and particularly democratic. Beginning with the contentions that individuals
are best suited to one role, and that political expertise requires specialization and
education not available to the majority of citizens in his contemporary democracy due to
both their lack of education and natural capacities, Plato’s characters construct highly
ordered societies, and therefore remove non-elites from the processes of political decisionmaking. Underlying the arguments of the Republic and the Laws, and explicitly stated in the
Statesman, is the contestation that the majority of these non-elite individuals (who served
as jurors, assemblymen, and magistrates in democratic Athens) had any sort of knowledge
of a political art of ruling that was distinct from their own discrete and separate trades (Pl.
Plt. 305c). Here the ideal ruler is posited as the one that knows how to organize these
discrete and separate arts based on when is the right and wrong time to use them (305d). It
could be noted that such an organization of the discrete and separate trades by a single
mind is essentially the ideal that is expressed in the social organizations in the Republic and
the Laws.206 There society is ordered by educated elites who (in the Republic in particular)
grasp the expert knowledge of the Form of the Good, one that is “not communicable to
non-experts.”207 Plato is therefore concerned with, and highly critical of the value of
knowledge among common people, particularly those that participated in Athens’
democracy, and the possibly of such knowledge to shape good decision-making.208

Sobak (2015): 705.
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Plato’s emphasis on questioning popular wisdom and establishing different
standards of valid knowledge than that of the democratic populace is directly related to his
desire to limit πολυπραγμοσύνη in both of his cities. My sketch of the πολυπράγμων in fifth
and fourth century Athenian literature suggests that one of the primary facets of the
πολυπράγμων, and of a cultural stereotype of a busybody—even in our day—is inquisitive,
active, and information-seeking behavior. The orators (who have rhetorical defense as
their goals) and playwrights (who had comedy as theirs) had often connected the gathering
and spread of such information to the goal of aiding libelous prosecutions, abetted by
slander and rumor. Such behavior can really only be played out in the open spaces of the
city—particularly in places like the agora, in ways that I have already sketched out above.
Demosthenes notes that his opponent in Against Aristogeiton makes his way through the
marketplace seeking individuals against whom to bring calumny or mischief (Dem. 25.52).
Demosthenes additionally calls Aristogeiton part of a class of meddlers (τῶν
περιεργαζομένων, Dem. 26.15). Aristophanes’ Wealth ties the spread of rumors in the polis to
the people who sit gossiping in barbers’ shops (Ar. Plut. 337-338), and in a fragment of
Eupolis a slave announces that he learns many things in the barbershops. When Peisetairos,
the embodiment of Athenian πολυπραγμοσύνη in Aristophanes’ Birds, critiques the Birds
for being ignorant and not inquisitive (ἀμαθὴς γὰρ ἔφυς κοὐ πολυπράγμων, Ar. Av. 469471), he highlights the relationship between information gathering and πολυπραγμοσύνη.
One of the most notable images of the information gathering πολυπράγμων comes
from Plato himself. His Socrates, in the Apology, when on trial for his life, admits that his
traditional activity of interrogating individuals about their morals in private (ἰδίᾳ μὲν
ταῦτα συμβουλεύω) might be viewed as meddling (πολυπραγμονῶ, Pl. Ap. 31c). The use of
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“ἰδίᾳ” which can mean “in private,” or “as a private citizen” is in this case deceiving. While
Socrates claims to never have had any public political role of speaking in the assembly,
holding magisterial office, or pursuing lawsuits in the courts (Pl. Ap. 32b), his inquiries are
an entirely public affair. In Plato’s dialogues, they more often take place in public spaces
such as the agora, public stoai, on the streets of Athens, at open palaestra and gymnasia,
inhabited by and including diverse social classes and individuals and in front of spectators
just as they are to be private conversations set in the homes of Socrates’ wealthy and
aristocratic associates.209 Xenophon (in contrast to Plato) represents Socrates as actually
interacting with many artisans and laborers, and other lower folk.210 In Plato’s Apology,
Socrates himself mentions that he has interrogated the manual artisans (Pl. Ap. 22b) along
with the poets and the politicians as to their sources of wisdom. For both the sycophant
and the itinerant philosopher, figures that are tarred with the name of πολυπράγμων, the
intermingling, spatial closeness, and occupational diversity that is present in Athens is
crucial to their business of generating and sifting through information in a democratic
city-state. Athens was not, as multiple scholars have noted, a face-to-face society with
“everyone knowing everyone else and their business.”211 However, “free spaces” in Athens
like the agora, which gathered—either due to business, politics, or leisure—a wide variety
of individuals of differing social status and function (some citizens, some not) were crucial

In the agora: Menexeus, Parmenides; in streets and public places: Gorgias, Second Alcibiades,
Greater Hippias, Ion, Meno; at palestrai, gymnasia and other schools: Charmides, Lysis, Euthydemus,
Theaetetus, Sophist, Statesman; Public buildings and stoai: Euthyphro, Eryxias, Theages. Locations
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for maintaining the possibility and opportunities for random or deliberate information
gathering through encounters between citizens.212
Whether entirely intentional or simply a side goal of his broader philosophic
treatments of the just cities, in constructing elaborately rigid and spatially separated
societies Plato negates even the possibility of these kinds of exchanges, contacts, and
accumulation and dispersal of knowledge between groups and classes that is represented
by the Socratic πολυπράγμων. There also would have been little room in Plato’s ideal cities
for many of the characters depicted by the writer Theophrastus, comic types that
nevertheless reveal some things about Athenian social behavior in the fourth century.213
Such figures not only include the περίεργος, a fourth century synonym for πολυπράγμων,214
but also the chatty individual who goes about from group to group, marketplace to palestra,
seeking and spreading information (Theophr. Char. 7.4-6.), or the garrulous man who
approaches strangers in public places and engages them in conversation unprompted
(Theophr. Char. 3.1-3). Obviously, such individuals are presented as caricatures, but Plato’s
ideal societies seem to present little use for such individuals—they are idlers, dabblers in
many things that are not their own, and busybodies. I only hint here at the value that such
individuals like Plato’s Socrates and even Theophrastus’s “garrulous man” have for the
functioning of the democracy—that will be a major piece of my final chapter.

Vlassopoulos (2007): 38: “Free spaces are spaces that brought together citizens, metics, slaves
and women, created common experiences and interactions, and shaped new forms of identity.
We can define a number of such spaces: the agora, the workplace, the tavern, the house, the
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Plato’s work demonstrates clearly that—at least in his mind—πολυπραγμοσύνη was
a crucial part of the Athenian democratic character and experience, both an outgrowth of
the rule of the many and the political equality and freedom that Athenian social and
political life introduced. Thus, it was something to be limited and mitigated, and his
prescriptions for Kallipolis and the city of Magnesia in the Laws reflect this desire, through
the institution of rigid specialization of both political and economic roles. Yet, it seems that
Plato’s spatially separated and closed societies do not simply work towards the goal of
creating expertise by promoting specialization. They also seem particularly geared towards
hampering the social conditions that allowed for the gathering of knowledge and its
dispersal in democratic Athens—particularly in their antipathy to the mix of business,
politics, and social life present in the Athenian agora. A crucial part about being a
πολυπράγμων is not simply being a doer of many things, but also being a knower of many
things. The fact that the way this elite epistemic critique of Athens is borne out in part by
directly limiting πολυπραγμοσύνη points to a larger question of how the Athenian citizens
generate, gather, and disperse knowledge amongst themselves, and the value and utility of
polypragmatic behaviors to democratic decision-making. 215 In my next chapter—in
conjunction with theories from modern social science—I hope to demonstrate that
behaviors that are typically described as polypragmatic and negative (by both democrats
and critics of the democracy) actually aided the Athenian process of knowledge dispersal,
enforced and supported community norms, and led to the kind of political and community
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culture that could truly be described by Thucydides as innovative, swift, and
adventurous.216

216

Thuc. 1.70.
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Chapter Four
Epistem ic Dem ocracy and the Polypragm on
The broad Platonic critique of Athenian culture, political institutions, and social
structure that I have highlighted in the Republic, Laws, and the Statesman was primarily
concerned with whether those making decisions in political institutions—namely, the
diverse and significantly non-elite citizens of Athens—are capable of manifesting “a form of
wisdom when they gather in political Assembly, and so prove capable of deciding what
would be best for the polis,” as Ober has succinctly put it.217 While the specifics differ from
dialogue to dialogue, Plato’s characters argue that ruling is something that in idealization
might be done by those individuals with a superior higher knowledge of governing. In the
Republic philosophers or kings carry this out informed by the philosophic Form of the Good
(Pl. Resp. 7.520b-521c), and in the Statesman by the unique individual who possesses a skill of
a secondary level of knowledge from the discrete, separate, and subordinate technai that
are the subject of their direction within the city (Pl. Plt. 304d-305d).218 In the Laws, the small
citizen body technically rules, but the highest sovereignty is given to the laws.219 It has
been noted by scholars that the Platonic treatment of the practical banausic arts and other
technai—which lack the transcendent character of knowledge arrived at through “sight,

Ober (1998): 160.
Among the arts that are “set in motion” when it is “the right time to begin” and the “wrong
time to begin” (305c-d) are the banausic arts involving “work with the hands,” (304b) the art of
rhetoric (304c-e), generalship (304e), and the art of judgement (305c).
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exercise sovereignty in the Republic. Since the ultimate purpose of law is, in Plato’s view, to
make the citizens virtuous, law and education are so closely linked that at times they become
almost indistinguishable.”
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speculation, contemplation”—has led to a long-standing bias against and preference in
higher education and scholarship for a non-banausic definition of “valid knowledge.”220
Plato’s critique of the capacity of democracies to use knowledge to function
effectively works in tandem with, but is substantially different, from comments offered by
other critics of the democracy. A critic like the Old Oligarch shares Plato’s concern about
the morality and the excessive individual freedom permitted at Athens,221 but makes his
primary argument against the democracy not that the rule of the demos—synonymous with
the worse people—is incompetent, but instead that it rules only in the interest of those
worse many (Ps.-Xen. Ath. Pol. 1.1). In fact, the Old Oligarch even grudgingly admits that the
democracy is successful at perpetuating its own regime, but also at accomplishing things
other city-states are unable to do (Ps.-Xen. Ath. Pol. 1.1, 3.1). In a section of Aristotle’s Politics
that has been contested in recent years, the philosopher notes that it is possible that in
deliberation “each person that composes the crowd is not individually a good man, but
when they join together they may be better, not individually, but collectively.”222
At the end of my previous chapter, I provisionally sought to connect Plato’s broader
epistemic critique of democracy with the political and societal proposals that his
220
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characters espouse in the Republic and the Laws, particularly as they relate to
πολυπραγμοσύνη. First, Plato’s Socrates makes explicit the ties between a democratic
political structure and the behaviors of πολυπραγμοσύνη. In the Republic and the Laws, one
sees that it is the endless participation of the Athenians in multiple roles—as soldiers,
artisans, members of associations, and most importantly, participants in decision-making
bodies—as being the essentially polypragmatic characteristic of Athenian social and
political life. In Plato’s thought, this Athenian tendency to do many things is doubly
dangerous—it ensures that individuals will never have the time to perfect one role and will
never be an expert at one thing. Therefore they will sub-optimally fill all of the varied roles
that they attempt to participate in, ruling being the most important of them.223 On first
blush it may not seem that Plato’s focus is specifically concerned with the other types of
πολυπραγμοσύνη that I had sought to demonstrate in my previous chapters, as referenced
by the fifth-century comedians and the fourth-century popular orators, who (in the case of
Euripides and Aristophanes) may have questioned the values and character of frequent
political, social, and economic busyness and involvement, but did not advocate for a
reduction of the franchise or endorse anything like Plato’s social structures. Their
πολυπραγμοσύνη appears as a negative (or at least comic) behavior at the intersection of
public and private life, featuring energetic, information gathering, agora residing, and
lawsuit bringing πολυπράγμονες who are more on the nosy side of being a busybody,
whereas Plato’s polypragmatic democrats appear as the hyperactive doers and joiners—less
223
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the characteristics of the πολυπράγμων. Plato is obviously playing up the fickle and disorderly
aspect of the democratic man, but he is characterized by a multiplicity of impulses, which he
alternatively acts on in seemingly irrational ways.
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interested in information, they are doers of many things—the linguistic essence of πολύπράγματα.
Yet, I believe that the ways that Plato’s ideal poleis attempt to impose social and
spatial rigidity, mediated interactions between citizens, and an antipathy to the culture of
free spaces that characterized Athens is an oblique response to the πολυπραγμοσύνη
represented in the popular culture of Athens—particularly centered on limiting the spread
and generation of democratic knowledge. I will not retread my arguments here, but I
merely reintroduce them to make the argument that Plato’s goal of limiting
πολυπραγμοσύνη in a well-ordered state is equally designed to prevent the kinds of
contexts that undergird the kinds of social, spatial, and situational interactions and ties
that enable Plato’s restless multifarious individuals to judge, vote, buy, sell, and gossip all
on the same day in the same location as well as allow for any number of defendants and
litigants to investigate both fact and rumor amongst their fellow citizens.
Largely because Plato’s epistemic critique of democracy seems antithetical to any
notion of a social basis for valid knowledge, and because the inquisitive πολυπράγμων
which he so proscribes thrives off of a social setting, I see the πολυπράγμων and
πολυπραγμοσύνη as being ripe for analysis on basis of modern social science scholarship
examining social ties, and information dissemination and aggregation in diverse groups. I
would particularly like to follow in the footsteps of modern scholars in the classics who
seek to use theories in modern social science and sociology to resolve quandaries and
criticisms (such as Plato’s) about Athens’ ability to design, implement and enact effective
and “good” policy, in a context where authority political decision-making and executive
action were dispersed broadly amongst a socioeconomically and geographically diverse
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populace. By considering the macro-level issue of Athens as an epistemic democracy
grappling with the question of how to manage and aggregate knowledge and inform its
citizen body, one sees the behaviors of the polypragmatic individual emerge as a useful and
necessary part of the democratic state’s functioning. Such activity also need not be
considered through the lens of altruism or patriotism—in a state such as Athens,
πολυπραγμοσύνη on the part of individuals was indeed necessary to accomplish individual
ends, be they for personal gain or in service of the state. By looking at the subject in this
light, I hope to demonstrate how the behaviors described in such diverse works and
contexts as πολυπραγμοσύνη could have contributed on an individual and micro-level
structurally and socially to a macro-level governing environment where Athens could truly
be considered as the nimble, innovative, and active and adventurous polis that Thucydides’
Corinthians present it to be.
According to Ober, arguably the current leading scholar behind the synthesis of
political science and classical studies on the subject of democracy, knowledge, and
decision-making, a “democracy may said to be ‘epistemic’ to the degree to which it
employs collective wisdom to make good policy.”224 This conception of democracy is not
only concerned with whether, how, and why mass bodies might make good decisions, but is
also interested in exploring the institutions and cultural context that facilitate the spread
of necessary information in a social and political setting, and make such mass decisionmaking possible. Joshua Cohen first introduced the term epistemic democracy into social
science literature in an article where he argued that in an epistemic conception of
democracy, there exists an “independent standard” of correct decision-making, a “cognitive
224
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account of voting” that expresses beliefs about what correct policies are, rather than
simply personal preferences, and an account of “decision making as a process of the
adjustment of beliefs, adjustments that are undertaken in part in light of the evidence
about the correct answer that is provided by the beliefs of others.”225 In his conception,
“what the epistemic populist claims is that, when there is a general will, and public
deliberation is guided by principles that define that will, the decisions of majorities about
which policies to pursue can provide good evidence about which policies are in fact
best.”226 Putting it a different way, List and Goodin argue that the aim of epistemic
democracy has previously been defined in relation to that of procedural democracy: “for
procedural democrats, democracy is not about tracking any ‘independent truth of the
matter’; instead the goodness or rightness of an outcome is wholly constituted by the fact
of its having emerged in some procedurally correct manner.”227 It is therefore the
“application of the appropriate procedure which is itself constitutive of what the best or

Cohen (1986): 34. The title of Cohen’s article is “An Epistemic Conception of Democracy,” but
the characteristics that I am describing here fall under his sub-category of “Epistemic
Populism.”
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List and Goodin (2001): 279, 282 on which they note some of the practical tenets of
democratic proceduralism: “Democratic proceduralists of the broader variety have insisted,
among other things, that elections should be ‘free and fair,’ with voting proceeding without
intimidation or corruption, and all valid ballots being counted; that the franchise should be
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transparent…that social decisions should be preceeded by certain processes of reasoned
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right outcome.”228 Scholars like David Estlund have advocated for a blending of the two
views, arguing, “democratic laws claim legitimate authority in virtue of being the product
of procedures that tend to make correct decisions.”229
Some of the earlier scholarship on this subject focused heavily on the “jury
theorem” of the Marquis de Condorcet (first set down in 1785), which argued that when
voters face two options, and vote independently of each other, and vote their judgment of
what the right solution to the problem is, rather than their interests, and if they on average
have a greater than fifty percent chance of being right, as the number of jurors increases to
infinity, the probability that the majority vote will yield the right number approaches onehundred percent. The initial version of such a theory’s premise was applied to jury trials in
criminal cases, with a binary decision of guilty or not guilty, given a presumption that the
jurors were legitimately attempting to discover the truth of the situation.230 Scholars have
seen this as a powerful tool, and seek to expand the feasibility of his rule to allow it to apply
to more than binary a-b decisions, such as ranking candidates amongst a variety of choices,
or even to plurality voting procedures.231 However, there are certainly limits to this
theorem. Even though some scholars have argued that the theorem can hold in plurality
voting situations even when some individual decision makers are likely to be right less than
fifty percent of the time—and is therefore perhaps a more realistic model of the average
voter’s competences232—the theorem could hold strongly for the inverse; if individuals are
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less likely rather than more likely to make the wrong decision, adding more individuals to
the process will increase the probability of choosing wrongly to a strong degree.233
Elizabeth Anderson highlights the limitation of relying on such simple models of
mass decision-making in arguing for the epistemic competence of democracy. Her
criticisms of solely using the Condorcet theorem also set out broader principles for
institutional arrangements designed to promote the aggregation and responsiveness to
diverse knowledge sources necessary for a successful and epistemic democracy. Condorcet
relied on and assumed an epistemically homogenous citizen body (citizens all shared
similar knowledge) that is not the case in democratic deliberation in both ancient and
modern contexts. In fact, many arguments made for the knowledge-aggregating powers of
democratic governance specifically highlight the diversity of knowledge in a community as
a crucial benefit and necessity.234 Additionally, such a theory supposes that voters vote
independently of one another, which excludes the ability to pool information. “Without
access to public fora for sharing information and opinions beyond their immediate
knowledge, voters are uninformed and often helpless.”235
Anderson, in setting out criteria for epistemic democracy, sees a useful analogy in
the works of Friedrich Hayek, who argued that the problems of efficiently allocating
Gaus (1997): 150: “Populists should be cautious about appealing to the jury theorem, as it is
not clear that it endorses widely responsive procedures: the probability of a correct answer
plunges just as dramatically downward if the average voter is more likely to be wrong than
right.”
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Anderson (2006): 11: “Most of the problems democracies have to solve are complex, and have
asymmetrically distributed effects on individuals according to their geographic location, social
class, occupation, education, gender, age, race, and so forth. Since individuals are most familiar
233

with the effects of problems and policies on themselves and those close to them, information
about these effects is also asymmetrically distributed.”
235
Anderson (2006): 11.

97

economic resources could not be solved by state planning, “because these facts are never
so given to a single mind,” and therefore “it is necessary that in the solution of the problem
knowledge should be used that is dispersed among many people.”236 For Hayek, this
translated to a preference for markets and price valuation as a method of economic
resource allocation. Anderson argues that in terms of the spread of non-economic and
other useful information there exists other ways that socially dispersed information can be
transmitted through a society: “votes and talk—democratic institutions.”237 Such a
description of the collective and dispersed intelligence existing in society fits with
Landemore’s characterization of collective intelligence and distributed intelligence.
Collective intelligence is the idea that the intelligence of the group is more than simply the
sum of the individual intelligence of its members.238 It implies that there is a value added
when the distributed intelligence of a given population or group is brought together by the
“votes and talk” institutions that Anderson identifies with democracy. Distributed
intelligence is a crucial concept to think about, especially when later considering the
Athenian situation, because it implies that knowledge “cannot be simply traced to
individual minds but rather to the interaction between those minds and between them and
their environment.”239 The collective intelligence of a society too is distributed, “it is not
located in one central entity, but stretched over many individuals and the cognitive
artifacts that are part of their environment.”240
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John Dewey, as cited by Anderson, favored an account of democratic government
similar to that proposed by Anderson and Landemore, calling it “the use of social
intelligence to solve problems of practical interest,”241 run first through the thought
process of deliberation, then enactment, and then a responsive evaluation of the results. In
her telling, “Dewey took democratic decision-making to be the joint exercise of practical
intelligence by citizens at large, in interaction with their representatives and other state
officials. It is cooperative social experimentation.”242 Dewey saw that universal inclusion in
a democratic system ensured first that the problems being addressed were genuinely in the
public interest (if majorities of the population seek to act on them) as well as a crucial
means of “pooling asymmetrically distributed information for decision-making.”243
Anderson, writing in a modern democratic context, notes that for information to be
aggregated and spread across a citizen body, individuals “need access to channels of
communication with one another and government decision-makers,” as well as need to
“follow norms that welcome or at least tolerate diversity and dissent.” For democracies to
make use of these epistemic benefits, they must not only have legal and institutional
structures, but also the cultural characteristics of “a way of life governed by cultural norms
of equality, discussion, and tolerance of diversity.”244
It is not within the scope of my own project to fully evaluate the broad claims of
these various epistemic conceptions of democracy. Many rely on statistical and probability
driven-models or studies carried out in the modern day. My own contribution to the
241

Anderson (2006): 13.

Anderson (2006): 13.
Anderson (2006): 14.
244
Anderson (2006): 15.
242
243

99

subject will be limited to a subsection of the relationship between social interactions,
political participation, and the spread of knowledge in Athens. However, modern scholars
in the fields of classics and political science have sought to integrate modern thinking
about epistemic democracy, institutions, and the spread of knowledge in order to better
explain the functioning of Ancient Athens as a whole. Ober took on this task in his
Democracy and Knowledge, which argued that Athens had a particularly “modern” approach
to aggregating, aligning, and codifying knowledge that allowed for “Athenian
exceptionalism,” and Athens’ “ability to outperform its rivals.”245 By using the limited
statistical data remaining to modern scholars about ancient Greece, Ober argues that
Athens was a success story in the ancient world—a polis that was bigger, wealthier, and had
more institutional and cultural longevity than many of its neighbors246—not only because
of its democratic institutions and culture, but because those institutions specifically sought
to employ “knowledge in action,” by which Ober means “making information available for
socially productive purposes through individual choices made in the context of
institutional processes, and involving both innovation and learning.”247
Ober further narrows his subject of knowledge in action into a definition of
“politically relevant knowledge” consisting of “people’s beliefs, capabilities, experience,
and information, organized in ways that can be reproduced and shared within and among
collectivities.” Such information “conjoins social/interpersonal and technical/expert forms
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of knowledge that are possessed by the organization as a whole (in the form of
institutionalized processes and formal codes) and by individuals (both explicitly and
latently).248 Social knowledge consists of knowledge of individuals, societal norms,
institutions, and their characteristic practices—in a democratic community, it is necessary
for participation in government and civic life, and is more or less broadly present in the
political body. It includes knowledge of what individuals to trust, how one ought behave in
public, and how to access political institutions.249 Technical knowledge accords more with the
technai that so caught the interest of Plato’s Socrates. It is “specialized knowledge about
how to use tools and processes to gain desired ends in a given domain of endeavor.” In
contrast to social knowledge, there is likely to be only a limited number of true experts.250
Ober’s endorsement of such a view is not to agree with Plato that one cannot do more than
one thing well—it is simply acknowledging that in a society there will be fewer people who
are the best at their skill, and a great many more who are somewhere between expert and
mediocre. The job of decision-making institutions in a context where information and
expertise are dispersed is therefore to bring the two types of knowledge together, allowing
a body of individuals of various levels of expertise to jointly possess a range of knowledge
beyond what could be found in a limited group of experts.251
Ober largely turns to formal Athenian political and institutional design to explain
how Athens aggregated what Landemore had called the “collective distributed intelligence
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of the people.”252 He focuses on the collegial magisterial boards, the assembly, and
particularly the design of the Council of Five-Hundred, the agenda setting body for the
Athenian assembly.253 However, in focusing on the macro-level structure of political
institutions, I believe that Ober leaves some space in his interpretive theory for me to add
to the nature of micro-level behaviors relating to the spread of knowledge and information
in Athens. In one sense, Ober’s focus on deliberative and participatory institutions meets
Anderson’s criteria for the two means non-market information may be spread in a
democratic society: “votes and talk.” Strictly speaking, Athens’ institutions, particularly the
Council of Five Hundred and the assembly, combined both institutionally. The council
brought together a yearly cross-section of five hundred members of Athenian society. On
the one hand it brought together a diverse group of citizens with respect to geography.254
At the same time this distribution was likely socioeconomically, and presumably
epistemically, diverse. It was a group that would spend a yearlong role together that
involved intensive debate, communal administration, and occasionally even living full-time

Landemore (2008): 16.
For a thorough description of how the council—despite having a new set of members every
year—was able to pool information from geographically diverse areas of Attica, institutionally
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learn and develop, as well as build ties between citizens from different regions, see Ober (2012).
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Rhodes (1972): 4: The councilors were apportioned amongst the 139 demes of spread through
Attica as a proportion of their size. Attica itself was a territory of over 2,500 km2 according to
Morris (2009): 109. According to my measurements from Trail (1975): Maps 1-3, 43 of the demes
were within a 10km radius of the city, while the rest were farther, with the farthest ones being
Rhamnous to the northwest (37km), Sunion to the southeast (40km), Oinoe to the East (33km).
Migration to the city during the Peloponnesian war attested by Thucydides (Thuc. 2.14-16)
might have changed that, but recent scholars like Rosivach (1993): 397-398 and Taylor (2011):
134 have challenged that fact, arguing that there was fluidity between city and country
migration in the fifth and fourth centuries.
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in the same space.255 The council was an institutional way for citizens to “talk,” as much as
public debates of the assembly offered citizens the chance to “vote.”
If an epistemic democracy is one that thrives off of the collection, aggregation, and
interest in useful information, while also requiring and incentivizing the participation of
many citizens within different deliberative and participatory institutions to make that kind
of information useful to the city, it seems that Athens, both on a polis-wide macro level, as
well as on an individual level, is eerily similar to the two broad types of the πολυπράγμων.
The first is the individual who is busy, restless, and inquisitive, seeking information for
public or private gain. Yet, πολυπραγμοσύνη also seems to entail a doing of many things
such as participating in multifarious deliberative bodies, and filling various social roles.
Being active as a deliberator and a trader in the marketplace, a craftsperson and a gossip—
these are a few of the ways that πολυπραγμοσύνη can represent a social or even hypersocial approach to Athenian public life. Even if such a figure was not always praised in
Athenian literature, in evaluating Athens from the more removed standpoint of epistemic
democratic theory, several of the more positive characteristics that the πολυπράγμων
embodies seem to fit into the criteria that Ober sets out for ideal participants in epistemic
decision making.
It is by expanding Anderson’s definition of “talk,” from her formulation of “votes
and talk” that I hope to demonstrate the role and benefit of a positive πολυπράγμων in the
epistemic marketplace of the social milieu of Athens. The individual who does many things,
who frequents (and is notorious for always frequenting) public places, and has an interest
Hansen (1999): 254 notes that when one’s tribe was in their prytany, or administration of the
council, one third of the tribe had to stay in the Tholos, the administrative building all day.
255

103

in the lives, experiences, and information of others, for whatever motivations, can serve an
important role when one considers the ways information may be spread through social
connections, networks, and “weak ties.” In this way, πολυπραγμοσύνη on the part of
individual citizens (on the micro-level) serves as a crucial and necessary function before
Ober’s and after institutional processes of knowledge aggregation. As was mentioned above,
part of the problem experienced by a society like Athens, or any society that wishes to
allow broad groups of non-experts to make decisions in non-hierarchical ways, is that
necessary knowledge for forming, enacting, and evaluating government policy is incredibly
varied.256 Michael Fuerstein, writing on this subject, doubts that there exists a Platonicstyle higher-order knowledge or “wisdom” that could simply allow one to pool all of these
epistemic categories to make good policy decisions, and instead argues that it is more likely
for communities to employ a “division of cognitive labor.”257 Much like Ober argues that
the highest levels of expertise may exist in society, but are dispersed, he argues that
politically “relevant bits and clusters of knowledge are abundantly, though by no means
completely, available in principle” throughout society.258 In a similar vein, even in a
theoretically idealized participatory democratic scenario, it is not always the experts on a
given subject who will be attending a given meeting where their expertise might be useful.
In the Athenian council, assembly, magisterial boards, or courts, subjects under discussion

Fuerstein (2008): 76-77 notes that such knowledge includes that of (a) administrating
government and procedurally passing legislation, (b) general knowledge of the various
sciences, theories, and practices behind governance (everything from economics to
epidemiology), (c) knowledge of how a particular policy will affect the lives of citizens, and (d)
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might involve technical knowledge—such as shipbuilding for naval operations, building
expenses or labor rates for individual artisans such as stonecutters and sculptors—as well
as social knowledge, and knowledge about individuals—such as the citizenship status of an
individual, or whether they were a slave or a metic—may not have always been immediately
available to those on the governing body at the time.
More importantly, even information that we take for granted as being centralized
and accessible in our day at various institutional levels of government or in the business
world—such as citizenship listings, taxation brackets and information, or even trade and
business listings—were not easily accessible, or in some cases, nonexistent. Athens, as was
noted previously, was not a face-to-face society as some modern commentators have
pictured it, and ancient sources such as Thucydides and Isocrates make reference to that
fact.259 However, certain institutional information was not centralized either, such as a list
of who was and was not a citizen in Athens. Such information was physically dispersed
amongst the demes of Attica, most of which were well away from the city center, inscribed
in a deme register.260 Institutionally, to be a citizen of Athens, and to participate in the
institutions located in the city center, one had to be first inscribed as a member of a

Cohen (2004): 105-106: “A society characterized by murky and complex multidimensional
social affiliations and arrangements that were continually being modified by internal
demographic mobility and by extensive immigration and emigration, Athens was not a ‘face-toface’ community—not on a polis wide scale, and not within its demes…” Thuc. 8.66 notes that
the oligarchic revolution of the Four Hundred was made possible because the size of the city
and the prominence of the conspirators seemed to exaggerate the power of the oligarchic
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deme.261 Such information was therefore not centrally located, and more often than not
was procured through social means. While Whitehead notes that the “demesman as witness”
was a common trope in Athenian court oratory, what is less known or explored are the
mechanisms by which a defendant or prosecutor acquired their information on their legal
adversaries.262 Particularly through proceedings in court cases that involved prosecutions
over false citizenship, a prosecutor would most likely have to come in contact with, and
inquire for information from, smaller and diverse communities within Athens (namely,
demesmen of another tribe) that they were not familiar with or only know peripherally.
Such activity might be the only possible way with which to bring a case, be it legitimate or
not; yet, following the literary depictions set out by the first two chapters, such activity
could also result in being branded as a πολυπράγμων.
One way to theoretically consider the spread of information by individuals between
discrete locations and clusters of knowledge in any given large (particularly non-face-toface) community is through the mechanism of “weak ties,” identified by the sociologist
Mark Granovetter. Granovetter argued that in contrast to what might be commonly
assumed, weak interpersonal social ties might actually be more effective for spreading
useful information to a broader community of individuals or inquirers than strong ones.
Defining the strength of a tie is largely intuitive—it is a “combination of the amount of
time, the emotional intensity, the intimacy (mutual confiding), and the reciprocal services
which characterize the tie.”263 Stronger ties imply more, frequent, and regular contact
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between individuals, while weak ties imply less contact and regularity. Most individuals are
situated at the center of a network of strong social ties such as family members, friends,
and daily coworkers. Additionally, there is a mathematically high chance that your own
strong ties will have strong, or at least weak ties to each other.264 Such ties are crucial to
anyone. Considering them instrumentally, they provide greater support and are often
more easily available.265 However, when considering such ties in the context of the spread
of ideas, innovations, and information, a network that is dominated by strong ties will be
seemingly paradoxically worse at providing those within it with new information.
Granovetter uses the example of the spread of a rumor in a high-density strong tie
network. If all of the individuals tell the rumor to their strong ties, it is more likely that
they will be telling the rumors multiple times to the same people, and because one’s own
strong ties are likely to have ties to each other, the rumor is less likely to leave the clique.266
On the other hand, weak ties, infrequent connections, acquaintances, and other less
immediate social contacts are more useful for sharing dispersed information because of
their function as “bridges” between different social groups and discrete strong-tie clusters
in a society. In Granovetter’s description, a bridge is the tie “in a network which provides
the only path between two points.”267 When thinking about the dispersal of knowledge and

Granovetter (1973): 1362 uses the example: “If A-B and A-C ties exist, then the amount of
time C spends with B depends (in part) on the amount A spends with B and C, respectively. (If
the events "A is with B" and "A is with C" were independent, then the event "C is with A and B"
would have probability equal to the product of their probabilities. For example, if A and B are
together 60% of the time, and A and C 40%, then C, A, and B would be together 24% of the time.
Such independence would be less likely after than before B and C became acquainted.)”
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information in a large network, the bridge is the most logical and efficient way for
information to spread between two discrete groups. Bridges are less likely to exist in
groups dominated by strong ties, because, as was said before, the weak ties are still more
likely to be between individuals generally in the same social sphere, rather than with of
groups outside of it. Therefore, not all weak ties are bridges, but all bridges are weak ties.268
In some cases, the bridging tie is not the only theoretical way that information may travel
between social groups. However, it is often the most likely.

Weak ties are important in terms of thinking about knowledge and the travel of
knowledge because if a weak tie is a bridge, and it is the only way that social group A has
any connection to social group B, it means that two distinct (and possibly epistemically
diverse) groups who would have no connection to each other otherwise now have a means
of sharing information with each other specifically through the individuals at both ends of
the bridge.269 According to Granovetter, “individuals with few weak ties will be deprived of
information from distant parts of the social system and will be confined to the provincial
Granovetter (1973): 1364. Granovetter notes that the possibility of a strong tie being the only
connection between two individuals is likely only in a small community. The probability is low
that B and C do not have (or do not develop) a connection independent (weak or strong) of A if
268
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Although I am thinking about this in the context of the dissemination of knowledge, norms,
and ideas, such social clusters could differ from each other in a variety of characteristics.
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news and views of their close friends.”270 One of the most cited and empirically tested
aspects of Granovetter’s thought is his claim that people are more likely to discover and
receive information about job prospects through weak ties rather than strong ties.271 Such
ties therefore are not only passive conductors of cultural symbols and ideas, and general
news, but also information that can be useful in an immediate and instrumental way.272 The
more weak “bridging” ties that an individual has, the more likely it is that they will have
access to new innovations, norms, and information coming from the different groups.
Weak ties offer a social mechanism through which one might be able to satisfy Ober’s and
Fuerstein’s desires to see differentiated and dispersed clusters of technical, expert, and
social knowledge interact across a society.
The question might be asked as to why individuals should seek out these kinds of
weak ties and the new kinds of information embodied in them, just as an Athenian citizen
might ask the question Socrates asks of himself at the trial, “Why do you meddle?”
(πολυπραγμονεῖς)273 These kinds of bridging ties can be useful for gathering and receiving
information in an instrumental way—particular to solving certain specific problems, but
from another modern perspective, they also allow individuals to benefit from the
perspective of accumulating social capital. In the words of Roland Burt, social capital refers
to the “features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can
improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated action.” However, social
Granovetter (1983): 202.
Granovetter (1983): 205.
272
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capital can also be framed as the benefit one may have from occupying a certain space in a
network or social structure.274 As Burt notes, “Certain people or certain groups are
connected to certain others, trusting certain others, obligated to support certain others,
dependent on exchange with certain others. Holding a certain position in the structure of
these exchanges can be an asset in its own right.”275 Building off of Granovetter, he argues
that weak bridging ties represent “structural holes” between differing groups in society,
which creates a competitive advantage for the individual who is on one side of the hole. By
being the sole receptor of information via the weak tie, this individual has “an advantage
with respect to information access,” and is therefore incentivized to make a broad diversity
of contacts, in order to “have a hand in, and exercise control over more rewarding
opportunities.”276 Cultivating and taking advantage of such ties is not something everyone
does, or is even in the position to do. However, Burt characterizes such individuals who do
make use of this kind of information and social position in a network as having an
entrepreneurial character—his research and empirical studies link those who take
advantage of such holes as being more creative and innovative. He, like Granovetter, seeks
to empirically link increased performance and innovative potential with networks that
span weak ties, as compared to strong tie networks. 277
The question to be raised is how such weak tie networks come into being. One way
that Ober connects the development of weak ties and this kind of social entrepreneurial
spirit in Athens is to consider it in an institutional sense. He sees the Council of Five
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Hundred (especially in its inception in 508/507 B.C., when Athens was socially reorganized
by Cleisthenes, and few people knew each other from other demes) as a source of initiation
of such weak ties—individuals were brought from all over Attica into close contact with
each other for extended periods of time.278 There they developed contacts, exchanged
information, and, hypothetically, created weak bridging ties between the strong-tie
networks of the demes in the form of the councilors who attended in a given year.279
However, another specifically non-institutional example favored by modern social
scientists is the example of participation in civic and private associations that allow
individuals to develop weak ties. Robert Putnam, who largely focuses on the role of civic
life and social capital in the modern United States, argues that associating in groups in civil
society is a way to both build weak ties and strong ties.
Putnam’s conception of social capital and its benefits are broad. In fact, his work
has been criticized for being a “catch-all” concept of community life.280 It is associated not
only with advantages gained to individuals through networks, but also greater social
cohesion, the promotion of common norms, and individual trust, simultaneously a public
and private good.281 Putnam, writing in the tradition of previous thinkers such as Alexis de
Tocqueville about modern liberal representative democracy—rather than participatory
Ath. Pol. 21.3-4 saw the Cleisthenic reorganization of demes into tribes that included equally
the three geographic areas of the coast, the plains, and the uplands as being specifically for
mixing the population up together. The author of Ath. Pol.’s narrative sees such a division as
breaking the geographic divisions embodied by the factional strife represented by Megacles,
Lycurgus, and the tyrant Peisistratus; Kierstead (2013): 121-122 seeks to make the current
academic orthodoxy more nuanced—he believes that Cleisthenes did not seek to disrupt or
replace old ties between demes and tribes, but simply supplemented them with more ties.
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direct democracy in the ancient style—sees the presence and prominence of such
associations as being crucial to the health of a democratic system.282 Such associations
discussed by de Tocqueville and Putnam are voluntary, are secondary associations
(meaning not family and friends), and are characterized by horizontal relations.283 That is,
they are largely non-hierarchical and egalitarian, and in that way, reflective of the
democratic society around them.284
In the Classics, James Kierstead and Nicholas Jones have recently done work on the
associations of classical Athens, and both writers focus largely on the “internally ordered
segments of public organization” as represented by the demes, phratries, and phyles.285
Such organizations had institutional functions in Athens and cannot be considered purely
voluntary in the modern sense. Membership in one of the demes was both inherited from
birth (with some exceptions) and had a number of institutional functions attached to it. To
be selected by lot for many citywide offices, candidates had to present themselves to be
picked by lot at their phratry (or tribal) assembly, having been screened by their fellow
demesmen first.286 Ober had identified the demes as sources of strong ties amongst the city,

de Tocqueville (2002): 489-500 for some of Tocqueville’s thought on the importance of
associations to American society, as well as democratic societies in general.
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and saw the tribal contingents in the council of Five Hundred as a generator of weak ties
from the perspective of individual non-institutional behavior.287 These are part of the
institutional framework of Athen’s public organization, and not a response to or crafted by
individual behavior. For most citizens, being a member of a deme, phratry, or phyle was
not a choice, it was a reality of being a citizen—in fact, because most of these bodies were
closed to the citizenry, it can be argued that they lack a major source of weak ties—
interaction with metics and slaves (freed and unfreed), who formed a sizeable part of the
population of Athens.288
Instead, I turn to some of the types of associations that Jones classifies as similar to
voluntary organizations of the present day (meaning one did not have to be a citizen to
join, and they were not included in the public structure of Athens’ internal organization).289
Voluntary organizations such as dining-clubs, religious associations, sailor’s associations,
brotherhoods and priesthoods, and business partnerships, all existed in Athens to some
degree, although our evidence for them is limited, by all accounts.290 Religious
organizations are particularly seen as developing ties between diverse members of a
community—Clare Taylor notes in a study of certain fourth-century religious Attic
inscriptional dedications that men, women, and slaves all contributed to and could be

Ober (2008): 127.
Akrigg (2015): 157-158 notes that a total number of metics in Athens is elusive, but that it was
a sizeable population. Many metics were “economic migrants,” but there were undoubtedly a
large number of free slaves who stayed in the city and achieved metic status after achieving
freedom. Akrigg uses this to argue that it is hard to speak of one distinct metic community or
experience.
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named together on group dedications.291 Some associations were obviously not crosscutting or bridging, and represent strong ties, such as the hetairia, usually translated as
association, company, or group, which often refers to “private societies of upper-class
males devoted to purely social activity amongst themselves.”292 Kierstead particularly
points to the philosophical schools as being an example of an open, relatively cross-cutting
associational structure that might have found replication in other aspects of Athenian life.
According to Kierstead, the “location and origins of the philosophical schools fed into their
character in the fourth century as open, dynamic institutions with permeable boundaries
with the rest of the Athenian polis.”293 As I had previously mentioned, much of the earliest
discourse between intellectuals in Athens (such as Socrates) happened in the public areas
of the agora. However, even after his death, some of the schools, such as the eponymous
Stoics and the Cynics also frequented public stoai and buildings in the agora, Athens’ most
frequented and highly visible location.294 The gymnasia to which the later philosophical
schools moved to (Antisthenes taught in the Kynosarges, Plato in the Academy, Aristotle in
the Lyceum) were indeed farther out from the city center as to not automatically include
the passerby in a given debate, yet, the gymnasia were indeed public spaces, and
philosophic attendants are at least anecdotally known to have been more diverse than

Taylor (2015): 43: “Onomastic analysis suggests that the people commemorated here
included citizens and non-citizens, men and women, and perhaps slave and free. However,
citizenship status is never explicitly stated on these dedications, which implies that
distinguishing between these groups was unimportant in this context.”
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solely the sons of aristocratic men who typically exercised there.295 Plato himself taught for
free—the only expense of attending for a lower-class citizen was remuneration for his (or
her) lost wages for attendance. Metics were obviously allowed—the founder of the Lyceum
school, Aristotle himself, was a metic.296
There is evidence then, albeit slim, that associations which were voluntary and not
associated with citizenship had the ability to have members of groups from many different
areas of society. The philosophical schools offer a particular nexus of individuals who
associate and spend time together, but are not particularly bound or divided from each
other by ties of class, wealth or citizen status. Other associations for which we have little to
no surviving evidence (possibly due to the fact that many of them would have belonged to
lower-class individuals, for whom our surviving literary or physical evidence is truly
scarce) such as the worker’s organizations, business partnerships, and sailor’s associations
mentioned in Aristotle and other banausic trade guilds and associations could have been a
source of at least weak ties between individuals who are neither of the same citizenship
status, nor of the same deme or phratry.297 Trade organizations probably would not have
crosscut divides of a socioeconomic nature, although they certainly might have cut across
the metic-citizen divide. As Taylor noted, religious and cultic organizations seem to
demonstrate a greater probability of being a location where a dedicated social

Jones (1999): 233; Kierstead (2013): 215.
Diog. Laert. 4.1 notes that Speusippus, Plato’s first successor as head of the Academy, was
criticized for introducing a fee to attend, which Plato was said to have not endorsed. Diog.
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entrepreneur of the type that Burt envisioned could have gathered and employed useful
information and contacts. Due to the paucity of evidence, it is hard to make a firm
argument on the subject, but these types of associations (in theory) offered individuals the
possibility to accumulate ties, and therefore, knowledge, from different parts of the social
spectrum.
As I have argued, I believe that associations could have served as one of the loci for
developing bridging paths for information and ideas, and weak ties in society. However, the
modern focus on individual association also seems to come out of concerns within societies
that are larger and greater distance (physical and institutional) between the individual,
their neighbors, and their government. Tocqueville, who inspires much of modern theory
on democracy and associations, had a fear that individuals in modern representative
democracies—who did not have the ability to wield power or govern themselves—would
become atomized and isolated from their fellow citizens, and eaten up in their own
concerns.298 If my review of the subject of πολυπραγμοσύνη has shown anything, those who
wrote about and criticized democracy in Athens—the thinkers who have influenced the
way individuals like Tocqueville and more modern political theorists consider our brand of
liberal and representative democracy—believed that democratic government (not just
voting, but office holding, as well) was too participatory, too frequent, and too ingrained in
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popular culture.299 Additionally, the fact that πολυπραγμοσύνη seems even to be a word
with purchase in Athenian discourse implies that rather than a fear that citizens were too
fragmented, too atomized, and uninvolved with each other’s lives, it might have been the
opposite, at least in the eyes of conservative theorists like Plato. Strong and prominent
associational life might have been a key part of that.
It is true that Athens was not a face-to-face society, and not a πόλις εὐσύνοπτος as
Aristotle defined it, a city with a population that could be taken in in one view.300 Such a
definition was crucial to my argument as to how information (and authority) was dispersed
and decentralized, making information spread by individuals to be necessary and also
beneficial for the polis, as well as for the individual spreading it. The territory of Attica was
large, and individuals could not have conceivably known each other all socially or by their
faces.301 Yet, given that fact, the facilitation of knowledge and weak ties between the citizen
body would still have been aided by what Ober calls the “interpresence” and
“intervisibility” of individuals and information in specific spaces in the city.302 I already

By “ours,” I mean American democracy, the context in which I am studying and writing this
thesis. My apologies for the provincialism to readers from outside of the United States.
300
Vlassopoulos (2007): 36 for the identification of those two concepts as the same; Arist. Pol.
1327a for the size of the ideal polis as being one where “τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων εὐσύνοπτον ἔφαμεν
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This is certainly true given that Akrigg (2011): 57 notes that some commentators have put
the number of male citizens along at near 60,000 before the war Peloponnesian War, and 2530,000 afterwards.
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Ober (2008): 192: Common knowledge is not just a matter of passively “taking up” a
particular message; it is an active social experience. Personal interpresence and especially
intervisibility among interpresent individuals create a particularly effective environment for
building common knowledge because each participant can personally observe not only that
others know some piece of information in common, but how others respond to that
information.”
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brought this up with a review of the differing types of activities that could be done in the
agora, but it is worth highlighting again. The diverse set of activities that occurred in “free
spaces” like the agora—a fact of life that conservative critics bewailed, and Plato’s poleis
legislated against—add to their nature as social and recreational spaces, as well as political
and economic. Demosthenes—albeit in a rhetorical attempt to portray one of his opponents
as an anti-social outsider—noted the centrality of the agora to all the citizens’ lives when
he stated that out of the approximately twenty-thousand Athenians, every single one of
them frequents the marketplace on public or private business (Dem 25.21). The speaker
seeks to use a rhetorically constructed fiction of the face-to-face character of Athens to
convince his fellow jurors that his opponent, Aristogeiton, does not do any of the things
that Athenians are typically said to do. Aristogeiton, in the speaker’s view, is not only
different from the Athenians because he does not spend time in the agora for official
business, but also for a lack of social interactions that presumably go hand in hand with the
agora. He is critiqued for not taking part in philanthropic or personal associations, but also
for neither calling at any of the barbershops in the city nor the workshops (Dem 25.22).
By recurrently frequenting spaces like the agora, individuals gained a set of casual
contacts—often changing, and often new—which are somewhere between strong ties and
anonymity. As was mentioned at the end of the last chapter as an example of
polypragmatic figures, the πολυπραγμοσύνη of such caricatured characters of
Theophrastus could also offer examples (albeit comedic) of how individuals are able to
generate weak ties simply by the interpresence of individuals in the city center. The
“garrulous man” is one who sits down and speaks to someone he does not know (Thphr.
Char. 3). The rustic figure will ask the first person he sees for information on entering the
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city (Theophr. Char. 4). The chatty individual will seek to spread the news of the assembly
meeting once he has learned of it (Theophr. Char. 7). Both the chat and the gossip are
enabled by the social nature of the agora and other associated spaces, such as workshops
and porches of buildings (Theophr. Char. 8). Large and open public spaces, such as inwardfacing agorai and theaters, were not unique to Athenian architecture, but it could be
argued that they particularly amplified the effects of intervisibility and interpresence in
Athenian political and cultural life.303 Individuals in Athens shared the same palaestra and
gymnasia, and sat together—all visible to one another—at the same theaters. Such
interpresence does not immediately create ties of any kind between individuals—but it
certainly offers entrepreneurial individuals the possibility for such.
One example of the relationship of social interaction, interpresence, information,
and knowledge, is the oft-cited example of the monument of Eponymous Heroes in the
agora, where much official information—such as the agenda of the assembly, notifications
about upcoming trials, new laws to be approved, and extraordinary or emergency
meetings—would be posted in writing on wooden boards in advance of assemblies, trials,
and tribal events.304 There are several ways to think about the relationship of the
Eponymous Heroes—a method of official dissemination of information—to the social flow
of information. One would be to consider it, as does Camp, a “crucial element in the
dissemination of official information and yet another reason why the average citizen who
lived in the city itself would have occasion to visit the agora almost every day.”305 In theory,
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coming to the monument and reading the notices there would require no social interaction
at all. Most of the citizens (who, if we are to believe Demosthenes’ exaggerated take on the
situation) would pass by the agora for some reason or another, and they could check the
monument, and consider themselves informed. Indeed, Athens was particularly known for
its “epigraphic habit” of posting laws, inscribed documents, and official lists on stelai in
public spaces, on buildings, or in frequently habited religious sites. Such information is
fixed, visible, and not particularly social in its means of transmission.306 The jury may
always be out regarding the question of whether all Athenians could read.307 If Athenian
literacy was high, then the relationship of epigraphy and posted information is less
germane to this argument. If, on the other hand, there was a mixture of literate, nonliterate, and semi-literate individuals in Athens, the social nature of knowledge becomes a
factor.
Rosalind Thomas argues that Athenian culture was primarily an oral culture—a
distinction that is different from literate and non-literate cultures—that prioritized the

Hedrick (1999): 389 takes the term “epigraphical habit” from an article by Ramsay
MacMullen; he uses it to simply mean the practice of erecting inscriptions. Various uses for
erecting monumental writing under a democracy include: functional accountability and
publication of the “people’s business” (397), the ideological aspect of promoting and enshrining
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democratic values (425), and purely informational, enabling individuals to have effective
knowledge of politics as well demonstrating what laws to observe (425-6).
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For a limited set of individuals participating in a “literate culture” of recreational reading
and writing, and perhaps a larger group of semi-literates and functional literates see Harris
(1989) and Morgan (1999) who argued that lack of literacy impaired the ability of certain
individuals to participate in Athens’ democratic processes. Incidentally, Harris also argues for a
lower amount of people participating in Athens’ democracy than most others. Missiou (2011)
argues for a high level of literacy in Athens, given the assumptions that many lower class
individuals (thetes) participated, and that many of the functions of Athenian government
required writing of some kind.
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spread of information through speech and pronouncement. 308 In her view, even knowledge
and material that was written (such as the Homeric poems) was often meant to be spoken
aloud by individuals, a conception which perhaps allows for the easy coexistence of those
functionally literate (in terms of literate culture) and those semi- or illiterate participating
in government. In light of that theory, one way to think about the social nature of
knowledge affecting how Athenian citizens gained information—even if they were illiterate
or only semi-literate—is through the basic social fact of simply being present in the same
space as another individual at the same time. Illiterate individuals could have had passerby
or fellow onlookers read out the notices on the monument of Eponymous Heroes to them.
Demosthenes notes that Athenians were commonly to be found running around asking
each other “what’s the news?” (Dem. 4.10).309 He also notes that news announced officially
at places like the council could be spread socially by individuals through the workshops of
the agora even before any herald had announced it or posted it officially.310 To return to
Theophrastus’ portraits, the chat and the gossip seem to be likely candidates. To think of
the spread of information beyond the weakest of these “weak ties,” such as the ones
generated between readers, non-readers, and passersby at a public monument in Athens,
one can consider as evidence the offhand comment of Theophrastus’s account of the rustic
who asks for news from whomever he might meet, as well as telling all of the news of the
Thomas (1989): 15: “In fact the society of classical Athens was still heavily dependent on the
spoken word even in the fourth century B.C.” She further notes “We must extend discussion of
literacy to the ‘mixture’ and interaction of literate and oral processes” (16).
309
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310
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events at the assembly to his workers on his farm. In this case, the comedy of the situation
perhaps comes from the fact that the workers on his farm could have been slaves or metics,
or even poorer citizen workers who had no ability (due to lack of remuneration or a lack of
rights) to go to the assembly in the city. One can certainly see the idea of strong ties as
embodied by the farmer’s connection with the workers (or more broadly, those that live
nearby in his locality), as well as the weak ties present in the contacts that might be made
when in the city and the agora, even if the visits are infrequent at best.311 Even if
infrequent, such visits of rural-to-urban citizens may develop connections, as they are not
irregular but often scheduled. Visits by rural dwellers to the city center might occur on a
regular basis, scheduled with certain market days when individuals could be expected in
the city, or timed with the four-times-a-prytany regular assembly meeting. For example,
Lysias mentions specifically that the Plataeans (both urban and rural dwellers) would meet
together at the fresh-cheese market on the last day of every month (Lys, 23.6). For the
individual who lives outside the city, it is not only the information that is spread via official
means at the assembly meeting itself, or at the Eponymous Heroes, that might have value,
it is the information that a rural demesperson too might gain from socially calling at a
barbershop or a workshop while stopping in the city.
The weak ties and associational contacts developed by the πολυπράγμων by virtue
of their interpresence and intervisibility in the common spaces of the city are not only
useful for accumulating and accessing politically useful knowledge from social sources. They
311
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are also useful in developing purely social knowledge, particularly of people and
characteristic social practices. Although the discussion of weak ties above had focused on
how individuals access knowledge from other individuals, the kind of behavior exhibited by
the πολυπράγμων is also important for permitting the conditions to develop knowledge of
individuals, and particularly, knowledge of whom one should trust and distrust.312 Modern
theorists of social capital and democratic governance seize on the concept of social trust
and trustworthiness—joint knowledge of and respect for communal norms of behavior
between members of a society313—as being crucial to developing the kind of “generalized
reciprocity” and “generalized trust” that helps to “build large scale, complex, and
interdependent social networks and institutions.”314
Some scholars doubt that generalized reciprocity and personal trust existed
between social groups and outside of personal “strong tie” relationships in Athens.
Matthew Christ has in fact argued that if an ethos of Athenian reciprocity (what he calls
“helping behavior”) did exist, it was considered more in the relationship between the
citizen and the state, rather than in a citizen/citizen context.315 It is not my goal to
overturn that argument. Yet, a crucial part of developing any type of trust amongst
members of a society—whether it is thin and generalized to a whole society, or thick and
particular to a given social group—is increased knowledge of whether individuals hold
Ober (2008): 91 claims that social knowledge “includes answers to questions like these: Who
is my friend/foe? Whom should I trust/distrust and under what circumstances?”
313
Fukayama 1995: 26: “Trust is the expectation that arises within a community of regular,
honest, and cooperative behavior, based on commonly shared norms, on the part of other
members of that community.”
312
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themselves to similar norms and standards of social interaction. The more time that an
individual spends with the marginal figures in one’s social networks (those who eventually
become “weak ties”) the more they will have knowledge of whether they are able to trust
those individuals. In Athens, as in the modern day, the implications of such knowledge
could be economic, such as a means of facilitating business relations; Millet notes that the
pseudo-Aristotelian Problems states that “no man makes a deposit with a man he does not
trust” (Arist. Pr. 950a28).316 Yet, in an environment of direct democracy—where citizens
would often debate and craft policy alongside the individuals that they saw in the
marketplace or at the barbershop—establishing whether an individual’s opinion is
trustworthy is a crucial part of deciding whether to be persuaded by their arguments in the
assembly or council-chamber. Knowledge of an individual’s reputation, personality, and
technical experiences could indeed be politically useful as part of judging policymaking in
an environment where all citizens had a hand in governance.
It is by looking at the ways in which the movement and accumulation of knowledge
by individuals occurs on ground level, on the street level, and at the level of the individual
citizen, rather than simply at the institutional level that one begins to finally complete the
fourth category that I had seen as lacking in my chapter—a praise of a kind of positive
polypragmatic democratic behavior in Athens. In this section I have sought to build a
theoretical basis for considering the behaviors of the πολυπράγμων, and in such a way
consider individual (and often, non-elite) citizen behavior from beyond the rhetoric-laden
portrayals of the orators and the caricatures of the comedians. In a situation where
Translation and attribution to the peripatetic school that followed Aristotle comes from
Millett (2002): 99.
316
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information, expertise, and “politically relevant knowledge” is not centralized or easily
accessible by individuals means the behaviors described negatively as πολυπραγμοσύνη
actually become an asset to the citizen, rather than something to be berated (in the
orators) or proscribed (as in Plato).
I particularly connected Plato’s abolishment of πολυπραγμοσύνη—of doing many
things and functions not proper to one’s role—in the Republic and (albeit without using the
term) in the Laws with the active, restless, innovative, and toilsome seekers of information
that come from the negative portraits of the behaviors in popular rhetoric and comedy.
Plato’s broader epistemic critique of Athenian democracy—of how democracy was, in his
mind, a clearly inferior form of government due to a lack of information and expertise on
the part of mass decision-making bodies staffed by part-time citizen-rulers—led me in turn
to investigate ways that modern democratic theorists have sought to explain the virtues
and weaknesses of participatory democracy, particularly in its ability to generate and
marshal information and individual expertise effectively for use by the citizen body as a
whole. The concept raised by some of these scholars—that knowledge is embedded and
dispersed throughout society, and can be organized through not only institutions, but
through social relations as well—seemed to be particularly applicable to the Athenian
situation, and was one that seemed to give great agency as well as benefits to the individual
who acted as did a πολυπράγμων. By introducing Granovetter’s theories of weak ties, and
Burt and Putnam’s concepts of social capital, I have laid out the theoretical foundations for,
first, one of the ways that modern theorists consider that dispersed information can be
spread throughout a society, and, second, how (from both a situational and incentive
perspective) such ties can come into being. Finally, I hope to have more fully explicated the
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ideas that I had teased at when discussing the rigidity of Plato’s spatial and social
construction of the city of Magnesia in the Laws. The ways in which the structure of the
Athenian agora and other public spaces in the city fostered interpresence, intervisibility,
and social interactions also simultaneously fostered the conditions necessary for the
creation of “weak ties” and acquaintance networks that allowed ordinary citizens to gain
access to socially-embedded information through social means, rather than institutional
ones. The Republic had explicitly abolished πολυπραγμοσύνη as an institutional and
political phenomenon by removing from positions of power those who were not capable of
good rule. On the other hand, the rigidity of the Laws rendered moot the processes that
enabled the social aspects of πολυπραγμοσύνη and many other typical Athenian social
interactions, reorganizing citizen life so as to limit the associative freedom between castes
and classes (such as between citizens, banausic tradespeople, and metics) and to severely
diminish the open and freewheeling nature of the “free spaces” of the city. The fact that
Plato takes aim not only at the direct manifestation of popular rule, but also the behaviors
that I have determined to be crucial in spreading information through that populous and
non-elite citizen body, is telling.
Josiah Ober has made a persuasive argument that the structure of Athenian political
institutions such as the Council of Five Hundred and the Assembly were crucial in
aggregating the dispersed knowledge of the Athenian population and bringing it to bear on
complex issues of decision-making. Institutions like the Council and the Assembly not only
gathered information, but they disseminated it to the rest of the population as well.
Common experiences of governing and working closely with others on committees, boards,
and in the Council not only gave the Athenians access to the specific technical knowledge
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of their fellow citizens, but also “social knowledge,” knowledge of individuals, norms,
procedures, and activity of actual governance. In this way, he seeks to combat Plato’s claim
that the Athenians were amateurs and incompetents—in his reading they were frequent
fliers in the art of self-governance. In this chapter, in complement rather than in
contradiction to Ober’s efforts, I have sought to understand how certain knowledge in a
democracy may be spread by purely social means. I assert that the figure of the
πολυπράγμων in Athenian literature was especially representative of such an environment
where knowledge is socially embedded and dispersed. I also hope to have argued that the
social behaviors pilloried by the orators and comedians as πολυπραγμοσύνη were neither
purely anti-social behaviors limited to a small group of the population, but instead, as
Thucydides and Plato presented it, attributes of Athenian social life in general. In studying
the πολυπράγμων in light of some modern social science theories, I hope to have contested,
or at least complicated Plato’s assertion of what is valid political knowledge in a politically
useful context. It is not only that the information, expertise, and talk between members of
the banausoi at Athens does not have any validity in Plato’s epistemic conception of good
governance—he also actively seeks to minimize those kind of informal social institutions of
“talking” altogether in his ideal states.
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Conclusion
I would like to end this paper by focusing on several points made by Aristotle.
Aristotle, like Plato, was a critic of the mix of business, politics, and social engagement that
occurred in the agora.317 Aristotle too rated Athens very poorly in the gradients of
democracy that he laid out in the Politics. Notably, his first form of democracy, the most
moderate and ideal one (Arist. Pol. 1291b30-40), is one where the majority will be composed
of farmers. Aristotle makes the direct political claim that Aristophanes and Euripides only
hint at when they had praised the ἀπραγμοσύνη of the rural farmer in my first chapter: if
they have to work for a living, they will have little leisure and will therefore hold few
assemblies, and the laws, rather than the people, will rule.318 Such a regime lacks the
characteristics of πολυπραγμοσύνη characterized by Plato, while also being very different
from the Athenian regime. On the other hand, Aristotle’s “final democracy” (τελευταία
δημοκρατία), the most degraded and socially unstable form of democratic government,
involved rule by all of the citizens in mass bodies, with magistrates solely executing the
decrees rather than deciding them (Arist. Pol. 1298a28-30).319 Such democracies include the
banausoi, the artisans, laborers and craftsmen amongst their magistrates and assemblymen
(Arist. Pol. 1277b). Numerous authors have commented on the similarities to this final form

Vlassopoulos (2007): 40; Arist. Pol. 1331a-b calls for the establishment of separate agorai for
business, politics, and leisure in the manner of the Thessalians.
317

Arist. Pol. 1292b26-28: “ἔχουσι γὰρ ἐργαζόμενοι ζῆν, οὐ δύνανται δὲ σχολάζειν, ὥστε τὸν
νόμον ἐπιστήσαντες ἐκκλησιάζουσι τὰς ἀναγκαίας ἐκκλησίας.”
319
Ober (1998): 294.
318
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of democracy to democratic Athens.320 In many ways, Aristotle’s critiques are similar to
Plato’s, the Old Oligarch’s, and Thucydides’ critiques of Athens.
As I noted above in a quote seized on by modern and ancient epistemic democracy
theorists, however, Aristotle also famously noted that there were situations where the
numerical superiority of mass bodies could actually enhance their collective wisdom. Many
modern democratic theorists seek to conjoin such a claim to Condorcet’s jury theorem to
make their cases about democratic wisdom. My review of political and social behavior as
occurred in Athens, particularly in respect to how institutions and individuals gathered
and employed information, seems to speak to these dual aspects of human existence. I
would argue that one of the clear ways that the desire to know can be satisfied is through
the interactions of the social community. The stereotypical πολυπράγμων is a character
who seems particularly given over to that human concern with knowing, and it seems that
the institutional and social conditions with regard to politically useful information in
Athens might have presumed (or at least enabled and rendered beneficial) those
individuals who took it upon themselves to act on such yearnings for knowledge within the
communal and social life of the ancient city state.
Aristotle actually differs from Plato in his own assessment of πολυπραγμοσύνη. He
declares in the Nicomachean Ethics—citing Euripides—that it is assumed by many that those
actively involved in politics are busybodies, and therefore the wise are those who stay
quiet, reserved, and seek their own good (Arist. Nic. Eth. 1142a2-7).321 Yet, in Aristotle’s

Hansen (1999): 71; Ober (2008): 294.
Leigh (2013): 24: Aristotle cites Euripides’ lost play Philoctetes, in which Odysseus ponders
between living a quiet life, or to be a restless, aspiring man of action.
320
321
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mind, such a policy is largely untenable when considering individuals as part of a broader
community. He states that it is impossible for an individual to tend to his or her own affairs
without engaging in things of the community and the state; what we would call politics.
Following one’s individual good often comes in tandem with the good and interest of the
political community—to call it πολυπραγμοσύνη and dismiss it as meddlesomeness would
do injustice to the contribution to the community that such behaviors might entail.322
While here it seems that Aristotle is referring to specifically political participation
through institutions, I believe that his line of argumentation can be linked to the nature of
human desire to know, as well as the ability of each individual to contribute to a political
decision-making process. Aristotle had too noted in the Metaphysics when speaking of truth,
that no one person can obtain all of it, but neither can each individual amongst all fail
entirely. While individuals might make a small and limited contribution to the total inquiry
alone, when brought together, their common knowledge might be of great magnitude
(Arist. Metaph. 993a30-b3). Such logic informs the epistemic argument made by modern
democratic theorists, and tied together with Aristotle’s other comments, cements a basis
for the role of the πολυπράγμων in the community. If all those who engage in inquisitive,
searching, restless activity, be it through institutional politics, or through social
interactions in the city of Athens, are labeled as πολυπράγμων, and simply discounted,
something will be lost from the epistemic conversation. This is especially true if one agrees
with the premise that politically relevant information is not solely something gained from
institutional, educational, or hierarchical sources of learning, but can also be embedded in
and accessed through social relationships. Those individuals who satisfy their desires to
322

Leigh (2013): 23.
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know by exploring them through social interactions are better able to contribute to the
common pool of knowledge when enabled to participate in mass decision-making
institutions such as the ones that existed in Athens in the fourth century B.C. By Aristotle’s
criteria, πολυπραγμοσύνη of this type appears to be tapping into some of our deeper
impulses as rational knowers and social animals.
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